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C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT) 
 
AF/S FOR BRIAN WALCH 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ZI
SUBJECT: SURVIVING IN TODAY,S ZDF -- VIEWS OF TWO SERVING 
OFFICERS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. RAY FOR REASONS 1.4 B,D 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The most senior ranks of the Zimbabwean military are 
so entwined with ZANU-PF as to be practically 
indistinguishable from the party.  This is particularly 
frustrating for many officers who want to concentrate on 
building a professional military that can serve as a national 
army and play a role in regional stability. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) The following views are from two general officers 
currently serving, who spoke privately with Ambassador and 
DATT on January 5 and 6;  Brigadier General Herbert Chingono 
(strictly protect), Inspector General for the Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA), and Major General Fidelis Satuku (strictly 
protect), Director General for Policy and Personnel, Zimbabwe 
Defense Forces (ZDF).  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------- 
FACTIONS AND SANCTIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) There are no "factions" within the military, as this 
implies leadership around which factions can coalesce.  There 
are different attitudes and opinions:  full support of 
ZANU-PF, recognition that the military has been politicized 
and improperly used, and the fence sitters who are waiting to 
see who comes out on top.  Except for those who are fully in 
bed with ZANU-PF, people keep their views private to avoid 
being accused of treason, which can have fatal consequences. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Commander of the Defense Forces, General 
Constantine Chiwenga, is a political general who works hard, 
but who has very little practical military experience or 
expertise.  A political commissar before 1980, he has only 
attended one mid-level training course, which he did not 
complete.  If given a choice between a military and a 
political issue, he routinely defaults to the political.  His 
goal is to be in politics when his tenure ends as defense 
chief, and he will be very disappointed if he fails to 
achieve that goal.  He has been given to making political 
statements.  This has caused some ZANU-PF politicians to be 
suspicious of him, and he was chastised by Mugabe for being 
too "political." 
 
¶5.  (C) Military officers at the one- and two-star level have 
felt the impact of sanctions, and would like to see them 
lifted, although they understand the reason they exist. 
Those who are currently undecided could be convinced to move 
into the reform camp if they saw any signs of flexibility in 
the sanctions regime.  Military personnel valued their former 
relationship with the U.S. and would like to see it resumed. 
Many acknowledge that the military's role in the violence of 
2008 and previously was a misuse of the military and hope 
such never happens again.  The key, they believe, is 
continued economic stability and a better resource flow for 
the military. 
 
¶6.  (C) Those military personnel who are older with more 
experience tend to view difficulties in life more 
realistically than the younger generation.  Life teaches us 
Qrealistically than the younger generation.  Life teaches us 
to expect a certain amount of difficulty and conflict. The 
situation in Zimbabwe with the current coalition government 
is no different.  To think that there would be little or no 
conflict in such a government is naive.  That said, both 
sides in the current lash-up must work out their differences; 
they owe it to the people who elected them.  In this regard, 
the media is often unhelpful.  Reports that emphasize extreme 
points of view should be read with suspicion and skepticism. 
Relations within government are hardly ever smooth, and 
conversely, reports that predict the demise of one side or 
 
another are often meant only to enflame, not inform.  For 
example, we have experienced a situation when two opposing 
politicians go into a private meeting and interact civilly, 
getting along relatively well.  Then, at the end of the 
meeting, as soon as a microphone is put in front of them, all hell 
breaks loose. 
 
------------------------ 
A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Ambassador and DATT met privately on January 5 with 
Brigadier General Herbert Chingono, Inspector General for the 
ZNA, and on January 6 with Major General Fidelis Satuku, 
Director General for Policy and Personnel, ZDF.  These two 
serving military officers took a grave personal risk meeting 
with us, and their identities should be strictly protected. 
In the current environment, they risk being charged with 
treason for an unsanctioned meeting with U.S. officials, and 
that could have fatal consequences.  Chingono, an artillery 
officer, was the last ZNA officer to train under the IMET 
program, graduating from NDU in 1999, while Satuku received 
training in England.  Both participated in the fight for 
independence as teenagers and received commissions for that 
participation.  Unlike some of the senior military who came 
out of the struggle, however, they sought to develop 
professional military credentials. 
 
¶8.  (C) Chingono said that the most senior ranks of the ZDF 
are so entwined with the ZANU-PF party as to be practically 
indistinguishable.  This is particularly frustrating for 
those officers who would like to focus on developing a 
professional military force that can be an effective national 
army, and can at the same time play a constructive role in 
the southern African region.  This situation has been 
exacerbated since the ZDF came under the leadership of 
General Constantine Chiwenga, a man with little practical 
military experience (he was a political commissar before 
1980), who has clear political ambitions.  Chingono said that 
once Chiwenga called a meeting of senior officers that 
started at 10:00 in the morning and went on until 9:30 pm, 
which discussed economics and politics, but not once did a 
military issue come up.  He said that near the end of the 
meeting, as he consulted his notes, he turned to a colleague 
next to him and asked, "Why have we not discussed how to 
teach soldiers to shoot straight, how to better feed and 
clothe them?"  This was, he said, a purely rhetorical 
question, as, given a choice between a military and a 
political issue, Chiwenga will always chose the political 
because he doesn't know enough about the military to be 
comfortable discussing it.  Satuku, who works directly for 
Chiwenga at the Defense Ministry, said that he is 
hardworking, coming to his office at 7:30 am and staying 
until 10:00 at night, but he spends his time on political 
issues. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
A GENERAL WHO WANTS TO BE A POLITICIAN 
-------------------------------------- 
Q-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Both officers stressed Chiwenga's political ambitions 
repeatedly.  Chingono said, "He will be very disappointed if 
he does not get a political position when his tenure as 
defense chief ends."  His politics, however, could very well 
be his undoing.  His frequent political statements have upset 
and worried some ZANU-PF politicians, and about five months 
ago Mugabe reportedly called him and chastised him for it. 
(COMMENT:  This comes as no big surprise.  People who do not 
hesitate to use the military to enforce and buttress their 
hold on power have to be concerned that a member of that very 
same military might one day use it against them.  What is 
surprising is that Mugabe himself took a hand in the matter. 
This seems to counter rumors we've heard that he is under the 
control of the military.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
NO MILITARY FACTIONS, JUST DIFFERENT VIEWS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) In response to a question about factions within the 
military, Chingono said that he would take issue with the 
view because factions implies that there is leadership around 
which they can coalesce.  What there are, he said, are 
different attitudes and opinions.  There are those who fully 
support ZANU-PF, have no compunction about engaging in 
violence when the party orders it, and who are intensely 
political.  Others recognize that the military has been used 
improperly, and in some instances, illegally, and would like 
to get back to the business of developing a professional 
military.  They worry about morale, discipline, and training 
of the troops.  Still others are fence sitters -- they could 
be professional military or thugs -- waiting to see who comes 
out on top, and will cast their lot with the winning side 
just to survive.  With the exception of those who are loyal 
ZANU-PF tools, no one dares publicly air their views.  The 
consequences of such rashness could be fatal. (COMMENT:  The 
Pomona Barracks weapons theft, when several soldiers, 
including at least one officer who fought in the liberation 
war, were tortured and several died, demonstrates how the 
hardliners treat those on the "out."  END COMMENT.)  Chingono 
said that on the issue of sanctions, the key people on the 
list probably don't really care, as they have other avenues 
of funding.  Hurt by them, though, are other officers who are 
not on the list.  He spoke of one brigadier general who was 
in Kenya for training who was unable to get his salary 
remitted through the banking system because of sanctions. 
While they would like to see them lifted, they are realistic 
enough to know this won't happen in the short term.  The 
fence sitters, however, could be swayed by some flexibility 
in sanctions relating to state-owned enterprises, as this 
would show that there is hope. 
 
-------------------------- 
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Regarding predictions on the future of Zimbabwe, 
both officers expressed cautious optimism.  Military 
personnel who are older and more experienced take a pragmatic 
view of difficulties compared to the younger generation. 
Life, they said, teaches us to expect a certain amount of 
difficulty and conflict, and the situation with the current 
coalition government is no different.  Anyone who thinks 
there would be little or no conflict in such an arrangement 
is very naive.  Having said that, it is essential that both 
sides in the coalition government work out their differences 
because they owe it to the people who elected them.  The 
people of Zimbabwe want to be able to live their lives in 
peace; they want a house, a car, and education for their 
children.  Many, perhaps even most, in the military want to 
be able to pursue their profession in an honorable manner. 
Qbe able to pursue their profession in an honorable manner. 
When the government, or the press, report that everything is 
rosy, they said, it is time to be suspicious, because it 
means they are concealing something.  The events of 2008 when 
the military was used to violate the human rights of those 
who opposed ZANU-PF are, Chingono said, hopefully an anomaly 
that will never happen again.  When asked why officers who 
want to be professional didn't oppose such employment, he 
said, "In a professional military, you can be court-martialed 
for failing to carry out an order."  (COMMENT:  This raises 
questions of culpability for following an illegal order, 
similar to the arguments advanced at the Nuremberg Tribunal 
after WWII, but one can also see the motivation for this, 
given the potentially fatal consequences here in Zimbabwe. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
¶12.  (C) Chingono said that if the West insists on 
prosecution of all personnel involved in the 2008 violence 
 
and the killings in Matabeleland, this is likely to ensure 
that those in power will do everything to retain that power. 
The Ambassador pointed out that these are issues that the 
people of Zimbabwe have to decide, but that there should at 
least be some forum established to allow healing.  Regarding 
any military involvement in violent land seizures, however, 
this is a politically-motivated criminal act, perpetrators 
can be identified, and the legal system should take 
appropriate action. 
 
¶13.  (C) Both Chingono and Satuku said they would like to see 
re-engagement with the U.S. military because they and many of 
their colleagues are impressed with the flexibility and 
resilience of American military personnel. They also think 
that the generation of military officers that will follow 
them could benefit from exposure to American military 
professionalism.  When asked about ethnic conflict in the 
military, the treatment of non-liberation officers, and 
morale, their response was that: (a) when people face 
hardships together, external differences tend to be 
minimized; (b) there is at the junior- and mid-levels no 
difference in treatment, and most units below battalion are 
commanded by officers who entered the military after 1980; 
and (c) while morale now is acceptable, if they're unable to 
keep the military productively occupied, there are likely to 
be problems in the future.  Satuku said that, if there were 
no discipline problems with young soldiers (provided they 
don't interfere with mission accomplishment) he would be 
worried, because it is not possible to have a grouping of 
young men in such an environment and not have at least a few 
problems.  Professional officers, though, can deal with these 
issues.  The key to keeping the military in good order, both 
officers said, is continued economic stability and growth 
which will allow the military to have an adequate flow of 
resources. 
 
¶14.  (C) COMMENT:  These views are from only two people, and 
can't be extrapolated to represent a general consensus of the 
military.  But, they are instructive, and tend to validate 
other information we hear about what goes on inside the ZDF. 
END COMMENT. 
 
RAY