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PP RUEHBC RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHKUK RUEHNH RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKL #0059/01 0271038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271038Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3733
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EEB/ESC THAMMANG 
STATE FOR EEB/TFS CBACKEMEYER 
STATE FOR NEA/IR RWADHWANI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ENIV ENRG EPET ETTC IR KNNP MY
SUBJECT: MALAYSIA: SKS VENTURES EXPLAINS ITS IRAN INVESTMENTS 
 
REF: A. 09 STATE 121808 
     ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 0037 
 
Classified By: Econ Counselor Matt Matthews for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: SKS Ventures (SKS) CEO Abang Iskandar Muas 
(Iskandar) met with Econoff January 19 to discuss SKS plans 
to develop the Golshan and Ferdowsi gas fields (G&F) in Iran. 
 Iskandar said that the GOM had initially negotiated the deal 
with the GOI and handed the project to SKS just prior to 
signing.  Iskandar told us that development of the G&F fields 
is going slowly because sanctions impeded National Iranian 
Oil Company (NIOC) ability to perform basic due diligence 
functions.  He also stated that NIOC has been extremely 
difficult to work with and that the initial buyback service 
contract signed in Dec. 2007 is the only commercial agreement 
between SKS and NIOC.  SKS,s only investment over the past 
two years since the announcement was limited to staff time 
from their 15 employees and air tickets for meetings with a 
total value under $1 million, according to Iskandar.  He was 
pessimistic on prospects for the deal and said that SKS is 
considering pulling out altogether.  However, he emphasized 
SKS would need GOM approval prior to exiting the transaction 
because Malaysian Trade Ministry and Foreign Ministry 
officials had encouraged SKS to enter into the deal in the 
first place and had reconfirmed GOM support for trade 
cooperation with Iran at a recent meeting.  Iskandar also 
denied reports of SKS participation with NIOC in a refinery 
projects in Syria and Indonesia and downplayed its deal with 
NIOC which is under review in Malaysia.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Comment:  SKS is small operation controlled by Syed 
Mokhtar al Bukhary, one of Malaysia's wealthiest 
industrialists with a Forbes Magazine estimated net worth of 
$2 billion.  Much of Syed Mokhtar's personal wealth has been 
acquired in dealings with the GOM and GOM-linked 
corporations.  He controls Malaysia Mining Corporation, DRB 
Hicom, Malakoff, and Gas Malaysia among other significant 
Malaysian operations.  Post believes Iskandar is a credible 
interlocutor that provided an important window on the GOM's 
role in the deal and SKS current thinking on the transaction. 
 Iskandar seemed genuinely frustrated that the G&F deal 
turned out to be an empty business proposition due to NIOC 
incompetence and Iran sanctions.  Other oil and gas industry 
contacts have confirmed the small size and scope of the SKS 
operation.    End Comment. 
 
SKS Ventures 
------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Econoff met January 19 with SKS Ventures (SKS) CEO 
Abang Iskandar Muas (Iskandar) to discuss the SKS intentions 
to develop the Golshan and Ferdowsi gas fields (G&F) in Iran 
and implications under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). 
Iskandar mentioned early in our conversation that Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) Senior Director Wong 
had called him January 15 informing him that the embassy had 
been trying to contact him and he needed to meet with us. 
Econoff delivered ref A points and offered additional 
background on our information request.  According to 
Iskandar, SKS has 15 full time employees and works on 
projects outside of Malaysia for Syed Mokhtar.  Iskandar is 
an experienced O&G industry professional, having worked for 
Shell Oil USA (based in Houston) for fifteen years in 
Sarawak, Saudi Arabia (where he was VP for Finance and Human 
Resources), and Kuala Lumpur prior to assuming his current 
position with SKS two and one half years ago.  Iskandar 
fondly reminisced of his frequent travel to the U.S. for 
business and family vacations prior to assuming his position 
at SKS. 
 
Golshan and Ferdowsi ) G2G Agreement 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Iskandar said the G&F deal grew out of 
government-to-government negotiations between Malaysia and 
Iran during 2007.  The GOM brought SKS to the table late in 
the negotiations, according to Iskandar, finalizing a buyback 
service contract between SKS and National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC) in December 2007.  He added that SKS entered into the 
agreement based on the GOM,s policy of expanding trade 
cooperation with Iran and the belief that the business 
climate for oil and gas (O&G) in Iran was improving during 
2005-6.  Iskandar said that the initial business strategy was 
for SKS to plan the project, NIOC to perform physical due 
diligence (appraisals, seismic analysis, feasibility studies, 
etc.), and, once the project was ready to start, sell 
controlling interest, at a profit, to an international oil 
company that could bring resources to develop the fields. 
Iskandar commented, "We have no wells, no drilling rigs, no 
facilities, no experts, and no technology" to implement a 
project the size of G&F.  His explanation as to why the 
Iranians would enter in to a transaction the size of G&F with 
such a small entity was, "in order to be friendly to the 
government(of Malaysia)." 
 
NIOC Difficulties 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Working with NIOC, according to Iskandar had been 
"extremely difficult."  He added, "we should have taken a 
lesson from Petronas" claiming that Petronas will not deal 
with NIOC any longer because NIOC still owed a substantial 
amount of money to Petronas from its buyback service contract 
for South Pars Phases 2 and 3.  Iskandar said that NIOC has 
made no progress on its due diligence obligations at G&F due 
to international contractors refusing to work in Iran because 
of sanctions.  He complained that SKS and NIOC also have not 
reached any commercial agreements on the project in the last 
two years.  Iskandar stated, "We have no idea how we would be 
paid.  NIOC has not agreed to LNG and we have no interest in 
selling gas domestically.  Iran uses most of their gas to 
inject into their oil fields to get more oil or to produce 
heavily subsidized electricity."  He listed numerous other 
problems plaguing the project related to Iran sanctions such 
as the inability to import LNG technology or hire expat 
expertise, a low likelihood that Iranian LNG could be 
consistently sold on the open market, and NIOC's lack of 
access to financing. 
 
SKS Ready to Walk Away 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Iskandar described the SKS agreement with NIOC on G&F 
as "barely hanging on" and that SKS is currently deciding 
whether to stay in or pull out, and added, "The decision will 
come sooner rather than later."  He viewed the buyback 
service contract as having "no commercial value" at this 
time.  He noted though that Syed Mokhtar's close connections 
to the Malaysian government mean SKS will not move on a G&F 
decision without policy direction from the GOM.  "We do not 
want to be on the wrong side of the government and we have 
not heard from PM Najib", according to Iskandar.  However, he 
added that SKS has "no money in the ground" in Iran, because 
the firm did not pay an initial "signing bonus" as the 
buyback service contract did not carry any vested rights to 
the gas.  He also stated that SKS management is aware of the 
change in the international political environment with regard 
to Iran and is "not entrenched," implying SKS would quickly 
drop the transaction if permitted by the GOM. 
 
Another View of the MITI Meeting 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Iskandar offered a different account of the recent 
meeting between MITI and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
officials and officers from the three Malaysian companies 
listed in ref A.  Iskandar said that after the companies 
answered MITI queries on their Iran investments, the 
companies, especially Petronas, pushed back at MITI and MFA 
asking "What is the government's stance on trade cooperation 
with Iran?" and "Should we adjust our investment strategies?" 
 MITI responded that the GOM still supports trade cooperation 
with Iran, according to Iskandar.  (Comment: The MFA account 
of the meeting (ref B) was similar to Iskandar's but omitted 
the companies' questions and MITI's response.  End Comment.) 
 
Other Announcements Inaccurate 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Toward the close of the meeting, Iskandar addressed 
recent Iranian and Malaysian press announcements of SKS 
participation in other transactions with NIOC.  He stated 
that the GOM asked SKS to commission a feasibility study on a 
project with NIOC. It involved a refinery project in Kedah 
with a pipeline across the Malaysian Peninsula to Terengganu. 
 Iskandar commented that the pipeline is economically 
unwarranted and an Iranian partner likely makes the refinery 
unfeasible.  He added that recent announcements of SKS 
participation in a refinery project in Syria with Iranian and 
Venezuelan partners and SKS participation in an Indonesian 
refinery project with Pertamina and NIOC are blatantly false. 
 He said that the first SKS had heard of either project was 
in press reports.  He explained that SKS never issued denials 
of participation in the deals in order to avoid embarrassment 
in case the government was involved. 
KEITH