VZCZCXRO8322
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHKV #0128/01 0261524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261524Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9210
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR UP
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DISAPPOINTED CANDIDATE 
HRYTSENKO REFLECTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft. Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Poorly performing Presidential candidate and head of 
the Rada National Security and Defense Committee, Anatoliy 
Hrytsenko, told the Ambassador January 22 that he did not see 
much of a difference between PM Tymoshenko and opposition 
leader Yanukovych, the two candidates for the February 7 
runoff.  Hrytsenko predicted neither would be able to unite 
the country.  Meanwhile, he warned Russian interests will 
move in following the election to buy up strategic assets. 
Hrytsenko believes public disillusionment could lead to early 
presidential elections within 1-2 years.  He was critical of 
U.S. policy toward Ukraine and recommended that the U.S. 
focus on tangible gestures of assistance that could earn 
goodwill, such as paying for disposal of remaining stocks of 
melange rocket fuel.  End Summary. 
 
Ukraine's Prospects 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador met with a disappointed Anatoliy Hrytsenko, 
Chair of the Rada Security and Defense Committee, January 22. 
 Hrytsenko, a former Defense Minister under President 
Yushchenko, amassed only 1.2% of the vote in the first round 
of Presidential elections January 17.  Hrytsenko observed 
that, despite the personality differences between Yanukovych 
and Tymoshenko, the long term consequences of either one 
would be about the same for Ukraine.  He saw two possible 
paths for the country: split in two or consolidate. 
Reminding us that he has "worked with these people," 
Hrytsenko judged that neither candidate was capable of 
achieving consolidation. 
 
¶3. (C) Presidential elections as early as 1-2 years from now 
are not out of the question, he said, once the people become 
disappointed with yet another round of no change and 
worsening economic prospects.  Hrytsenko mused that it might 
be better if Yanukovych won, so that his inevitable failure 
as president could teach Eastern and Southern Ukraine an 
object lesson on the perils of clan-based voting. 
 
Relations with Russia 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Asked where he sees Russian relations going under a 
new president, Hrytsenko said he believes Russia won't 
differentiate between Yanukovych or Tymoshenko; relations 
will be normal and pragmatic on the surface.  However, behind 
the scenes, Russia will buy up strategic assets.  It is 
through the economy, he continued, that Russia will influence 
election outcomes and the information space. 
 
NATO 
---- 
 
¶5. (C) Similarly, Hrytsenko did not foresee a major change in 
Ukraine's formal relations with NATO.  He predicted that 
Ukraine would likely continue to participate in such 
activities as peacekeeping operations.  However, Hrytsenko 
does not believe Ukraine's efforts would be productive on the 
ground.  He cited the example of the rapid reaction/disaster 
response mechanism, which, for want of an enabling phrase in 
the Ukrainian authorizing legislation, is unable to be 
convened. 
 
¶6. (C) Serious military capabilities are a problem for 
Ukraine, he said.  Neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych 
understand why Ukraine needs a modern army or why it should 
maintain skill levels even when the country is not a fighting 
or facing a war.  Hrytsenko expressed doubt that, under 
either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych, the Rada would approve 
multilateral military exercises in 2010. 
 
U.S. Relations 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Hrytsenko observed that there is anti-U.S. feeling in 
Ukraine, but said that it is "artificially planted." 
Nevertheless, he went on to say U.S. policy toward Ukraine is 
unclear, and argued that Ukraine needs real engagement on 
real issues.  For example, the U.S. should pay for and finish 
the disposal of SS-24 fuel in Pavlograd; the U.S. could, with 
a few million dollars, pay for the disposal of the (16,000 
metric tons of) melange rocket fuel stored around the 
country.  This in particular would win the U.S. great public 
favor in Ukraine.  He suggested the U.S. could impact 
corruption in Ukraine by helping isolate/attack the offshore 
assets of oligarchs and criminal figures.  Finally, Hrytsenko 
 
KYIV 00000128  002 OF 002 
 
 
said the U.S. should be working to help the Ukrainian defense 
industry, or it could fail and turn to old partners. 
 
Hrytsenko's Plans 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (C) According to Hrytsenko, early Parliamentary Elections 
could happen, but it would be a matter of financial 
expediency.  It would depend on whether the parties involved 
determine whether it would be cheaper to buy votes in the 
current Rada for a new coalition, or cheaper to run another 
election. 
 
¶9. (C) In the meantime, Hrytsenko plans to announce a new 
party that would participate in all upcoming elections: 
local, parliamentary, and presidential.  The board members of 
his NGO, "Citizenship," include the heads of many 
micro-parties.   He plans to consolidate these under the 
umbrella of the NGO as a political party, and assume the 
leadership. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Hrytsenko appeared disappointed and disillusioned. 
Although his campaign had minimal funding and was low-key, he 
had likely expected more than the 1.2 percent he got on 
January 17.  Tymoshenko's advisors had told us Hrytsenko was 
a contender for Defense Minister if she won, but Hrytsenko's 
refusal to endorse her for the second round -- combined with 
his poor result -- have not helped his chances, assuming he 
even wants the job.  His grumblings about the U.S., despite 
his pro-Euro-Atlantic orientation, were notable.  Hrytsenko 
may be overly pessimistic in his doubts regarding Rada 
approval for multilateral military exercises in 2010. 
Whether his new party will have any more traction than he had 
as a presidential candidate remains to be seen.  His showing 
was well below the three percent needed for a party  to enter 
parliament.  In short, Hrytsenko's attempt to market himself 
as a pragmatic, uncorrupted, national interest-focused 
alternative to the existing leadership essentially failed to 
register. 
TEFFT