VZCZCXRO0887
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0046/01 0051256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051256Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4563
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000046 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS UK CAN IT NL AS AF
SUBJECT: KEY AMBASSADORS IN KABUL DISCUSS REVIEW OF COMMAND 
STRUCTURE IN SOUTH WITH COMISAF 
 
Classified By: Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affai 
rs Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne 
 
¶1. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) Begin Summary.  In a New Year's Day 
briefing by Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez for the 
embassies most active in the South and Southwest of 
Afghanistan ) Australia, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States ) the Generals 
outlined the conflicting military and political 
considerations in deliberations about how to effectively 
manage the large number of troops flowing into the South, 
including the option to split the regional command in two, 
either along provincial borders or some other configuration 
that makes sense militarily.  Recognizing the political and 
economic linkages across the South and the fact that the 
insurgency recognizes Kandahar and Helmand as one area, 
General McChrystal said the large and slowing size of the 
coalition force in the South is driving the review of the 
current command structure.  Additionally, the group discussed 
the need to better coordinate political approaches with 
malign actors, including restricting contracting.  Ambassador 
Wayne noted that we need to better refine and coordinate a 
plan for limiting the role of malign actors in Helmand and 
Kandahar so that in parallel with our troop and civilian 
build-up we can act to help create a better model of Afghan 
governance in these key areas.  End Summary. 
 
Calculations for Splitting the Military Command in RC-South 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) On New Year's Day, ISAF Commander 
General Stanley McChrystal and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) LTG 
David Rodriguez held a meeting to discuss the issues 
surrounding splitting Regional Command-South (RC-South) in 
two.  Ambassadors from Australia, Italy and the Netherlands, 
the charges from the UK and Canada, and U.S. Coordinating 
Director for Development and Economic Affairs Ambassador E. 
Anthony Wayne attended.  General McChrystal emphasized that 
while he is focused on the military options, he wants the 
decision to take political dimensions into account.  He said 
his intention is to make a decision on how to proceed before 
the London conference on January 28, and to implement the 
decision between July and September when forces move into 
Kandahar, but he wants political input from key contributing 
countries before any decision. 
 
¶3. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) General McChrystal said RC-South is 
the biggest command in Afghanistan ) well beyond the size of 
a normal two-star headquarters, has a disproportionate number 
of significant incidents, and will be getting many more 
troops in the coming months.  Likewise, he emphasized the 
many political and economic factors influencing the RC-South 
command decision, including: 1) a population concentrated on 
rivers, which link Helmand and Kandahar provinces; 2) the 
insurgency recognizes Kandahar and Helmand as one geographic 
entity; 3) the international boundary with Pakistan could be 
complicated by a split as it currently aligns with RC-South 
and redeployment of troops could have a destabilizing impact 
on the current Afghanistan-Pakistan balance; and 4) the 
continuity of the economic corridor between Helmand and 
Kandahar, which impacts development and infrastructure 
activities.  Additionally, LTG Rodriguez highlighted the 
increased number of Afghan troops heading into the region, 
and the heavy emphasis in the new strategy to partner with 
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP), which would lead to more than 150 friendly force 
locations.  All of these create serious span of control 
issues should RC-South remain a single entity. 
 
¶4. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) General McChrystal said the 
cleanest military solution is to divide the command down the 
line between Helmand and Kandahar provinces, but that others 
may have a better solution.  The key, he said, is that the 
solution needs to be militarily defensible.  The Dutch 
Ambassador asked where Uruzgan would figure into this 
planning, also noting that there may be news on the future of 
Dutch troops following a January 8 meeting in The Hague.  The 
UK Charge said the UK sees the logic of keeping Helmand and 
Kandahar together but understands the military logic of a 
split.  In response to a question from the Italian Ambassador 
about changes to the geographic structure of RC-West, LTG 
Rodriguez said he did no, he does not anticipate such a 
change. 
 
¶5. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) The bridging organization for the 
period of transition would be the IJC, said LTG Rodriguez. 
Ambassador Wayne noted that whatever decision is ultimately 
made ) whether a split between Helmand and Kandahar, or some 
 
KABUL 00000046  002 OF 002 
 
 
other configuration that takes into account the political 
issues -- will require regular and frequent interactions 
among the Regional Commands and the senior civilians if the 
stand-up of a new Command in the South is to work.  General 
McChrystal agreed, noting the importance of determining and 
communicating clear accountability for each area of 
responsibility (AOR), which is not the case now. (Note: the 
current construct divides the battlespace among coalition 
partners within the provinces themselves.  End Note) 
 
Coordinating an Approach to Sideline Malign Actors 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) Discussion turned to development of 
a strategy to effectively minimize the influence of malign 
actors.  General McChrystal said that the coalition needs to 
develop a coordinated strategy that identifies those actors 
we must influence or sideline to have effective results. 
Amb. Wayne said we need a plan targeted to address these 
actors that in Helmand and Kandahar so that we can act in 
parallel with troop and civilian build-up to show the Afghan 
people that the future can be different.  To succeed, 
McChrystal said, there must be a concerted and coordinated 
strategy, he said, and a delicate approach to President 
Karzai.  A coordinated decision-making process on how to deal 
with malign actors, which has been lacking up to now, will 
help ensure the success of the approach, said McChrystal. 
Addressing the systemic corruption that has plagued our 
contracting must be part of the approach, emphasized LTG 
Rodriguez.  The UK Charge noted that even our friends are not 
pure.  Rodriguez agreed, emphasizing the need to better 
monitor our contracting with our working partnerships and 
find ways to show we are serious about dealing with malign 
actors. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) While the decision to divide the 
RC-South Command is a military one, there are serious 
political implications for governance and development efforts 
in the South.  ISAF outreach to key coalition ambassadors is 
a welcome step in ensuring a collaborative approach to the 
final decision on how to proceed.  Whatever the final 
decision is on how to split the command, a key challenge will 
be coordination and collaboration during the July-September 
timeframe, a time of peak operational activity across all 
civil-military lines of effort.  Strong coordination and 
planning among the civ-mil leadership at the regional 
commands will be essential.  Additionally, clear strategies 
and guidance on how we intend to sideline malign actors 
during this period of enhanced economic activity in the South 
will be an essential element of our efforts there.  Embassy 
Kabul is working closely with our civilians in the South to 
develop these strategies and will ensure close collaboration 
with coalition partners to ensure a unified approach, 
particularly in Helmand and Kandahar. 
EIKENBERRY