VZCZCXRO0143
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0025/01 0280850
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280850Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0093
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000025 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28 
TAGS: PGOV MCAP PREL KCRS AORC MARR PHUM PINS CG
SUBJECT: CHOD Outlines Military Reform Plans 
 
REF: 09 KINSHASA 1033 AND PREVIOUS; 09 KINSHASA 976 
 
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 (B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Didier 
Etumba Longila discussed plans to reform the military during a 
January 26 briefing to select UNSC ambassadors and senior MONUC 
officials.  The FARDC plans to organize its national defense into 
three geographical zones headquartered in Kinshasa, Kisangani, and 
Lubumbashi.  Etumba announced a revised combat chain of command 
under the CHOD, not the MoD, as was the case previously.  Etumba 
was remarkably open about the need to reform the FARDC, including 
reducing overall numbers, improving training, and providing better 
opportunities to re-insert demobilized soldiers into civilian jobs. 
Interestingly, Etumba announced the FARDC would deploy a contingent 
of engineers and a company of military police to the small city of 
Dongo, the scene of fighting in Equateur Province over the last 
several months.  End summary. 
 
Kabila's zone defense 
 
¶2.  (C) During a January 26 briefing to select UNSC ambassadors and 
MONUC leadership, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Didier 
Etumba Longila confirmed plans to organize the DRC's national 
defense into three zones headquartered at Kinshasa, Kisangani, and 
Lubumbashi, respectively.  This concept was previously discussed at 
working level meetings, but the briefing was the first time that 
the concept was formally unveiled in a multilateral setting, 
perhaps pointing toward a coalescing of purpose and opinion within 
the GDRC.  Etumba explained that the defensive posture, centered on 
the three largest cities, was designed around economic centers.  It 
is noteworthy that the geographic placement also complements 
President Kabila's centers of power: the capital in Kinshasa; his 
base of support in Lubumbashi; and Kisangani, gateway to the East 
and purported construction site of a new presidential retreat 
(report to follow septel).  In addition to reducing response time 
to crises, Etumba said an advantage of basing soldiers in key 
locations throughout the country was to "ensure national unity 
after decentralization." 
 
Dongo - engineered peace or martial law? 
 
¶3.  (C) In a previously unreported development, the plan assigns 
engineering and military police (MP) battalions to each defensive 
zone.  Etumba said deployment of MP battalions aimed to address 
both broad concerns of troop discipline and specifically to counter 
human rights violations.  While battalion headquarters would be 
collocated with the defensive zone commandants in major cities, MP 
companies would be posted near military bases and strategic cities. 
Interestingly, the previously unremarkable city of Dongo in 
Equateur Province, site of recent inter-ethnic fighting that 
escalated into a quasi-insurgency (ref A), will receive both a 
contingent of engineers to work on local development projects and a 
company of military police to maintain the peace.  The deployment 
could be seen as a troubling application of quasi-occupation or a 
realistic assessment of the risks and causes of civic unrest in the 
impoverished border region.  On a small scale, the GDRC response to 
the Equateur crisis could be an important evolution towards central 
planning to counter a security threat.  The decision to deploy 
engineer and MP companies to Dongo, coupled with the measured 
response to the uprising itself - in terms of proportionality of 
response, early involvement of the international community, and 
military preparation involving airlift, stocking of rations, 
communications, and vehicles for command and control - is a first 
for the DRC. 
 
The president as commander-in-chief 
 
¶4.  (C) While stating the goal of the reform is to develop "a 
professional, modern, and credible republican army ," which is a 
deterrent to internal or external aggression, Etumba said it was 
necessary to establish a revised chain of command to implement army 
reform.  He displayed an organizational chart that delineated a 
parallel command structure that places recruitment, training, 
logistics, and administrative matters under the Ministry of 
Defense; and the combatant commands under the Chief of Staff. 
While both command structures would ultimately report to the 
president, the exclusion of the Minister of Defense from the combat 
chain of command effectively centralizes military authority in the 
presidency. 
 
Current state of soldiers: untrained and nearing retirement age 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In describing the current state of the military, Etumba 
 
KINSHASA 00000025  002 OF 002 
 
 
enumerated limitations of an army that is poorly equipped, 
operationally incapable of force projection and logistical 
resupply, and suffering numerous personnel problems.  Chief among 
the latter, Etumba said, are the absence of  support for military 
dependents, insufficient discipline and a lack of respect for human 
rights in the force itself, which he described as "a composite army 
with imbalances in ethnic and geographic composition, of which 70% 
are untrained and 40% aged."  Establishment of a training command 
under the Minister of Defense would address one problem and 
retirement would deal with the other problem.  Retirements offer a 
means to reduce the force, replace those incapable of performing 
their duties with new recruits, and demonstrate the government's 
resolve in honoring soldiers' service with a severance package. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Etumba outlined a short-term, three-year program 
beginning in 2010 to retire over 45,000 soldiers, including 71 
general officers in their early to mid-60s.  All forced retirees 
would receive a lump sum payment (up to $30,000 for a general 
officer), a monthly pension, and some would be offered continued 
government employment in the diplomatic service or in parastatals 
as part of a program consisting of retirement, demobilization, and 
retraining.  Etumba envisaged a force over 140,000; however, he 
commented that numbers should not be viewed with "close precision." 
(Comment:  To date, all GDRC interlocutors have quoted optimal 
force levels half as large.  Publicly offering this high number as 
the FARDC's opening position, the GDRC might ultimately agree to 
lower numbers.  The reverse scenario would be diplomatically 
difficult to manage.  End comment.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) To reach this end state, Etumba outlined three phases of 
implementation identical to those Defense Minister Charles Mwando 
Nsimba outlined when describing his plan for armed forces reform to 
the parliament in October 2009 (ref B). 
 
¶A. Phase I (2010-2011): reorganize the army, "participate" in 
operations to secure the country, and prepare to relieve MONUC 
 
¶B. Phase II (2011-2016): consolidate the new organization and 
territorial orientation of the army 
 
¶C. Phase III (2016-2025): conduct operations to assure territorial 
defense and peace 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Mwando said he hoped to instill discipline in the armed 
forces, a respect for human rights, and civic education by 
reforming the military's organization, physical infrastructure, 
training, and access to the resources necessary to fulfill their 
defensive mission.  He concluded by saying he hopes to have bi- and 
multilateral partners, welcoming prospective partners who wish to 
engage within the reform structure "under Congolese coordination 
and leadership." 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment:  By presenting a 15-year reform plan, the GDRC 
unexpectedly exhibited an ability to realistically assess - and 
publicly discuss - the many problems facing its armed forces. 
While stark self-criticism of the army by President Kabila and 
senior officials happens only in private, the frank review of the 
current state and desired end-state of the military is a promising 
development for meaningful reform of the security sector.  End 
comment. 
GARVELINK