VZCZCXRO0070
RR RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKM #0001/01 0041056
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041056Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0065
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/04 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MCAP MARR UG SO
SUBJECT: UGANDA: THE LIMITS OF UGANDA'S AMISOM COMMITMENT 
 
REF: 09 KAMPALA 01276; 09 KAMPALA 01322 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tim Manarin, Political Officer, State, Pol/Econ; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  Uganda plans to add a fourth battalion to its 
contribution to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 
February 2010, bringing the total number of Ugandan troops in 
Somalia to 3,500.  While President Museveni would like to expand 
AMISOM's capability and mandate, Uganda's commitment to AMISOM and 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is not open-ended absent 
political progress on the ground in Somalia.  Moreover, the 
potential for renewed hostilities between northern and southern 
Sudan along Uganda's northern border, and Uganda's own general 
elections in February 2011 - well before the expiration of the 
TFG's mandate - could force a diversion of Ugandan troops and 
resources away from AMISOM, with negative implications for the 
viability of the TFG and U.S. interests in Somalia.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
Uganda Ready to Do More in Somalia... 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
 
¶2. (C)  Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Minister of Defense 
Kiyonga, and other senior Ugandan leaders have repeatedly expressed 
interest in sending more forces to Somalia to take offensive action 
against al Shabaab (see reftels for background).  The  Ugandan 
People's Defense Force (UPDF) currently has three battalions 
totaling 2,750 peacekeepers in Mogadishu and will send another 
mechanized battalion of around 750 troops in February 2010.  In 
August 2009, the AMISOM Force Commander Major General Nathan 
Mugisha told the DATT of Ugandan plans to drive Al Shabaab out of 
Mogadishu following the arrival of the UPDF's fourth battalion. 
Uganda intended to deploy this battalion to Somalia in November, 
but the deployment was delayed by the September 17 suicide attack 
on AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu.  In addition to troop 
contributions, Uganda has trained approximately 600 TFG troops.  A 
second cohort of 661 trainees and some 30 officers will finish in 
March 2010 .  Uganda has also agreed to host European Union funded 
training for another  2,000 TFG troops set to begin in May 2010. 
According to Ugandan police, 40 TFG police officers have attended 
Uganda's police training academy and the Ugandan Police are 
prepared to train as many as 3,500 more TFG police officers in 
¶2010. 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
...But Not Forever 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (C)  Ugandan officials also stress that the status quo in 
Somalia is not sustainable, and that Uganda will contemplate 
withdrawing from Mogadishu if there is no progress over the next 
year.  They have indicated that Uganda is looking for a longer term 
policy and additional international support that will allow AMISOM 
and the TFG to defeat Al Shabaab.   While highlighting the weakness 
and unpopularity of Al Shabaab, these officials express growing 
doubts that the TFG has the capacity to capitalize on either the 
AMISOM presence or any gains it could make.  They caution that 
Uganda is unwilling to remain in Mogadishu indefinitely, unless the 
TFG develops traction as a government, can win popular support, and 
stand on its own two feet. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
Sudan and Domestic Politics 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (C)  Two other variables that could precipitate a Ugandan 
withdrawal from Somalia are Sudan and Uganda's February 2011 
 
KAMPALA 00000001  002 OF 002 
 
 
general elections.  Although Uganda regards an unstable Somalia as 
a serious security threat for East Africa, Uganda's more immediate 
concerns focus on the Sudan.  Ugandan military leaders have told 
DATT that war between northern and southern Sudan would likely 
force Uganda to divert resources from Somalia to assist the 
Government of Southern Sudan with logistical support.  With the 
recent peace in northern Uganda after 23 years of the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, the GOU will be inclined to 
increase troops in the region if it looks like a war in southern 
Sudan could destabilize the area and spark more domestic unrest 
there 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) On the domestic front, Uganda's opposition political parties 
believe President Museveni is using AMISOM as a hedge to soften 
U.S. criticism of Uganda's democratic backsliding.  The leading 
opposition contender, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) President 
Kizza Besigye, told PolOffs on December 15 that the AMISOM 
deployment is exacerbating an internal Somali political crisis, and 
questioned Uganda's motives for sending forces to Mogadishu.  A 
December 9 editorial by a Kenya-based Ugandan journalist critical 
of Museveni praised the UPDF's good conduct and selfless service in 
Somalia, but said many see Uganda's peacekeeping mission as "part 
of a scheme" by Museveni to placate Western donors.  As the 
presidential campaign proceeds, it will be difficult for Museveni 
to address these criticisms barring  tangible progress in Somalia 
or the addition of other African troops to ease the burden on 
Uganda. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Internal election-related security, however, is perhaps the 
highest priority for President Museveni.  Uganda maintains one of 
the largest militaries in Africa, with approximately 40,000 
soldiers.  Museveni uses the UPDF to augment severely 
under-resourced police forces during moments of instability, such 
as the deadly September 10-12 riots in Kampala.  A highly 
contentious and competitive 2011 presidential election campaign 
will likely trigger a sustained security presence throughout 
Uganda, possibly requiring the withdrawal of troops from  the 
UPDF's deployment against the LRA in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Central African Republic, or from AMISOM, or both. 
 
 
 
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Comment 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) The international community is focused on the end of the 
TFG's mandate in August 2011.  Uganda, however, is focused on Sudan 
and Uganda's February 2011 elections.  While President Museveni and 
other senior Ugandan leaders remain committed to AMISOM and 
Somalia, this commitment is not open-ended.  If 2010 does not bring 
clear signs of progress in Somalia or additional support for AMISOM 
from other African nations, Uganda's willingness to remain AMISOM's 
lead participant could end before the expiration of the TFG's 
mandate. 
LANIER