VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHOS #0013/01 0110951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110951Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0711
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1166
INFO RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0073
RHFJUSC/HQS US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 000013 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
DHS FOR LUTE, PLCY/OIA (BPIANTEDOSI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS NI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY TO NIGERIA, JANUARY 12-13, 2010 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Dundas C. McCullough for reasons 
 in sections 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 This is an Abuja cable transmitted from Lagos due to a Cable 
Express outage. 
 
¶1. (SBU) The U.S. Mission to Nigeria warmly welcomes the 
visit of Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Jane Holl 
Lute.  The following political and economic backdrop provides 
context for your visit. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RELATIONSHIP STRESSED BY RECENT EVENTS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, elected in 2007 and 
eligible to run for a second term in 2011, has been absent 
from Nigeria since his departure on November 24 to Saudi 
Arabia for medical treatment.  Vice President Goodluck 
Jonathan has been a reticent stand-in.  Jonathan's lack of 
close confidants, division between North and South political 
classes over his ability to become president, and competing 
personalities aligning themselves ahead of 2011 elections 
have left the Government of Nigeria (GON) muddling along for 
the past six weeks. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  During his inaugural address, Yar'Adua announced a 
"Seven Point Agenda" to enhance electricity generation, food 
security, job creation, road construction, land reform, 
education, and stability in the Niger Delta.  He also 
acknowledged and promised to redress flaws in the electoral 
system.  Actual performance, however, has been poor.  The 
report of the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) took 20 months 
to produce, but only a few weeks for a Cabinet committee to 
gut.  Remnants of the ERC's recommendations have languished 
in the National Assembly, however, the Chair told the 
Ambassador in mid-December he expected these to be considered 
early this year.  The upcoming February 6 gubernatorial 
election in the southeastern state of Anambra is likely the 
last opportunity for the ruling People's Democratic Party 
(PDP) and GON to show it can conduct a proper election before 
the national 2011 elections.  In response to a personal 
appeal from President Yar'Adua in late October, the U.S. and 
the U.K. chiefs of mission are jointly hosting a USAID/DFID 
team of technical experts January 11-30 to assess Nigeria's 
ability to hold credible elections in 2011. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  For the past half-century, the inherent strength 
of our bilateral relationship originated largely from the 
positive view most Nigerians held of both the USG and the 
American people.  Nigerians are broadly sensitive to how they 
are seen by Americans, and many crave international approval 
and respect for their perceived primacy as a regional power. 
This support has been greatly affected by the repercussions 
following the Christmas Day incident in which a Nigerian 
citizen failed in an attempted attack on a U.S. jetliner near 
Detroit.  While privately many Nigerians have shown their 
support of our actions to thwart terrorism, the Nigerian 
public has voiced its concern that it should not be viewed as 
a nation of terrorists due to the act of one of its 
citizens--some of whom argue that he became radicalized 
outside Nigeria.  Following a January 6 Federal Executive 
Council meeting chaired by the Vice President, Nigeria's 
Minister of Information echoed the call by some Nigerian 
politicians to sever diplomatic ties with the U.S. due to the 
country's reported inclusion in the TSA's list of countries 
of concern requiring additional screening when flying into 
the U.S. 
 
------------------ 
ON THE BRIGHT SIDE 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  One area of progress is the current lull in militant 
activity in the Niger Delta.  Through a 
combination of force and payoffs, the GON persuaded all major 
militant leaders in early October to renounce violence and 
surrender arms in exchange for amnesty, government subsidies, 
training opportunities, and promises of more money and 
development for the Delta.  The GON has followed up the 
amnesty program with a series of consultations with Delta 
stakeholders, including the ex-militants.  United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) partners sent a letter to Minister 
of Defense and Amnesty Committee Chairperson Retired General 
Godwin Abbe in December offering to engage on the Niger 
Delta, but has yet to receive a reply.  All development 
partners in Abuja (including USAID and the EU) believe that 
 
 
the GON is more interested in funding, without strings 
attached, rather than technical assistance.  Some concerns 
exist that the GON may not start serious rehabilitation 
efforts before ex-militants become more impatient for such 
help.  Throughout November, security was greatly improved in 
most areas of the Delta, but ex-militants are protesting in 
Bayelsa, Rivers, and Delta states more frequently due to 
their frustration about the lack of progress on 
rehabilitation and reintegration by the federal government. 
The President's absence and lack of federal-state 
coordination have exacerbated the levels of frustration. 
 
¶6. (C) On corruption, there have been a few positive moves. 
In August, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor Sanusi 
Lamido Sanusi ordered the audit of all 24 of Nigeria's banks. 
 The two rounds of audits led to a USD 3.9 billion bailout of 
eight troubled banks, replacement of top management at the 
same banks, publication of a "name and shame" list of 
hundreds of bad debtors--including many closely tied to the 
PDP and Yar'Adua personally--and recovery to date of ten 
percent of the bad debt.  In late October, the former 
chairman of the Nigerian Port Authority (and Vice-Chairman of 
President Yar'Adua's 2007 presidential campaign) was 
convicted on various corruption charges and is in jail for up 
to eight years.  Sanusi's actions in particular are seen as a 
small miracle, in part because they seemed to have been done 
with the clear approval and personal support from Yar'Adua. 
These modest steps aside, the enormity of systematic 
corruption in Nigeria--including oil bunkering--remains 
essentially unchanged. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Last year, G/TIP promoted Nigeria's efforts against 
trafficking in persons to Category One thanks to the hard 
work of the Nigerian Agency for the Prevention of Trafficking 
in Persons.  Also, the Nigerian Drug and Law Enforcement 
Agency has decided to accept an embedded retired DEA agent at 
its headquarters to provide technical assistance.  The 
Mission has also made some modest progress in some of the 
long-standing extradition cases of interest to the USG. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On trade and development, the Mission's efforts have 
led to the elimination of import bans and lower tariffs on 
key products, bringing down the cost of doing business and 
reducing incentives for smuggling.  The Mission has helped 
the GON solve regulatory and policy problems to allow 
increased electricity supplies, boost agricultural 
production, and assist in establishing reliable regional and 
international markets, including use of the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  The Mission has also worked 
toward a healthy restructuring of the oil and gas sector, and 
toward improving aviation safety and security.  For the past 
year, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) has provided 
technical assistance to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority 
(NCAA) in preparation for an FAA flight safety audit in 
January.  Should the audit prove successful, the GON hopes to 
achieve FAA Category One flight safety status by the middle 
of this year. 
 
¶9. (C) On the military side, bilateral cooperation is strong 
and growing.  The third African Partnership Station (APS) 
deployment in the last two years is taking place February 
12-18.  Two Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) 
radar sites have been installed (one in Lagos and the other 
in Bonny Island this month) and the Mission is helping stand 
up a counter-terrorism unit in the military.  Nigerian troops 
continue to participate in peacekeeping operations in Darfur 
and Liberia with the help of Africa Contingency Operations 
Training and Assistance (ACOTA), and the GON has made clear 
its continuing interest in working with the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote regional 
security where needed. 
 
---------- 
CHALLENGES 
---------- 
 
¶10. (C) There is a great deal of sensitivity in Nigeria 
regarding outside views on the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). 
 Minister of Petroleum Resources Dr. Rilwanu Lukman cautioned 
international players last year on linking the interest of 
the IOCs to the PIB because of potential domestic political 
backlash, particularly during the run-up to the 2011 national 
elections.  He explained that the PIB is intended to be a 
"100-percent Nigerian piece of legislation."  He refused to 
be involved with the PIB once it was introduced to the 
National Assembly for fear that his name would be linked to 
the PIB in such a way that it would appear to be "his" bill 
 
instead of Nigeria's bill.  He was subsequently pulled back 
into the legislative process when he was instructed by 
President Yar'Adua to address problems that arose during 
public hearings.  Given this sensitivity, USG opinions about 
the PIB should not be shared in any press setting as it would 
be counterproductive to our efforts to get problems in the 
bill changed.  There are also concerns about the Local 
Content Bill (LCB) which increases local content requirements 
for oil and gas services.  There is strong domestic support 
for the LCB.  As with the PIB, expressions of concern about 
the LCB should focus on the potential impact on Nigeria, 
rather than the potential impact on international oil and gas 
service companies. 
 
¶11.  (C)  The twin blows of lower oil prices and more shut-in 
oil production in the Delta beginning in late 2008 decimated 
GON revenues.  Militant surrenders under the amnesty program 
allowed production to rebound from an estimated 1.6 million 
barrels per day in August 2009 to 2.0 million barrels per day 
in December 2009, with the prospect of as much as 2.4 million 
barrels per day by mid-2010.  The GON offset the decline in 
revenue in 2008 and 2009 by drawing down the Excess Crude 
Account to fund the National Integrated Power Project and 
distribute additional funds national, state, and municipal 
governments.  GDP growth is expected to have declined from 
6.4 percent in 2008 to 3.0 percent in 2009, according to the 
latest IMF estimates, which is still respectable in the 
current global economic environment.  Meanwhile, total 
foreign exchange reserves declined from USD 63 billion in 
August 2008 to USD 43 billion at the end 2009, while the 
Excess Crude Account declined from USD 20 billion in January 
2009 to USD 6.5 billion at year's-end.  This decline in both 
foreign exchange reserves and the Excess Crude Account is 
expected 
to stabilize given the steady recovery of both oil prices and 
oil production in 2009. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  In the north, both poverty and poor governance 
have fueled Islamic extremist recruitment of marginalized 
groups, including disaffected youth.  Violent clashes erupted 
in four states in July 2009 after supporters of an Islamic 
extremist group, "Boko Haram," attacked police stations and 
other government facilities provoking police and military 
sweeps in several states thought to harbor Boko Haram members 
and sympathizers.  The group opposes western education models 
but has not targeted western nationals or interests. 
Extremist support remained spotty, and Nigeria's Islamic 
leaders strongly condemned the attacks.  The Nigerian army 
crushed Boko Haram, but clashes between security forces and 
militants reportedly resulted in around 700 deaths, including 
innocent bystanders.  Boko Haram's leader was killed while in 
police custody, and Boko Haram members are either in jail or 
underground.  On August 17, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) issued a "Statement of Consolation, Advice, and 
Condolences to our Brothers and family in Nigeria." 
 
¶13.  (U)  A separate outbreak of violence occurred in Bauchi 
State in December 2009 after local residents 
expressed concern to authorities about aggressive, open-air 
preaching by members of an Islamic sect known as "Maitatsine" 
or "Kala Kato."  Sect members reportedly questioned the July 
crackdown by security forces on Boko Haram members and 
ridiculed others, possibly including members of their own 
sect, calling them "infidels."  Security personnel responded 
to the scene and quelled the violence, but clashes resulted 
in an estimated 40 deaths.  Bauchi State Police Chief Aikur 
Kafur said security officials arrested 20 individuals, 
including 11 juveniles, and claimed that security forces had 
killed the sect's leader, Mallam Badamasi, and recovered 
"bomb-making tools and explosives." 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In December 2009, Nigerian national Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an improvised explosive 
device (IED) on a U.S. commercial carrier arriving at Detroit 
airport from Amsterdam.  Abdulmutallab later admitted to 
obtaining the IED and receiving training in its use from 
al-Qa'ida operatives in Yemen, where he was enrolled as a 
student at the Sanaa Institute of Arabic Studies (SIAS). 
Nigeria's Muslim community roundly condemned Abdulmutallab's 
actions in unconditional and unequivocal terms.  Several 
Muslim organizations issued public statements condemning 
violence as un-Islamic, emphasizing Islam as a religion of 
peace, and voicing concern that this incident will be 
injurious to the Nigerian national interest. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
 
---------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  While our bilateral conversation has recently 
become clouded by the Christmas Day incident in Detroit, we 
continue to promote with the Government of Nigeria an agenda 
that addresses key USG priorities, namely: Electoral Reform, 
the Niger Delta and Regional Security, Anti-Corruption, and 
Energy and Investment. 
 
¶16.  (C)  The wild card in Nigerian politics and for our 
bilateral relationship is the possible transition to a 
Jonathan presidency should Yar'Adua's die.  His prolonged 
absence continues to weigh heavily on this country's ability 
to function domestically and interact with the international 
community.  Moreover, a failed election in 2011 would 
seriously damage all USG equities--from democratization 
efforts to polio eradication to Niger Delta stability to 
reduced gas flaring--in all parts of Nigeria.  Meanwhile, we 
should not lose sight of the long-term challenge of working 
with our Nigerian partners in government and civil society to 
promote economic and social development, combat corruption, 
and address a multitude of shared interests, from HIV/AIDS to 
law enforcement. 
BLAIR