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DE RUEHLGB #0024/01 0111655
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P 111655Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6572
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV PHUM KAWC KJUS PINS KPKO
CG, RW 
SUBJECT: NSS OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST NTAGANDA ARREST, CALLS 
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF MARCH 23 AGREEMENT IN DRC 
 
Classified By: Ambassador W. Stuart Symington for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Joseph Nzabamwita, head of the National 
Security Service (NSS)'s Department of External Intelligence 
and Security, on December 14, pressed visiting EU Great Lakes 
Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer and Deputy to the U.S. 
Special Advisor for the Great Lakes James Yellin for Western 
support to combat FDLR leadership, warned that an arrest of 
CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda would be destabilizing, and called 
for implementation of the March 23 agreement between the GDRC 
and the CNDP.  DCM and UK ambassador also attended the 
meeting, which took place in Nzabamwita's office.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
EU SPECIAL ENVOY ON CONGO'S TROUBLED EAST 
 
¶2. (C) Nzabamwita welcomed his visitors with a flourish and 
invited all to speak freely and openly.  Van de Geer, drawing 
on his recent visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
with Yellin, said it was difficult for the Government of the 
DRC (GDRC) to act with "determination and timeliness" and 
said the accelerated DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) integration 
"has cracks."  The army had not been paid, fed or equipped, 
and there were many defections; but the good news was the 
soldiers' names had been successfully reinstated in the 
computers so that correct payments could be made. 
 
¶3. (C) Regarding the Congres National pour la Defense du 
Peuple (CNDP), van de Geer said Bosco Ntaganda remained in 
the FARDC, but was nervous and engaged in a two-pronged 
policy:  he had his own group in the army and he was 
reinforcing his supporters in Masisi, which was becoming 
"CNDP Boscoland."  (Note:  After CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda 
was arrested by Rwandan authorities in early 2009, the bulk 
of its members agreed to integrate into the FARDC.  End 
Note.)  MONUC felt there had been some military progress with 
respect to the FDLR, but it was, in fact, very limited, van 
 
de Geer said.  (Note:  The FDLR is an armed Rwandan group 
based in eastern DRC that opposes the Government of Rwanda 
and includes former members and supporters of the Rwandan 
government that orchestrated the 1994 genocide.  End Note.) 
The FDLR controls the bush; the Congolese Armed Forces 
(FARDC) controls the roads and towns so it had become a 
classic guerilla situation.  There were direct confrontations 
between CNDP-inclusive FARDC units and the FDLR.  There had 
been many atrocities and the GDRC needed to take more 
responsibility, Van de Geer asserted.  MONUC was under 
pressure from many sides, including, indirectly, Kigali; 
however, MONUC's withdrawal would mean victory for the FDLR. 
 
¶4. (C) Van de Geer summarized his discussion with Jean 
Sayinzoga, Chairman of Rwanda's Demobilization and 
Reintegration Commission (see reftel), and called on Rwanda 
to exercise maximum pressure for voluntary returns of FDLR 
rank-and-file.  The EU and United States are pushing for 
returns and want to stick to the text of the 2007 Nairobi 
Communique, i.e., return to Rwanda, but were willing to 
support any flexible solution agreed upon by Rwanda and the 
DRC.  Van de Geer saluted Rwandan outreach, renewed 
Rwandan-French relations and the exchange of Ambassadors 
between the DRC and Rwanda but expressed concern that the 
GDRC was "outside the game" in eastern DRC, Kabila's failure 
to visit the United States or UK, and the overall difficulty 
to dialogue with him. With respect to CNDP leader Bosco 
Qto dialogue with him. With respect to CNDP leader Bosco 
Ntaganda, Van de Geer contrasted the comment by Nzabamwita 
during a previous visit that "Rwanda has a moderating 
influence on the CNDP largely through Bosco so we don't 
support his arrest now" with that of Congolese generals who 
said Ntaganda could be arrested.  UK ambassador then asked 
whether Ntaganda might leave the FARDC and form his own 
group. 
 
RWANDAN OFFICIAL URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON FDLR... 
 
¶5. (C) Nzabamwita spoke of the need to "stay the course," 
arguing that there were no quick fixes for the FDLR nor in 
the wake of the insecurity that came out of genocide.  He 
described Umoju Wetu, the combined Rwandan-Congolese military 
offensive against the FDLR that took place in early 2009, as 
the culmination of all that had gone before it and the FDLR 
as "at the heart" of security concerns for Rwanda.  He called 
for support within the region and from Europe, the United 
States, and the UN since FDLR actions in eastern DRC were 
being coordinated from Western capitals.  Nzabamwita asked 
rhetorically:  "How is it possible to coordinate divergent 
interests in different capitals?  If it took Germany ten 
years to arrest FDLR leader Murwanashyaka, how long would it 
 
take the DRC to act?" 
 
¶6. (C) Nzabamwita said that when FARDC and MONUC continued 
operations (after Umoja Wetu, as Kimia II), the FDLR changed 
its strategy and tactics to create chaos in eastern DRC; 
Rwanda told Special Representative of the Secretary General 
Alan Doss of the change in strategy and insisted MONUC and 
the FARDC were not defeating the FDLR.  When asked if there 
were any forces capable of dealing with the FDLR, Nzabamwita 
said the Rwandan Defense Forces might be able to get quicker, 
better results, but would benefit from command and control 
capabilities from the U.S. and Europe. 
 
¶7. (C) Nzabamwita then compared the Rwandan situation with 
FDLR to that of the U.S. against Al Qaida.  He suggested the 
FDLR be listed as a terrorist organization in the U.S., said 
that UNSCR 1804 and other resolutions needed to be 
implemented, and people "who undermine the security of the 
Great Lakes" should be sanctioned.  (Note:  The FDLR has not 
targeted Americans and is not listed as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization by the USG.  A predecessor organization, ALIR 
(Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, aka Interahamwe or 
ex-FAR), is listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List, which 
designated terrorist organizations for immigration purposes. 
In tandem with UNSCR 1533, the USG has designated several 
FDLR members under E.O. 13413 as subject to an asset freeze, 
travel ban and prohibiting Amcits from engaging in 
transactions with them.  End Note.) 
 
...AND SAYS UMOJA WETU FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED RWANDA-DRC 
RELATIONS 
 
¶8. (C) Regarding the CNDP, Nzabamwita said Umoja Wetu 
fundamentally changed the bilateral relationship between 
Rwanda and the DRC and helped neutralize the "internal civil 
war" among the CNDP, PARECO and various Mai Mai groups. 
Rwanda was able to help join FARDC and CNDP structures 
together.   Although the integration was quick, the CNDP 
stopped fighting the FARDC.  It was a misinterpretation that 
Rwanda controlled the CNDP, Nzabamwita continued.  There were 
FARDC units with some former CNDP members who collaborated 
with the FDLR against the GDRC on the ground.  Nzabamwita 
called Rwanda's Western Province his country's "breadbasket" 
- the source of gas, tourism revenues, and its most fertile 
land.  The GDRC-CNDP agreement of March 23, 2009 still has 
not been implemented and if there were an alliance between 
former CNDP and FDLR elements, it would be a threat.  Rwanda 
is more interested in the stability of this region than 
Kinshasa, Nzabamwita claimed.  (Note:  The March 23 agreement 
specifies, among other things, that the CNDP will transform 
itself into a political party and will integrate its fighters 
into the Congolese army and police.  End Note.). 
 
WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ARREST NTAGANDA 
 
¶9. (C) UK ambassador again raised the possibility of further 
political fragmentation if authorities arrested Bosco 
Ntaganda.  Nzabamwita said that it would take time for the 
CNDP and Kinshasa to develop trust in one another.  The CNDP 
agreed to join with FARDC because Rwanda would be there to 
guarantee implementation of its political demands, but the 
CNDP was not one hundred percent happy:  there were two 
factions and a lack of implementation.  The group now taking 
the upper hand is asking, "Why did Bosco sell us out?"  Then 
there is the international community and the International 
Criminal Court, which are demanding that Ntaganda's arrest. 
QCriminal Court, which are demanding that Ntaganda's arrest. 
"But this so-called criminal brokered the peace."  This area 
needs to be stable in order to implement justice. 
 
¶10. (C) Nzabamwita then returned to the theme of "no quick 
fixes."  He described Ntaganda as a "victim" who was "being 
paid a private first class salary" and said that arresting 
him would not help the situation.  Rather, the solution was 
to "go to Kinshasa and tell the leadership that the lack of 
implementation of the March 23 Agreement will increase 
fragmentation."  He added that if Bosco were arrested, "you 
would surely have ten Boscos.  You touch him and you touch 
the rank and file of the CNDP.  Is he the worst criminal in 
eastern DRC?"   UK ambassador asked if Ntaganda would stay 
where he was or move elsewhere with his militia forces if 
left alone.  Nzabamwita said that he "still has to think 
about the ICC, so where would he go?"   Ntaganda tried to 
contain several ex-CNDP battalions that wanted to mutiny, he 
added.  Let all the parties stick to implementation and we 
should oversee implementation.  What message do you send if 
you arrest Bosco?  If this agenda is driven by international 
NGOs, it will be a disaster.  "You will crumble Kinshasa." 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT:  Nzabamwita's professional role is to 
monitor and combat the GOR's external enemies, chief of which 
is the FDLR.  He reiterated the GOR's views on issues such as 
the GOR's relationship with the CNDP and the DRC, the need 
for international pressure on the FDLR, and the possible 
effect of arresting current CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda. 
Nzabamwita made clear that continued Rwandan-DRC and 
international cooperation was essential to defeat the FDLR. 
END COMMENT. 
SYMINGTON