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RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFN #0008/01 0061835
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061835Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3091
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 FREETOWN 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PINS PINR SL
SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE STABILITY IV: CONCLUSIONS 
 
REF: A. 09 FREETOWN 465 
     ¶B. 09 FREETOWN 466 
     ¶C. 09 FREETOWN 471 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/ 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) As reftels have shown Sierra Leone is faced with 
challenges and threats to short- and long-term stability. 
Perhaps the greatest hallmark of Sierra Leonean governance at 
the moment is that it is driven and supported by individuals, 
rather than institutions or ideologies. Reminiscent of the 
country's cultural heritage, in which communities' fortunes 
rested in the hands of the Paramount Chief, government and 
party structures focus power in the hands of very few, who 
either refuse or fear to delegate. There are few checks and 
balances that cannot be bought or sold, and resources are 
insufficient to combat cultural acceptance of corruption or 
fully equip the untrained and unmotivated civil service. 
 
¶2. (C) Without checks and balances or the expectation of 
impartiality and reason, the system is bound to be fraught 
with the same foibles and frailties as the people who embody 
it: fatigue, irrationality, and greed set against an opaque 
backdrop of internal tension and cohesion created by family 
dramas, history, personal slights, ethnicity, regionalism, 
etc. As observers, members of the international community can 
clearly see the results of this system.  Promoting 
development becomes a constant battle, to be fought again and 
again over time, with changing weapons and players but 
consistent outcomes. Our inability to attack root problems 
means that even strategies that take these issues into 
account are limited in their effectiveness, and programs that 
do not are doomed from the start. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The UK attempted a multi-pronged approach by 
investing in institutions and also supporting individuals 
they deem appropriate, but even some British interlocutors 
have conceded that the short-term results are mixed and the 
long-term results uncertain.  Some believe that they 
underestimated the role self-interest plays in local 
decision-making, and they see the tendency for even the most 
educated and informed government officials to rely on their 
personal connections and obligations rather than pragmatism, 
logic, or a sense of national duty. 
 
¶4. (C)  This plays out not only in government ministries, but 
between parties. Sierra Leonean political strategy sometimes 
seems to be a "race to the bottom," wherein opposition 
parties (regardless of who is in power) would rather 
undermine development efforts and spotlight the e ruling 
party's failures than support positive change and rightfully 
assume part of the credit. This holds true even within 
parties, where it appears rivals will cut each other off at 
the knees behind closed doors regardless of the collateral 
damage, and only marginally close ranks in public. This has a 
deleterious impact on governance decisions, since no one has 
national best interests at heart, and in fact deliberately 
creating new hardships is seen as an opportunity to praise or 
criticize. In short, Sierra Leone's political leaders are 
generally a hindrance to economic and social development, 
rather than a help. 
 
¶5. (C) The capacity for Sierra Leone to absorb any kind of 
shock is therefore low: tension in Guinea, external economic 
pressures, and even the 2012 elections represent potential 
damage to this under-performing system. Sierra Leone is 
ill-equipped to handle the potential spill-over of Guinean 
violence and refugees: indeed, the country has insufficient 
financial and operational resources to handle its own 
poverty, floundering economy, and potential for crisis in the 
build-up to 2012. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Sierra Leonean stability exists because of a 
delicate equilibrium between a variety of issues and 
interests. Public will for peaceful development along with 
donor support created this balance in the aftermath of the 
war, but development and support are not mutually exclusive: 
without national will, there would be no donor support, and 
without donor support, national will is likely to evaporate. 
But forces are converging on both elements that put Sierra 
Leonean stability at risk: donors have less funds to provide 
for the numerous needs, and political connivance and 
self-interest, as well as economic desperation, undermines 
the collective will for peace. In the short-term, any factor 
or combination of factors could bring about a devolution, and 
the international community needs to be prepared to provide a 
targeted reaction that will at least address the catalytic 
problems, if not the underlying ones. In the long-term, 
though, endemic corruption will likely be the country's 
greatest destabilizing factor, as it prevents tangible, 
 
FREETOWN 00000008  002 OF 002 
 
 
universal development. The reliance of development partners 
on a few key people with integrity and vision (such as 
President Koroma, Anti-Corruption Commissioner Abdul 
Tejan-Cole, and Chief Justice Umu Hawa Tejan-Jalloh) may not 
be enough to counter-balance the challenges Sierra Leone now 
faces. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Comment continued: Sierra Leone's development 
partners are left with few options, but the presence of a 
handful of senior leaders dedicated to their nation's future, 
while sadly an historic anomaly, is an opportunity that 
points a way forward.  While democracy and governance 
programs will continue to struggle to affect overarching 
change, and the resources to expand agricultural productivity 
remain limited, programs that focus on the provision of 
services -- health, education, and infrastructure -- may 
provide better opportunities for long-term impact. 
Educational programs such as the Ambassador's Girl's 
Scholarship Program (AGSP), Fulbright scholarships, and 
others should be expanded, to create the critical mass of 
future leaders needed to ensure a stable Sierra Leone that is 
part of the solution, rather than a part of the problem, in 
West Africa.  END COMMENT. 
FEDZER