VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0022/01 0111639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111639Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6569
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV PHUM KAWC KJUS PINS KPKO
CG, RW 
SUBJECT: DEMOBILIZATION OFFICIAL EXPLORES NTAGANDA, 
NKUNDA'S ROLE IN REGIONAL STABILITY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador W. Stuart Symington for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Jean Sayinzoga, Chairman of Rwanda's 
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) told 
visiting EU Great Lakes Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer and 
Deputy to the U.S. Special Advisor for the Great Lakes (and 
former Ambassador to Burundi) James Yellin on December 14 
that if Congolese authorities were to arrest Bosco Ntaganda 
at this time, it would destabilize the region.  Sayinzoga 
defended Rwanda's continued low-profile detention of Laurent 
Nkunda, and urged UN peacekeepers in the Congo to do more to 
help repatriate ex-combatants.  DCM and UK poloff attended 
the meeting in Sayinzoga's office.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EU ENVOY CONVEYS DIFFICULT SITUATION IN KIVUS 
 
¶2. (C) EU Great Lakes Special Envoy van de Geer, who had met 
Sayinzoga on previous visits, opened by describing the 
situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): 
integration of the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple 
(CNDP) was "difficult," the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) 
were "falling apart," and soldier morale was low.  Sayinzoga 
said current CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda feared prosecution by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has issued a 
warrant for his arrest, but was also building up his presence 
in the Masisi Territory of North Kivu province, which was 
becoming "CNDP Boscoland"--a very dangerous development, in 
van de Geer's view.  The FDLR continued to be "very present" 
in the Kivus and after Rwandan forces withdrew following the 
DRC-Rwanda combined military campaign, the Government of the 
DRC (GDRC) failed to follow up adequately.  He warned that 
the GDRC must control its army or run the risk some would 
defect to Ntaganda.  Sexual violence was high, though 
decreasing.  The recent arrests of leaders of the Forces 
Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) leaders in 
Germany were a positive step; however, it would have been a 
bigger achievement if it had happened four months ago - since 
the FDLR had already been expecting it.  (Note:  The FDLR is 
an armed Rwandan group based in eastern DRC that opposes the 
Government of Rwanda and includes former members and 
supporters of the Rwandan government that orchestrated the 
1994 genocide.  End Note.) Van de Geer said Europeans felt 
increased pressure to act and he hoped France would move on 
FDLR Secretary General Callixte Mbarushima, resident in that 
country.  Van de Geer also hoped the EU would be able to get 
the planned EU-Rwandan judicial cooperation off the ground 
soon, including a small liaison office in Rwanda that would 
enhance bilateral cooperation. 
 
WHY NOT ARREST BOSCO? 
 
¶3. (C) Van de Geer told Sayinzoga that he had previously 
discussed Bosco Ntaganda with Rwanda's National Security 
Service, and was told Rwanda still had some moderating 
influence over the CNDP through Ntaganda, so handing him to 
the ICC would pose a risk.  Van de Geer then contrasted the 
Rwandan attitude with that of the Congolese army, which said 
"go ahead and arrest him."  Sayinzoga argued this was "not 
the time" to turn Ntaganda in or place too much pressure on 
him lest he develop his own resistance; he remains a useful 
link to the CNDP and arresting him would decrease the ability 
of the GDRC to control the situation in eastern DRC.  At some 
time, however, he would have to be arrested. 
 
LOCAL SUPPORT FOR NKUNDA; RWANDA KEEPING HIS PROFILE LOW 
QLOCAL SUPPORT FOR NKUNDA; RWANDA KEEPING HIS PROFILE LOW 
 
¶4. (C) Van de Geer said North Kivu army chief General 
Vainqueur Mayala told him there were Tutsi elements linking 
with the FDLR.  Sayinzoga agreed this was plausible: 
"Congolese Tutsis are not happy with what happened to 
Nkunda."  (Note:  Rwandan authorities have held former CNDP 
leader Laurent Nkunda under house arrest in Rwanda since 
January 2009.  End Note.)  He noted that Rwandans had 
demonstrated in favor of Nkunda when authorities took him 
into custody, adding that he had not seen Nkunda personally 
as he had no need to, but that Nkunda was able to receive 
visitors.  (Note:  Nkunda's lawyer told us recently that only 
Nkunda's wife was allowed to see him; post has no confirmed 
information.  End Note).  Nonetheless, Sayinzoga concluded, 
it was best to keep public visibility low rather than allow 
media access to Nkunda; it was not in Rwanda's interest to be 
seen as promoting him. 
 
¶5. (C) In response to Yellin's query about the 
demobilization/reintegration (DDRRR) program, Sayinzoga said 
Rwanda 
wished to accelerate the repatriation of ex-armed combatants 
 
and had urged MONUC officials, during a December 3 meeting in 
Gisenyi, to help facilitate this.  However, there were places 
the FARDC was unable to go and although MONUC troops were now 
physically closer to the FDLR, MONUC had not yet redeployed 
its DDRRR structures and personnel.  There were 480 FDLR and 
RUD-Urunana ex-combatants at the demobilization and 
reintegration camp in Mutobo.   (Note: The RUD-Urunana is a 
breakaway faction of the FDLR.  In a public ceremony, Rwandan 
authorities released into Rwandan society the 362 
ex-combatants who had completed the course at Mutobo on 
December 23.  End Note.)  Sayinzoga said the FARDC sometimes 
beat and even killed FDLR combatants in the Congo, and the 
FDLR took their revenge on the local population.  He added 
that the FDLR in Denmark had recently sent the FDLR in the 
Congo $8000; Van de Geer concurred with the need for Europe 
to act against the FDLR in Europe. 
 
¶6. (C) Van de Geer asked Sayinzoga if he had any concrete 
suggestions to reinforce the Rwandan-DRC partnership. 
Sayinzoga explained GOR's three pronged citizenship 
"strategy," which (1) allows Rwandans to hold two or more 
nationalities, including Rwandan and DRC; (2) allows Rwandans 
to resettle in other countries and retain Rwandan nationality 
and the ability to return to Rwanda at any time; and (3) 
allows the return of those of Rwandan origin who have adopted 
another nationality.  Fourth, he added, genocidaires could be 
tried in the country in which they resided or be tried in 
Rwanda.  Rwanda was prepared to help countries that receive 
FDLR members.  The UNHCR cessation clause has already been 
signed, he added; they will be able to become citizens of 
their resettlement countries or they can return to Rwanda. 
(Note:  The cessation clause is a provision of the 1951 
Refugee Convention that terminates refugee status. 
Technically, it will not take effect QQ1S\qUNSQission will merge functions with 
those parts of government that handle refugee issues, and 
that when it does, he intends to retire.  As long as FDLR 
forces remain in the field in significant numbers, however, 
the GOR is unlikely to dismantle the RDRC, which is one of 
Kigali's key tools for de-fanging the FDLR.  END COMMENT. 
SYMINGTON