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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/25/2020 
TAGS: ELTN PREL ETRD UZ TI
SUBJECT: UZBEK-TAJIK TRANSPORT -- OFF THE RAILS 
 
REF: A: 09 DUSHANBE 1364; B: DUSHANBE 052 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Ambassador, EXEC, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  A tit-for-tat over rail shipments highlights 
the Tajik rail system's dependence on Uzbekistan for its 
international transport.  After Uzbekistan delayed Tajik 
railcars carrying construction materials for hydroelectric 
projects, Tajikistan responded by holding up Uzbek trains. 
Tashkent upped the ante by prohibiting its trains from carrying 
passengers and most commercial goods across Tajikistan's 
northern Sughd Oblast and by delaying transit of hundreds of 
Tajik railcars and trucks.  Both governments released all 
railcars and trucks by early January, but the Uzbek ban on most 
Uzbek rail transport through Sughd continues.  Tajik officials 
played down the dispute, saying it stemmed from logistical, not 
political, problems.  Foreign Minister Zarifi used this quarrel 
to underscore Tajikistan's intent to request funding for new 
Tajik transport routes that do not cross Uzbek territory at the 
January 28 London conference on Afghanistan.  END COMMENT 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) As of January 1, 2010, the Uzbek government, per decree 
by President Islam Karimov, prohibited shipment of passengers 
and goods, except for fuel and other strategic materials, across 
the Sughd Province of Tajikistan.  The railroad through Sughd, 
which is surrounded by Uzbek territory on three sides, is the 
most direct route from Central Uzbekistan to the Ferghana Valley 
and Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and had been used heavily before the decree 
took effect.  The January 1 decree requires Uzbek trains 
carrying non-strategic goods to make a long detour to the north, 
which dead ends at the Uzbek city of Angren.  Goods must then be 
transported by road to Kokand in the Ferghana Valley and 
re-loaded onto the old rail line. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) The Uzbek decision to end shipments across Sughd follows 
a Tajik-Uzbek dispute over rail shipments that began in November 
¶2009.  In November, after the Tajik government began a major, 
nationalism-fueled campaign to build the Roghun hydroelectric 
dam (reftels), Uzbek officials held up 20 to 30 Tajik railcars 
carrying Roghun construction materials through Uzbek territory, 
according to an employee of Global Link transit company which 
ships Embassy materials by land and rail.  The Tajik government 
responded by holding an equal number of Uzbek train cars 
transiting its Sughd Province.  The Uzbek government then 
delayed transit of hundreds more Tajik railcars and trucks. 
National rail companies supply locomotives to transport all 
railcars transiting their respective territories, giving them 
the ability to control the movement of foreign cargo railcars. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Deputy Head of Tajik Railways Vladimir Chetkalov said 
on January 21 that the problem was resolved and Uzbekistan 
released all Tajik railcars and trucks.  He noted that 
Uzbekistan hurt its own citizens and businessmen with its order 
to end rail transport through Sughd Oblast since shipping costs 
and travel times between Tashkent and the Ferghana Valley would 
increase for Uzbeks.  "We can transport goods by rail at $4.60 a 
ton.  How can they transport goods that cheaply by road from 
Angren?"  The Uzbek decision also hurts Tajik National Railways 
because it will no longer earn transport fees for pulling Uzbek 
railcars across Sughd.  On the Northern Distribution Network, 
Chetkalov complained that the international coalition in 
Afghanistan has underused the Tajik rail system and not sent any 
materials by rail across Tajik territory to coalition forces in 
Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) At a January 18 press conference, Foreign Minister 
Zarifi said he would request funding for building a railroad 
linking Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan (at 
Mazar-i-Sharif) at the January 28 London Conference on 
Afghanistan.  Zarifi said Tajikistan's unreliable rail links to 
its trading partners impeded progress on its economic and 
foreign policy priorities, such as joining the 
Russia/Belarus/Kazakhstan Customs Union.  Zarifi declared that 
Tajikistan "never employed the politics of confrontation toward 
neighboring countries on any issues, including hydroelectric 
power," possibly forgetting Tajikistan's autumn 2009 threats to 
fill its water reservoirs during the summer rather than release 
water to downstream Uzbekistan for irrigation. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) The government has played down the political element of 
the railcar dispute.  In a January 20 meeting with Ambassador 
Gross, Zarifi confirmed that Uzbekistan had released all Tajik 
railcars and said the problem had been "only 10% political" and 
 
DUSHANBE 00000107  002 OF 002 
 
 
resulted mainly from shortages of locomotives in "upstream" in 
Turkmenistan.  However, he admitted the Uzbek government had 
singled out Tajik railcars carrying construction materials for 
Sangtuda-2 and other hydroelectric dam projects.  Railways 
Deputy Chetkalov said the Uzbek Embassy explained the back-up as 
a result of a logjam up-track in Turkmenistan.  Sughd Oblast 
Governor Qohir Rasulzoda said in an interview with Ferghana.ru, 
that the reason for Uzbekistan's decision to cut rail links 
through Sughd was Uzbekistan's opposition to Tajik hydroelectric 
projects, particularly Roghun. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT:  This railcar dispute is only the latest in a 
series of mutually destructive actions by the Uzbek and Tajik 
governments that hurt Tajikistan more because of its physical 
isolation and relatively weaker economic position.  Uzbekistan's 
tough visa regime for Tajiks, the absence of flights between 
Tashkent and Dushanbe, its withdrawal from the Central Asian 
energy grid, and now the severing of most Uzbek rail transit 
through Sughd are perceived in Dushanbe as indications that 
Uzbekistan seeks to detach its economy and transportation system 
from Tajikistan while maintaining its ability to pressure 
Dushanbe.  Since Tajikistan has decided to go all out to build 
Roghun, Uzbekistan can be expected to employ further tactics to 
prevent building materials from reaching Tajikistan.  Though the 
Tajiks see a solution in donor-funded rail links to 
Afghanistan/Turkmenistan, it cannot escape its geographic bond 
to Uzbekistan.  For its long-term economic growth, 
transportation links, and security, Tajikistan must come to an 
understanding with Tashkent on Roghun and a range of other 
issues.  END COMMENT. 
GROSS