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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: ONE WEEK TO ELECTION: YANUKOVYCH CAMP CONFIDENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft.  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Even allies of PM Tymoshenko concede to us that 
Regions Party candidate Viktor Yanukovych is holding on to 
his lead in advance of the February 7 Presidential runoff. 
Tymoshenko must mobilize greater numbers of "Orange" voters 
over the next week or face defeat.  If Yanukovych wins, 
members of the current coalition tell us he could bring down 
the Tymoshenko government, form a new coalition, and install 
a new PM -- without need to resort to pre-term parliamentary 
elections.  Party of Regions campaign advisors tell us that 
the Tymoshenko campaign (if not Tymoshenko herself) knows it 
can not win, and is working to discredit the election. 
Behind the scenes, names are surfacing as candidates for PM 
or Foreign Minister if Yanukovych is victorious.  End 
Summary. 
 
Tymoshenko's Hope: Mobilizing Orange Voters 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Tymoshenko Bloc MP Andriy Shkil told us January 28 
that he believes there is an 80% chance Tymoshenko will lose. 
 To avoid this, she must somehow rally the Orange base, many 
of whom are deeply disillusioned, in the final week.   Her 
efforts between now and election day will be focused on that 
goal.  Highlighting Yanukovych's biography (criminal and 
oligarchic connections) and claiming he will sell out 
Ukraine's sovereignty will be her chief weapons. 
 
¶3. (C) Shkil believes Tymoshenko can accept defeat and will 
not try to block Yanukovych's election via court challenges 
unless his victory is close -- within one percent.   Shkil 
believes Regions operatives will engage in fraud in Donetsk 
and Luhansk but not enough to affect the overall outcome, 
again, unless the election is close. 
 
Yanukovych Victory and Prospects For A New Coalition 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (C) We also spoke on January 28 with Kryilo Kulikov, an MP 
from the pro-coalition group within Our Ukraine-People's Self 
Defense (OU-PSD) faction, which is the Tymoshenko Bloc's main 
coalition partner.  Kulikov put Yanukovych's chances for 
victory at 70%.  He said he had no doubt that Yanukovych 
would be able, if elected President, to break the 
Tymoshenko-led coalition and install a PM of his choosing. 
Party of Regions representatives are working now to build the 
necessary support within the 0U-PSD faction.  Serhiy Tihipko, 
third place finisher in the first round, also recently told 
the Ambassador that formation of such a coalition would be 
"easy to do." 
 
¶5. (C) Kulikov recalled that coalitions are formed on the 
basis of factions.  If a majority of the 72 member OU-PSD 
Rada faction voted to pull out of the coalition, the 
Tymoshenko coalition would fall.  The margin had already been 
close.   Following a Yanukovych victory, inducements from the 
Yanukovych camp could deliver the needed 37 votes inside 
OU-PSD.  Kulikov said that he expected that the fall of the 
Tymoshenko-led coalition would take place within days after 
the final certification of the election.  He himself would 
vote against joining Yanukovych. 
 
¶6. (C) Shkil agreed with Kulikov's appraisal.  For purposes 
of coalition formation, Regions would have its own votes, 
172, plus the 72 from OU-PSD.   (The calculation credits the 
entire faction count.)  This was more than the 226 needed for 
a new coalition.  There would thus be no need to call early 
parliamentary elections in May as Yanukovych had threatened. 
 Shkil and Kulikov noted to us that Regions would not have to 
invite the Communists to join the coalition.  This might be a 
condition of OU-PSD participation.  The bloc of Rada speaker 
Lytvyn would also lose its king-maker status.  Regions might 
well move to replace Lytvyn as speaker with an ally of 
Regions from within OU-PSD to cement the deal. 
 
Role of International Observers 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Taras Chornovil, an MP who has broken with Party of 
Regions, told us January 28 that he too expects a Yanukovych 
victory.  He stressed that international observers would play 
a key role in validating the election.  If, as in the first 
round, international observers rate the elections generally 
free and fair, Tymoshenko will not want to go against them. 
She will be conscious of not ruining her reputation in the 
West.  Chornovil believes that only if Yanukovych's margin is 
two percent or less would Tymoshenko mount a full-scale 
challenge in the courts. 
 
KYIV 00000170  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Chornovil, Shkil and Kulikov agreed that a new 
coalition without early elections was in Regions' interest. 
New elections would bring new factions into the Rada allied 
with candidates Tihipko, Yatsenyuk and  Yushchenko.  Regions 
might lose seats, especially to Tihipko.   In addition, 
elections are expensive.  Regions' financial backers, like 
oligarch Akhmetov, would want to avoid having to fund a 
costly parliamentary race. 
 
Views from Yanukovych Campaign 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador met January 28 with senior advisors to the 
Yanukovych campaign.  They made the following points: 
 
--The ten percent margin between the two is holding, albeit 
at higher levels.  (About 45% Yanukovych vs. 35% Tymoshenko). 
--Turnout is trending lower in the West and is stable or 
higher in the East.  Bad for Tymoshenko. 
--Overall turnout will be about 61% (versus 67% in the first 
round). 
--Tymoshenko is not mobilizing the broader Orange base. 
Attacks from President Yushchenko have hurt her with those 
who look to him. 
--The Tymoshenko campaign, anticipating defeat, is seeking to 
discredit the election and cast doubt on a Yanukovych 
victory. 
--The Tymoshenko campaign planted a false exit poll after the 
first round (with a difference of only 4%) to discredit the 
outcome. 
--Tymoshenko activists are preparing to engage in fraud 
Western Ukraine. 
--Tymoshenko election commissioners may seek to subvert the 
election process by not showing up at some precinct or 
district electoral commissions, thus inhibiting voting or 
tabulation because of a lack of quorum. 
--Regions will seek a clean election.  Yanukovych has given 
orders to that effect.  They believe they will win and don't 
need to resort to falsification. 
--Regions welcomes election observers, except the proposed 
2,000 Georgians who are "thugs" brought in to disrupt and 
intimidate voters in Donetsk. 
--The negative campaign against Yanukovych is not working. 
--Yanukovych will end with a positive message on Friday 
February 5. 
--Regions will hold large rallies outside the Central 
Election Commission February 8 to signal that they want to 
protect the vote (that they believe they will win). 
 
Yanukovych Appointments 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) With Yanukovych remaining in the lead, talk in 
political circles is turning to possible appointments.  Rada 
and analyst contacts thought that Yanukovych might go with 
Mikhailo Azarov, his former Deputy PM and Finance Minister, 
as PM.   Azarov, although well known as pro-Russian, would be 
more neutral among Regions' "clans" than other candidates, 
such as Borys Kolesnykov who is closely linked to the clan 
led by oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. 
 
¶11. (C) Opinion is divided on whether Yanukovych would offer 
Sergey Tihipko the position as PM.  Unlike Tymoshenko, 
Yanukovych has not yet offered him the job.  MP Skhil 
commented to us that Yanukovych bears a grudge against 
Tihipko, who was Yanukovych's campaign chairman in 2004, but 
who abandoned him after the disputed second round. 
Yanukovych considers Tihipko a "traitor."   Other observers 
contend that, with many difficult economic decisions to come, 
Regions could set Tihipko up as a fall guy by appointing him 
PM. 
 
¶12. (C) For Foreign Minister, the name heard most often is 
that of current Ambassador to Russia, Kostyantyn Gryshchenko. 
 Well respected, he has served as Ambassador to Russia and 
the U.S. and as an advisor to Yanukovych.  Gryshchenko met 
the Ambassador January 27 during a visit to consult with MFA 
and the Yanukovych team.  He said he had not been asked to be 
Foreign Minister, but indicated a readiness to take the job 
should he be asked.  The Regions' shadow FM is MP Leonid 
Kozhara, a former Ambassador to Sweden.  Contacts generally 
believe he would be a weak FM and that he lacks the stature 
for the post. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Serhiy Lyovochkin, Yanukovych's Chief of Staff and 
a Regions MP, is the favored candidate to be Head of the 
Presidential Administration. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
KYIV 00000170  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶14. (C) Tymoshenko has a week to turn things around.  Many in 
her camp, as noted, doubt she can do it.  Yanukovych has 
refused to debate, so Tymoshenko will get free, uninterrupted 
air time to make her final appeal.  She has traditionally 
been a strong finisher.  Her resort to the courts seems 
probable if a Yanukovych victory were close and/or the fraud 
allegations egregious and credible.  Yanukovych will continue 
to try and avoid mistakes and ride disenchantment with the 
Orange leadership to victory. 
 
TEFFT