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P 071413Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9610
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USAFCENT SHAW AFB SC PRIORITY
RBDHDZA/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCAICL/MARCENT HQ ELEMENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T DOHA 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2020 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.- QATAR MILITARY CONSULTATIVE 
COMMISSION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
¶1. (C) The eleventh meeting of the U.S. - Qatar Military 
Consultative Committee (MCC) is scheduled for 11-15 January 
2010 in Washington DC.  The last MCC between Qatar and the 
U.S. took place in March 2007.  Brigadier General Abdulla 
Juma'an, Chief of International Relations, (referred to as 
"General Abdulla"), will lead the Qatar delegation. The 
Qataris see this MCC as an important demonstration of the 
U.S. - Qatar strategic relationship reflecting Qatar's 
commitment to a broad strategic partnership with the United 
States. 
 
¶2. (S) Below is a brief overview of the major issues and 
trends in our bilateral relationship with Qatar. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
THE MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: KEY ISSUES AND TRENDS 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) BACKGROUND: Qatar provides the U.S. military 
rent-free access to two major Qatari military installations, 
Al Udeid Airbase and Camp As-Sayliyah.  Al Udeid is the site 
of both CENTCOM's Forward Headquarters and Special Operations 
Command, Central (SOCCENT). Until recently, the U.S. had 
never made a major defense sale to Qatar.  In July 2008 Qatar 
signed contracts with Boeing for two C-17s with an option for 
two more, and with Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js also with 
an option for two more.  The C-17 and C-130 sales could be a 
signal Qatar may be beginning to invest in its own defensive 
capabilities, with a preference for U.S.-origin equipment. 
It has expressed interest in many other systems, most notably 
integrated air defense equipment. 
 
¶4. (S) DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:  We have 
long believed that Qatar lacks an overarching national 
military strategy.  It has not clarified what it envisions 
for its military over the next 5, 10, or 20 years. With 
regard to the US-Qatar mil-mil relationship, it has not 
suggested what it will do when the DCA comes open for 
renegotiation in 2012.  It has not committed itself to a 
long-term Foreign Military Sales program.  In 2008 GEN 
Petraeus offered CENTCOM assistance in development of  a 
national military strategy, something the Crown Prince 
accepted.  A senior Qatari delegation traveled to Tampa in 
August 2009, where they held discussions on the subject. 
Their next meeting with CENTCOM planners was scheduled for 
mid-November but was postponed by the Qataris.  We are 
looking to re-engage with them on this subject at the MCC and 
try for the next meeting in March 2010, either in Doha or 
Tampa. 
 
¶5. (S) PROTECTION OF CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: 
Security of Qatar's oil and natural gas infrastructure, 
especially the North Field off the northern tip of the 
country, and the on-shore gas liquefaction facilities at Ras 
Laffan, are of high interest to the U.S.  Armed smuggling, 
piracy, and potential terrorist activity in the North Field 
would be felt around the world. Protection of these assets 
figures prominently in Qatar's vision for an integrated air 
and missile defense system. 
 
¶6.  (S) INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM:  Three 
times since 1999 Qatar has expressed interest in purchasing 
elements of a missile defense system, including PATRIOT, only 
to back away after significant time and expense was invested 
by both them and the US.  The current round of interest began 
in June 2008 with six Letters of Request for Price and 
Availability (PnA) data on PATRIOT, THAAD, MEADS, SL-AMRAAM; 
a site survey and defense analysis; and for a bilateral 
working group.  The working group met throughout the fall of 
2008 but progress ultimately halted after Qatar refused to 
fund a site survey (required under the FMS process). Movement 
has begun again since September 2009 with DSCA agreeing to 
provide PnA data for PATRIOT per the 2008 LOR, but Qatar 
still balks at funding a survey.  There is more to this than 
meets the eye:  some of Qatar's intransigence is likely due 
to bargaining, but also to insecurity as it wishes, as Qatar 
sees it, to be treated the same as Kuwait and UAE, with whom 
the US apparently has shared some initial IADS costs. 
 
¶7. (C) CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATIONS ISSUES: Customs and 
immigrations problems stemming from Qatari concerns related 
to sovereignty over Al Udeid Airbase will continue to plague 
 
the mil-mil relationship for some time to come, although the 
Crown Prince, Sheikh Tamim, and the Qatar Armed Force Chief 
of Staff, Major General Al-Attiyeh, have pledged to work with 
U.S. counterparts to put in place reliable procedures and 
enforce them. Late last year the U.S. Mission in Qatar formed 
a USG civilian-military interagency synchronization group for 
joint pol-mil engagement with the Qataris on the civilian and 
military customs and immigration issues faced by the Embassy 
and the US military. We have begun active engagement with the 
Qatari interagency on these issues and hope that the upcoming 
MCC discussions will assist in taking that engagement to the 
next level, bringing us closer to finding strategic solutions 
to these persistent problems. 
 
¶8.  (S) LAIRCM (Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure): 
There are two issues with LAIRCM:  LAIRCM for Qatar's Head of 
State (HoS) aircraft, and LAIRCM for Qatar's C-17s. 
 
a.  LAIRCM for Qatar's HoS aircraft: As background, Qatar 
Airways (not the State of Qatar) submitted Letters of Request 
(LORs) in July and September 2007 requesting installation of 
the AN/AAQ-24 (LAIRCM) infra-red counter-measure system on 
several of their HoS aircraft--2 x A330s, 1 x A340, and 2 x 
B747-800s.  The US Government approval authority for LAIRCM, 
the OSD(AT&L) Defensive Systems Committee (DSC), denied the 
request based on the following considerations: 
 
      - (S) The classified USAF policy guidelines for export 
of LAIRCM to non Tier-1 countries requires HoS aircraft to be 
wholly government-owned, and exclusively used for HoS travel. 
 The Qatar HoS aircraft were owned and operated by Qatar 
Airways, which is only 50% government owned. 
 
      - (S) A comprehensive intelligence assessment, which 
included Qatar's international relationships, technology 
protection capability, and security capability, identified a 
significant risk of technology exploitation. 
 
Qatar reduced the number of aircraft it designates as HOS (to 
two) and transferred them to the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) 
in an effort to address US concerns.  It has stated its 
desire to submit a new request for LAIRCM.  OMC Qatar wrote a 
new draft Letter of Request and gave it to QEAF in Sep 09. 
To date Qatar has not returned the LOR. 
 
b.  (SBU)  LAIRCM for Qatar's C-17s Qatar bought two C-17 
aircraft via Direct Commercial Sales from Boeing, and 
understood that those aircraft would come with the LAIRCM 
system installed.  Shortly before delivery of the C-17s in 
Aug 09, Qatar learned that LAIRCM was an after-market add-on 
and their planes would be delivered without the system. 
Anticipating that Qatar will not be approved LAIRCM for its 
C-17 aircraft, CENTCOM in coordination with SAF/IA and DSCA 
has urged Qatar to consider ELIAS (Enhanced Large Aircraft 
IRCM Solutions) as an alternative. 
 
c.  (SBU)  In late Dec 09, Brigadier General Abdulla Juma'an 
requested a LAIRCM capabilities brief at the January MCC. 
SAF/IA has replied that it will not brief the LAIRCM system 
until Qatar submits an LOR. 
 
¶9.  (C) CAS SECURITY CONTRACT WITH DYNCORPS: DynCorps holds 
the security contract for Camp As Sayliyah (CAS).  Its 
ability to employ armed guards comes from a legal waiver 
granted to it annually by the Qatar government.  In 
anticipation of a change to Qatari law, the Qatar Armed 
Forces advised CAS on 10 Dec 09 that it would not extend the 
waiver past the end of the year. 
 
Since then, ARCENT has requested that QAF extend the waiver 
another year; or, failing that, an extension of 90 days to 
allow it to organize an alternative force protection plan. 
QAF has so far granted an extension of the waiver through 
January 2010. 
 
¶10. (S) Following are the key trends over the next three 
years that we believe will have the greatest impact on our 
military relationship: 
 
-- (S) Qatar will continue to modernize its (tiny) military 
through the purchase of U.S. weapons systems, though 
competition will continue from the French, British, and 
others.  However, these defense purchases will be made in the 
context of a frugal military budget. 
 
 
-- (S) Economic and human development will remain Qatar's top 
spending priorities, and we have heard that military 
purchases will be on a slower track.  This slower-track 
approach will be a notable factor in their calculations as 
they deliberate on which air missile defense system to 
purchase and how many units. 
 
-- (S) Qatari leadership will seek to enhance the prestige of 
its military within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
the international arena, but has no clearly defined strategy 
for doing so.  Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest 
military systems, even while its military modernization is 
not guided by a national security strategy. 
 
-- (S) We expect that the biggest factor in our engagement in 
the near-term will be Qatar's sensitivity to the large, 
enduring U.S. military presence.  While Qatar's leadership 
regards our presence as a permanent and necessary deterrent 
to the aggression of surrounding states, principally Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, it does expose it to regional criticism and, 
potentially, to terrorist attack. 
 
-- (S) Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge 
staffing its military with Qataris because there are so few 
of them, and because more attractive opportunities exist 
elsewhere in the government and the private sector.  The 
continued dependence on foreign nationals, particularly in 
the enlisted ranks, will continue to present concerns about 
transfers of sensitive U.S. technology. 
 
-- (C) Despite occasional tactical irritants, we expect that 
Qatar will continue to pursue a policy of strengthening and 
deepening the military relationship at a strategic level 
through increased combined planning, training, exercises, and 
operations. 
 
-- (S) Throughout its short history Qatar has relied on the 
presence of an outside power (Britain, then the U.S.) to 
guarantee its security.  In addition, demographic realities 
(the shortage of military-age male citizens to serve in the 
military) and the lack of any martial tradition in the 
culture contribute to a national reluctance to be 
self-reliant in terms of defense.  We expect this reluctance 
to continue and consider it one pillar in Qatar's unwritten 
military strategy. 
 
-- (S) That said, the current leadership appears to recognize 
the need to modernize and professionalize its military 
forces.  Qatar recognizes that its foremost strategic center 
of gravity is the economic wealth derived from hydrocarbon 
resources.  Any threat to the facilities or transport systems 
that supply that wealth could deeply undermine the government 
and the country's independence. With that in mind, we believe 
Qatar wishes to continue to make incremental improvements in 
all components of its military, with the caveat that such 
investments will remain subordinate to the primary national 
goal of economic and human development.  We perceive a shift 
in Qatar's preference for defense equipment from European to 
American products, and expect this is in part due to the 
recognition that interoperability with U.S. forces will serve 
as a force-multiplier for their own troops.  Nevertheless, 
Qatar's desire to be the "friend of everyone and the enemy of 
no one" means that politics will remain a crucial factor in 
any defense purchase decision. 
 
--------------------------- 
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with 
the U.S. is impressive, especially for a small country of 
only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are 
actually Qatari citizens. 
 
-- (SBU) Beyond the mil-mil relationship, the broader 
economic relationship between Qatar and the United States is 
important to Qatar.  U.S. energy companies have invested tens 
of billions of dollars in the oil and gas industry here. 
Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas reserves in 
the world after Iran and Russia, will soon be one of the most 
important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas to the 
U.S. 
 
-- (U) Because it is so small and its energy resources so 
large, Qatar has an annual per capita income of over $60,000, 
and far more than that, if only Qatari citizens are 
considered.  Even during the recent global financial crisis 
Qatar's national revenues continued to grow.  Qatar now has, 
according to the IMF, the highest per capita income in the 
world. 
 
-- (S) Qatar's location, wide-ranging foreign relations, 
fast-growing economy, and expanding transportation links have 
made counterterrorism cooperation, including counterterrorist 
financing, a key aspect of our relationship. Qatar's wealth, 
in particular, means its citizens are potential sources of 
money for violent extremists and cooperative efforts to 
target and prevent these financial flows are central to our 
bilateral agenda. 
 
-- (SBU) Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab 
states to modernizing its educational system and has turned 
decisively to the Unites States for help.  Qatar has imported 
branch campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas 
A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School, 
Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern.  It is 
instituting a U.S. model of charter schools at the elementary 
and secondary levels. 
LeBaron