VZCZCXRO3934
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0103/01 0211202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211202Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1160
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0394
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 2555

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/21/2020 
TAGS: EFIN PHUM ENRG EAID IMF TI
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS AGREE ON UNIFIED ROGHUN MESSAGE 
 
REF: A. DUSHANBE 052 
     ¶B. 09 DUSHANBE 508 
     ¶C. DUSHANBE 67 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Gross, Ambassador, Exec, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Ambassador Gross convened a meeting of heads of 
diplomatic missions in Dushanbe to discuss a common approach to 
the government of Tajikistan's campaign to force its citizens to 
contribute to the construction of the Roghun dam.  Attendees 
agreed on a two-pronged strategy:  They would work to ensure the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) looked carefully at potential 
violations of its assistance to Tajikistan posed by the Roghun 
campaign.  At the same time they would present a broader set of 
common concerns to government officials.  Attendees agreed on a 
set of limited, achievable goals they would seek via both 
approaches.  Embassy Dushanbe is developing a list of talking 
points for meetings with government and IMF representatives. 
While the government is unlikely to completely back off its 
Roghun campaign, a unified and persistent approach by major 
international donors will be difficult to ignore.  End summary. 
 
 
 
A Unified Approach 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) On January 20, Ambassador Gross convened a meeting of 
heads of diplomatic missions in Dushanbe to discuss the 
government of Tajikistan's campaign to extort and intimidate its 
citizens into buying shares in the Roghun hydroelectric project 
(ref A).  Representatives attended from the British, French, and 
German embassies, as well as the European Commission office. 
Embassy Dushanbe Econoff and USAID Deputy Director also were 
present.  Attendees agreed on the importance of adopting a 
unified approach to the issue:  The government was more likely 
to respond productively to international concerns if they were 
raised with one voice.  President Rahmon has (probably 
deliberately) linked Roghun with the very survival of the Tajik 
nation; any mission criticizing the campaign in isolation risks 
drawing a very emotional and unproductive reaction from the 
government. 
 
 
 
Working Through the IMF 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Representatives agreed on a two-pronged approach.  On the 
one hand, they would bring up a common set of concerns in 
individual meetings with government representatives.  On the 
other, they would work to make sure multilateral donors, 
particularly the IMF, carefully considered potential violations 
of their assistance posed by Roghun.  Even though the IMF's 
concerns are narrower than those of the international community 
as a whole -- for instance they are unlikely to consider human 
rights questions -- the Fund has a degree of clout and influence 
with the government not shared by any other organization. 
Furthermore, other international lenders, such as the Asian 
Development Bank and the European Commission, require that the 
government abide by IMF agreements as a condition for their own 
assistance.  EC Charge d'affaires ad interim Charlotte Adriaen 
stated flatly that if the IMF withdrew its funding she "had no 
problem immediately withdrawing EC funds as well."  She noted 
that this is precisely what had happened in 2008 as a result of 
the National Bank misreporting scandal. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) At the meeting several possible violations of the IMF's 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility were identified (ref C): 
(1) Overall government spending was likely to expand beyond 
agreed-upon amounts; (2) spending on Roghun in particular would 
exceed the $140 million agreed to; (3) the government is failing 
to meet minimal social sector spending requirements because its 
expenditures have been offset by forced Roghun contributions 
from pensioners, doctors, teachers, and other social sector 
employees; (4) Roghun funds are being maintained off-budget; and 
(5) no analysis has been conducted about adverse macroeconomic 
effects of the Roghun campaign. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Attendees agreed to raise these concerns with their 
representatives on the IMF Executive Board in Washington and 
with a high-level IMF assessment mission coming to Tajikistan 
February 1-12.  The goal is not only to make sure the IMF 
understands how important an issue Roghun is, but to help it 
take a firm -- but still productive -- stand in its discussions 
with the Tajik government.  Since Roghun shares went on sale 
January 6, 2010, and many of the IMF's existing benchmarks 
(e.g., minimal social spending) apply to 2009, the Fund could 
 
DUSHANBE 00000103  002 OF 003 
 
 
adopt a very narrow approach and defer judgment on many Roghun 
questions.  According to IMF Resident Representative, however, 
the team visiting in February will have to consider Roghun; a 
unified message from international donors will reinforce this 
focus.  They will also be responsible for drafting 2010 
benchmarks, which many donors believe should require government 
transparency regarding Roghun. 
 
 
 
Approaching the Government Directly 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) All at the meeting agreed it was also necessary to 
approach the government directly with concerns about the Roghun 
campaign.  There was some discussion about whether this should 
be done via a joint statement or diplomatic note, perhaps from 
the Donor Coordination Council (DCC), or whether missions should 
individually voice their concerns.  In the end it was agreed 
that a series of individual, informal meetings with government 
officials, all carefully emphasizing the same key concerns, was 
likely to be the most effective means of demonstrating the 
seriousness of our concerns without eliciting an unproductive 
response.  A formal, joint effort could trigger a defiant 
"us-against-the world" reaction from the government.  Some 
believed the DCC could follow up with a more targeted message 
focusing on potential violations of international agreements, 
but should steer clear of the emotions associated with the 
broader Roghun campaign itself. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Concerns delivered directly to the government would 
expand on those enunciated through the IMF:  (1) Numerous and 
persistent reports of forced purchases in Roghun raise serious 
concerns about human rights; (2) donors are concerned that 
Roghun finances lack transparency and may violate provisions of 
international assistance; (3) the purchase of Roghun shares 
destroyed the savings of many poor Tajiks, leaving them very 
vulnerable to future shocks, such as poor weather, falling 
remittances, and increasing inflation; (4) International donors 
are very sympathetic to the government's desire for energy 
security, but they would have to carefully review their future 
assistance if they believed the government's policies were 
adding to, rather than alleviating, poverty.  Embassy Dushanbe 
is circulating a set of suggested talking points for both the 
IMF and the government. 
 
 
 
Goals 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) No one at the meeting expected the government could be 
convinced to reverse the Roghun campaign and return the money 
spent on shares, but several achievable goals were identified: 
 
 
 
(A) The government should act to end forced purchases of Roghun 
shares.  This includes direct government coercion of its 
employees, as well as the indirect coercion at universities, 
hospitals, private firms, and other institutions. 
 
 
 
(B) The government should transparently account for and spend 
the money generated from sales of Roghun shares. 
 
 
 
(C) The government should provide more public information about 
shareholder rights, including when and how shareholders may 
sell, transfer, or redeem their shares; what their voting rights 
are for the Roghun board of directors; and other specifics. 
 
 
 
(D) Minimum social sector spending must be maintained; Roghun 
expenditures from social sector employees and institutions -- 
doctors, clinics, teachers, schools, pensioners, etc. -- should 
be offset by additional investment in this sector. 
 
 
 
(E) Individuals who were fired or otherwise penalized for 
refusing to buy Roghun shares should be reinstated and/or 
entitled to a credible grievance procedure.  This includes 
individuals who resigned in protest over the government's 
 
DUSHANBE 00000103  003 OF 003 
 
 
coercive policies. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  Achieving these goals, and ending the majority 
of human rights violations, will require balance -- donors must 
be firm enough to make sure the government understands the 
seriousness of our concerns but not so severe that it ends the 
discussion.  A series of individual approaches all underlining 
the same key issues stands the best chance of achieving this. 
At the same time, it is important to be clear and consistent 
with the IMF about our concerns about financial transparency. 
This means approaching key IMF officials both in Dushanbe and in 
Washington.  Though the IMF's concerns are narrower than those 
of the donors at large, its clout and reputation give it the 
best chance of ending some of the government's most flagrant 
practices. 
GROSS