VZCZCXRO1250
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHHK #0182/01 0291026
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291026Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9516
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 000182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EEB/IFD/OMA, TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2025 
TAGS: EFIN ECON HK CH
SUBJECT: HK ECONOMISTS DISMISS DOWNSIDE RISKS TO CHINESE 
ECONOMY 
 
Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut, Reason 1.4 b 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: China macroeconomists in Hong Kong predict 
inflation and Renminbi (RMB) appreciation for 2010 but are 
not overly worried about asset bubbles or non-performing 
loans.  The recent small interest rate increase and hike in 
reserve requirements were intended to show the market that 
Chinese economic policymakers are watching closely and will 
step in to tighten if needed.  But with growth still 
dependent on loose monetary policy, officials will be 
reluctant to do too much, too soon.  Overheating, caused by 
stronger-than-expected global demand, was the biggest risk 
they saw to Chinese economic growth.  Loose monetary fiscal 
policies are already spurring high growth.  Add resurgent 
exports and the Chinese government may be forced to rapidly 
tighten, with unforeseen consequences.  But several months of 
export growth could also provide helpful cover for RMB 
appreciation.  Economists warned that foreign pressure to 
allow the currency to strengthen would not be helpful. 
Observers agreed that China needed to rebalance its economy 
away from exports towards more domestic consumption, but this 
was a long-term goal likely to be delayed until the new 
Chinese leadership team was installed in 2012.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Hong Kong Economic Unit Chief and Beijing Deputy 
Financial Attach met with China economists Shen Minggao 
(Citibank), Helen Qiao (Goldman Sachs), Qu Hongbin (HSBC) and 
Ben Simpfendorfer (RBS) in Hong Kong January 22 to discuss 
the risk of inflation in China, asset bubbles, exchange rate 
policy, economic rebalancing and risks of non-performing 
loans in China's banking system. 
 
Inflation Accelerating, China Wary of the Brake Pedal 
============================================= ======== 
 
¶3.  (C) Shen predicted that China's 2010 economy would face 
many of the same problems last seen in 2007, namely, loose 
money and global commodity price increases leading to asset 
bubbles and concerns about inflation, which he said might 
reach five percent by year's end.  He noted that while China 
planned to restrict lending to just RMB 7.5 trillion in 2010, 
that was still over 50 percent above pre-2009 peak lending. 
Simpfendorfer noted that food and energy prices were 
increasing, in part due to bad weather in China, and that 
could spur inflationary expectations.  Qiao and Qu also 
agreed that the risk of increased inflation this year was 
significant.  The People's Bank of China's early January 
decision to raise its base rate 27 basis points was a signal 
to markets that the PBOC would not hesitate to tighten if 
necessary, said Qu.  Qiao predicted that Chinese authorities 
would rely on administrative measures to cool the economy. 
Loan quotas and price controls could be in the cards, she 
said.   But all agreed that with liquidity-driven growth, 
China would be cautious about tightening too much, too soon. 
 
NPL = No Problem Loans 
====================== 
 
¶4.  (C) Rapid loan growth has raised the specter of 
non-performing loans (NPLs), but none of our interlocutors 
were overly concerned.  Qiao believed only an economic "hard 
landing" or double-dip recession -- which she did not expect 
to occur -- could generate serious NPL problems, and in any 
case the government would not slow the flow of funding to 
ongoing projects.  Shen acknowledged that an increase in NPLs 
stemming from China's unprecedented loan growth in 2009 was 
certain but argued that they wouldn't be a concern for 
several more years; if the amount of new NPLs grew too large, 
however, Shen believed they could worsen China's fiscal 
situation and undermine public confidnce in the Government. 
Continued rapid nominal growth would resolve the issue, said 
Qu.  In the meantime, "evergreening" (rolling over debt with 
new loans) would prevent bad loans from showing up on bank 
books.  Simpfendorfer agreed, noting that much of the 
short-term debt had been replaced by longer term borrowing. 
In any event, NPLs in infrastructure loans had historically 
been low, he said. 
 
¶5.  (C) Senior Chinese officials worried more about asset 
bubbles than NPLs, said Qiao, but she downplayed concerns 
that housing or equity prices were in bubble territory.  She 
drew a distinction between the low and high end of the 
housing market, noting that prices for luxury properties were 
rising rapidly while lower-end property prices were more 
stable.  Given that investors and speculators in the high-end 
often paid in full and in cash, Qiao questioned the 
effectiveness of government controls on lending, down 
payments, and higher interest rates.  The government should 
focus on ensuring there was a sufficient stock of lower end 
 
HONG KONG 00000182  002 OF 002 
 
 
properties at reasonable prices and let the top of the market 
go where it would, she said.  Shanghai equity prices, after 
leading the world in late-2008 and early-2009, now were 
lagging other regional markets and were not a worry. 
 
Biggest Risk to China?  U.S. Recovery 
===================================== 
 
¶6.  (C) Ironically, many of our interlocutors identified a 
stronger-than-expected recovery in developed markets as the 
most serious risk to the Chinese economy.   China's December 
export figures surprised the market, said Qiao.  Some 
recovery in the U.S. and other developed country markets, 
combined with low numbers from early 2009, would make Chinese 
export growth look strong in the first half of 2010.  If 
export growth remained at about 20% beyond the first quarter, 
China risked overheating and the government would be forced 
to tighten monetary policy and slow spending, said Qu.  Only 
Citibank's Shen disagreed, arguing that with China's share of 
G3 (U.S., EU, and Japan) imports hovering around 20 percent, 
these economies don't have capacity to absorb much more from 
China.  Significantly higher-than-expected growth in both 
developed and emerging market economies was the only thing 
that could support a meaningful increase in Chinese exports, 
he said. 
 
Bet on a Strengthening RMB in 2010, But When? 
============================================= 
 
¶7.   (C) All agreed that RMB exchange rate appreciation was 
likely this year, but our interlocutors disagreed on the 
timing.  Shen predicted a return to gradual appreciation 
during the first half of 2010, driven by concerns about 
inflation and sterilization costs.  He noted that large firms 
would welcome a stronger RMB for its impact on smaller 
rivals.  With many exporting firms operating on thin margins, 
a three percent appreciation could force the smallest and 
weakest into the arms of larger competitors or out of 
business entirely.  Chinese firms would benefit from 
consolidation, but the government worried about increased 
unemployment, said Shen.  Qu agreed that appreciation was 
overdue, but suggested that Chinese policymakers needed to 
see several months of strong export growth to provide them 
with political cover to allow a return to a gradual 
appreciation.  He added that foreign pressure, particularly 
from the developed economies, wasn't helpful. 
 
¶8.  (C) Qiao also advised against pressuring China on 
currency issues.  Senior leaders knew it had to happen and 
would allow the RMB to appreciate this year but were 
extremely sensitive to accusations that they were responding 
to foreign demands, she said.  The "unfavorable political 
calendar," including U.S. Treasury's foreign currency report 
in April, the G20 meeting in June, and the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue in mid-year, would prevent Chinese 
officials from taking action until the second half of 2010 
when she predicted a relatively large and sudden appreciation 
of up to five percent. 
 
¶9.  (C) A stronger currency could contribute to weaker 
external demand for Chinese exports in the second half of the 
year and force leaders to start the process of rebalancing 
toward domestic consumption, said Shen, although he did not 
expect significant structural adjustment until 2012 or 
beyond.  Chinese statistics suggesting domestic consumption 
was already increasing were not credible, said RBS's 
Simpfendorfer, and merely reflected temporary subsidies 
rather than real rebalancing.  Without income growth or 
increased access to consumer credit, Chinese consumers were 
in no position to spend more, he said, so any real increase 
in private consumption would be a "slow-burning story."  Qiao 
agreed, noting that household income had grown more slowly 
than GDP since 2000.  She and Shen argued that real change 
was unlikely before the new leadership took charge in 2012 
and would require at least five to ten years to achieve. 
MARUT