VZCZCXRO5299
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKI #0017/01 0221426
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 221426Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0004
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0056
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000017 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/22 
TAGS: PGOV UNSC MONUC MOPS PHUM PINR KPKO MARR MASS PREL CG
SUBJECT: Operation Amani Leo: Old Wine in a New Bottle? 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Samuel V. Brock, Charge d'Affaires a.i., STATE, 
Embassy Kinshasa; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.       (C) Summary:  Various MONUC officials have underscored 
that the overriding objective of Operation 
 
 Amani Leo is civilian protection, although several, including SRSG 
Alan Doss, cautioned that demands for no collateral damages from a 
military operation were illusory.  The operation, according to 
Doss, was not a panacea for the FDLR problem.  Responding to 
criticism that Amani Leo was simply a re-packaged "Kimia III," 
MONUC interlocutors stressed that Amani Leo was a leaner, more 
focused, better-targeted operation than Kimia II.  Amani Leo will 
require vetting of FARDC commanders; a much smaller number of FARDC 
troops will actually be involved in operations (18 battalions vice 
94 in Kimia II); operations will target FDLR leadership and 
economic interests; any MONUC support will require joint 
operational planning; and conditionality will apparently be used 
more readily as a stick.  Legitimate concerns remain concerning the 
continued presence of human rights violators in certain command 
positions.  CHOD Didier Etumba and Doss voiced concern about 
maintaining discipline amongst the 76 FARDC battalions, which are 
based in the Kivus but not involved in Amani Leo, once MONUC stops 
feeding them.  Separately, the DRC, Rwandan, and Burundian CHODs, 
along with MONUC Force Commander General Gaye, met in Matadi on 
January 19 to demonstrate publicly their support for Amani Leo. 
The CHODs also called for closer intelligence cooperation to secure 
common borders and to better fight armed rebel groups in the 
region.  End summary. 
 
 
 
Announcing Operation Amani Leo:  What it is 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Over the past week, various MONUC officials have provided 
emboffs with public and private assessments of the Amani Leo 
military operations, which officially commenced on January 1. 
During a January 13 press conference, Kevin Kennedy, head of 
MONUC's Public Information Office, listed the principle objectives 
of Amani Leo: 
 
 
 
-- protecting the civilian population; 
 
-- capturing strategically important zones, which negative forces 
currently hold; 
 
-- maintaining control of territory retaken from the FDLR; and 
 
-- assisting in restoring state authority. 
 
 
 
In line with newly adopted UNSCR 1906, MONUC would place the 
protection of civilians at the center of the operation and its 
joint planning.  In addition to civilian protection, the operation 
aims to "clean-up, hold, and construct" strategic territory. 
"Constructing," according to Kennedy, meant re-establishing state 
authority and rule of law.  DDRRR efforts, Kennedy added, would 
continue to complement military operations. 
 
 
 
¶3.   (SBU) In a January 17 meeting with Goma-based diplomats, SRSG 
Alan reiterated the civilian protection aspect of Amani Leo, but 
cautioned that, "if the UNSC wanted zero civilian casualties, then 
MONUC would have to cease all operations."  In a separate meeting 
with Goma poloff on January 15, Christian Manahl, acting head of 
MONUC's Political Affairs, underscored that everything would be 
done to mitigate consequences for civilians, but he noted that 
there are no military operations in the world that do not result in 
collateral damage.  In an attempt to enforce better discipline on 
the FARDC, Doss announced that all FARDC commanders involved in 
Amani Leo would be subject to a vetting process similar to the 
USG's Leahy vetting. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Doss acknowledged that Amani Leo was no panacea, aiming 
to completely neutralize the FDLR.  Nor was Amani Leo simply "Kimia 
III" under a different name.  Manahl said that operations would be 
"greater in number, but more focused."  Joint operational planning 
 
KINSHASA 00000017  002 OF 004 
 
 
would be mandatory for MONUC logistical support.  Manahl described 
the conditionality paragraph of UNSCR 1906 as "micromanagement," 
but useful for MONUC to use as a stick to withdraw support when 
necessary.  There were questions about what would constitute a 
"grave abuse," which would result in MONUC withholding support. 
MONUC has decided on a three-week timetable for the FARDC to 
respond to any alleged violations. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In a smaller group, Doss noted that only 18 out of 94 FARDC 
battalions based in the Kivus would conduct field operations, thus 
leaving the majority of FARDC forces without MONUC support.  Doss 
said that CHOD Didier Etumba had confided to him that the FARDC 
lacked the means to care for those troops not receiving MONUC 
support.  In the view of Doss and Etumba, this represented a threat 
to civilian protection.  Doss estimated that a modest contribution 
($1 per day per soldier or $9 million per year) would provide 
rations for these units, making a vital difference in their quality 
of life as the all-important task of garrisoning FARDC units moves 
forward (Comment:  This is a huge issue, in our opinion, which, if 
not properly managed, will almost certainly lead to increased FARDC 
exactions on the civilian population.  The resulting international 
outcry will (once again) sully MONUC's image and lead to calls for 
all military operations to stop.  End comment). 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) In a January 19 conversation with polcouns, poloff, and TDY 
PRM officer, Stephane Auvray, Protection Officer in the Deputy 
SRSG's office, said that Amani Leo would be easier to manage and be 
more effective than Kimia II, which he characterized as 
"uncoordinated and useless."  The idea of targeting the operations 
was welcome.  Auvray maintained that only about 1,500 FARDC troops 
would be actively involved in Amani Leo.  The idea was to get a 
smaller core of better-trained and better-disciplined troops to do 
the heavy lifting.  In addition, it would now be much easier for 
MONUC to monitor the behavior of 1,500 FARDC troops in 
company-sized units, rather than the current 16,000 troops at the 
battalion level. 
 
 
 
How it's different from Kimia II 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  There are several important differences between Amani Leo 
and Kimia II.  First, there will be significantly fewer FARDC 
forces involved in actual operations - 18 (8 in North Kivu and 10 
in South Kivu) -with the remaining held "in reserve, " as Auvray 
termed it, to hold and secure areas vacated by the FDLR.  Secondly, 
the sorties should be smaller in nature, short-term, 
geographically-focused, "intelligence-driven" strikes against FDLR 
leadership and economic interests.  MONUC expects one operation per 
week per province.  Third, MONUC estimates that it will only have 
to supply logistical support to not more than 1,000 FARDC troops at 
any one time in each province.  Fourth, as opposed to Kimia II 
where joint operation planning was severely lacking, Amani Leo will 
require Force Commander General Gaye to sign off on operational 
plans developed at a tactical level (Comment:  While this is 
theoretically optimal and probably necessary given FARDC 
indiscipline, it could also lead to bureaucratic inertia and lack 
of initiative to undertake necessary or preemptive action.  End 
comment).  MONUC will set up Joint Tactical Headquarters at FARDC 
brigade headquarters responsible for carrying out operations. 
Fifth, MONUC intends, according to Manahl, to place a MONUC company 
alongside FARDC battalions during operations.  Finally, the 
opportunity to vet FARDC commanders is a welcome change. 
 
 
 
How it's the same 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) First, perhaps the most glaring and unwelcome similarity to 
Kimia II is that the FARDC command structure remains unchanged, 
with former CNDP Chief of Staff Bosco Ntaganda unofficially 
involved in the operations and other ex-CNDP commanders holding key 
positions.  For example, a MONUC contact told us that Lieutenant 
Colonel Kipanga, who was convicted in 2009 of raping four girls in 
 
KINSHASA 00000017  003 OF 004 
 
 
Rutshuru, reportedly holds a command position in Amani Leo. 
Secondly, although MONUC's Joint Protection Teams have been 
deployed relatively successfully throughout the Kivus in an ad-hoc 
manner, MONUC's protection and human rights offices will not be 
allowed to participate in planning in or oversight of the 
operations (Comment:  there may indeed be operational security 
issues that might warrant this.  End comment).  Third, there will 
be little or no ability to monitor FARDC elements in the area, 
which are not involved in the operations (Comment:  while desirable 
in a perfect world, this is undoubtedly way beyond MONUC's 
capabilities due to resource constrains.  End comment). 
 
 
 
Regional CHODs Discuss Kimia II/Amani Leo 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Separately, MONUC Force Commander General Gaye joined the 
DRC (General Didier Etumba), Rwandan (General James Kabarebe), and 
Burundian (General Godefroid Niyombare) Chiefs of Defense on 
January 19 in Matadi to discuss lessons learned from Kimia II and 
plans for Amani Leo.  The tripartite meeting was a follow-up to an 
August 31 meeting in Goma.  Etumba presented a positive balance for 
Kimia II, claiming FDLR capabilities had been "drastically 
reduced."  Kabarebe welcomed the progress, but encouraged the FARDC 
and MONUC to continue pursuing the FDLR "to eradicate the group, 
i.e., to entice FDLR elements to surrender, renounce armed 
conflict, and release Rwandan citizens held hostage in the DRC 
since 1994."  Kabarebe called for "joint monitoring" of the 
situation on the ground, and Niyombare urged more intensified 
intelligence sharing by the three countries to better secure common 
borders.  In an apparent reference to the Group of Experts Report, 
which claimed that FDLR forces had used Burundi as a safe haven, 
Niyombare stated that a GoB investigation into the matter did not 
confirm these allegations.  He, nevertheless, acknowledged that 
"uncontrolled armed elements or demobilized Burundians" may be 
assisting FDLR forces along the border. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The participants agreed to the following actions: 
 
 
 
-- maintain the current tempo of operations to ensure that Amani 
Leo is successful: 
 
-- hold regular meetings at different command levels to share 
intelligence regarding the operations; 
 
--implement joint monitoring on the ground and a mechanism for 
intelligence sharing between the three countries; 
 
--intensify efforts to encourage the population not to sympathize 
with the FDLR. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment:  There are many question marks surrounding how 
effective Amani Leo will be operationally, in protecting the 
civilian population, and in curbing FARDC human rights violations. 
A more targeted approach is welcome, but it should maintain steady 
pressure on key FDLR assets, rather than one-two fleeting successes 
per month.  Just as the military option is necessary to pressure 
the FDLR to surrender, the "carrot" of DDRRR must remain a viable 
option for FDLR combatants.  The international community should 
voice its strong disapproval at the presence of wanted war 
criminals and convicted rapists in Amani Leo's command structure. 
Despite public proclamations in support of operations, it is 
uncertain how committed the GDRC will remain to conduct anti-FDLR 
operations over the long-term - and "dealing with the FDLR" will be 
a long-term task.  Operation Amani Leo is not, as Doss said, a 
panacea.   How the 76 FARDC battalions, stationed in the Kivus and 
suddenly cut off from MONUC care and feeding, will react is 
critical, and potentially destabilizing if they began to prey on 
the local population.   Although we see various challenges/problems 
facing the Amani Leo Operation, it is probably the best we can hope 
for given the circumstances on the ground.  To do nothing would be 
to simply abdicate any responsibility to try to rid the Eastern DRC 
of negative forces that have plagued the region for over a decade. 
The new and improved aspects of Amani Leo - vetting of commanders, 
 
KINSHASA 00000017  004 OF 004 
 
 
utilizing smaller more focused FARDC elements, conditionality 
(absolutely crucial), and an improved joint planning structure - 
outweigh any negatives.  The international community, not to 
mention the GDRC, still needs MONUC assistance, if there is any 
hope to eliminate the FDLR problem.  We are, nevertheless, entering 
a new phase in MONUC's relationship with the GDRC, as both sides 
begin thinking about "life after MONUC."  In this vein, MONUC, the 
international community, and the GDRC may have to settle for less 
than optimal solutions, which, nevertheless, correspond to the 
situation on the ground.  Less MONUC/international community may 
even have some upsides: who would have predicted a year ago that 
the DRC, Rwandan and Burundian CHODs would agree to cooperate more 
closely on intelligence matters? 
BROCK