VZCZCXRO3714
RR RUEHPT
DE RUEHBY #0053/01 0210739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210739Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2551
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3803
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 6919
RUEHPT/AMCONSUL PERTH 5186
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 5195
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUHEMAB/PACOM CCP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2020 
TAGS: PREL MRRR PARM PINS AS JA
SUBJECT: SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION FORUM (SDCF) 
READOUT 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Edgard D. Kagan for reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Delegations from the United States, 
Australia, and Japan met in Sydney on November 23, 2009 for 
the third Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF).  The 
U.S. delegation was co-chaired by Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 
Affairs Wallace "Chip" Gregson.  Over two days, the 
conference tackled a wide-ranging agenda.  There was general 
agreement on most issues, but the conference continued to 
highlight the need for greater coordination among the three 
countries on many security-related issues.  Some of the key 
outcomes included: 
 
--Continued importance of building a viable trilateral 
information sharing mechanism among the three countries. 
 
--An agreement to conduct a desktop exercise featuring a 
disaster relief scenario early next year. 
 
--Australia will prepare a paper detailing opportunities for 
further partnership among the three countries in maritime 
security. 
 
--An agreement to better coordinate the schedule of military 
exercises.  An open invitation was also offered for Japan to 
observe the U.S.-Australia Talisman Sabre exercises, and 
Australia asked to observe the U.S.-Japan KEEN SWORD/EDGE 
exercises. 
 
--Australia will prepare a paper on maritime security 
cooperation for presentation at the next intercessional 
meeting of the SDCF. 
 
--Australia will host the next director-level intercessional 
meeting in May or June 2010. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Information Sharing and Security 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Information sharing has continued to improve, but all 
agreed that establishment of a formal information sharing 
mechanism between Australia and Japan remains a top priority. 
 Japan and Australia are currently in the midst of 
negotiations on a legally binding information sharing 
agreement and hope to have it finalized by late 2010. 
According to Nobushige Takamizawa, Director General of the 
Defense Policy Bureau for the Japanese Ministry of Defense, 
the new Japanese government is looking to create a unified, 
government-wide regime for handling classified information. 
The United States and Japan recently traded visits to observe 
one another's procedures for handling classified information, 
as called for in the bilateral General Security of Military 
Information Agreement (GSOMIA). 
 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Australia, Japan, and the United States agreed that 
it is important for the three countries to better coordinate 
future responses to disasters and humanitarian crises.  The 
three delegations viewed the joint responses to the 
earthquake in Indonesia and the tsunami in Samoa as 
successes, but said that those efforts also highlighted the 
need and opportunity for greater coordination.  Australian 
Acting Deputy Secretary of Defence for Strategy Peter 
Jennings called on the three sides to hold a meeting of key 
HA/DR planners, and suggested that the Australian draft 
tabletop exercise currently scheduled for February might be 
the right opportunity.  As directed in the 2006 Pacific 
Global Air Mobility Seminar terms of reference, the three 
countries plan to develop SOPs for airlifts and air 
refueling.  The Japanese delegation pushed hard for a mutual 
Qrefueling.  The Japanese delegation pushed hard for a mutual 
logistics support agreement between Japan and Australia, like 
the U.S.-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
(ACSA), which would allow more seamless cooperation between 
Australian and Japanese forces in HA/DR operations. 
 
Joint/Combined Training Opportunities 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The SDCF explored opportunities to expand and enhance 
 
CANBERRA 00000053  002 OF 003 
 
 
joint/combined training opportunities; however budgetary 
constraints and real-world demands on forces may limit what 
is possible.  Australia issued an open invitation to Japan to 
observe Talisman Sabre, a major joint U.S.-Australia 
exercise, and expressed interest in observing KEEN SWORD and 
KEEN EDGE, major U.S.-Japan joint exercises.  Australian 
officials asserted that lack of access to Japanese airfields 
limits their ability to participate in training exercises, 
and all sides agreed to investigate this problem further. 
The group also discussed expanding P-3 training 
opportunities, possibly conducting a trilateral ground 
exercise, and conducting a trilateral exercise based in Guam, 
but all will require further discussion before any future 
plans are finalized.  Assistant Secretary Gregson also raised 
the possibility of conducting training in the Freely 
Associated States in the Western Pacific at some point in the 
future. 
 
Basing of Australian Aircraft 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Jennings pressed the United States and Japan to find 
a way to extend the U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to 
cover Australian personnel embedded with U.S. forces and to 
allow the basing of Australian aircraft for trilateral 
exercises in Japan.  This issue was referred to the 
directors' meeting the following day, but no agreement was 
reached, as Japan is unwilling to apply the U.S. SOFA to 
Australians and Australia is reluctant to cede sovereignty of 
its forces to the U.S. UCMJ.  After a lengthy discussion, the 
best Japan would offer was to examine this on a case-by-case 
basis.  Discussions will continue in the future. 
 
Perspectives on China's Goals in the Region 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The SDCF agreed that China's short-term intentions 
are peaceful, but questioned its long-term goals.  Colonel 
Frank Miller of the U.S. Joint Staff said that China's 
ultimate goal is to perpetuate Communist Party rule.  China 
is seeking to ensure stability through economic growth and 
has determined that peace is the best way to accomplish this. 
 Jennings noted that while China claims its intentions are 
benign, its acquisition of force projection and asymmetrical 
capabilities raises concerns about China's long-term intent. 
 
Bilateral Military Engagement with China 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The three countries each outlined their bilateral 
military engagement with the PRC.  Both Japan and Australia 
reported that they feel their bilateral engagement with China 
has been productive.  Australia has a major bilateral 
exchange in 2010, along with a seminar on peacekeeping and a 
military artistic exchange (i.e. military bands).  Japan 
expected that the Chinese defense minister will visit Japan 
in late November.  During the visit, Japan will propose 
formalizing regular ministerial visits, bilateral ship 
visits, and a trilateral China-Japan-South Korea forum.  In 
the next year, Japan also expects that its defense minister 
will visit China.  In closing, Australia stressed the need to 
push for more substantive military engagement with China, 
rather than just a formulaic exchange of visits. 
 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The three delegations agreed that it is important to 
persuade North Korea to return to the negotiating table, but 
that they are not willing to offer concessions for promises 
Qthat they are not willing to offer concessions for promises 
the DPRK has already undertaken in previous rounds of 
negotiations.  All parties agreed that is was important that 
China take a more active role with regard to North Korea. 
 
Contributions to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The three sides all summarized their current 
commitments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and what future 
contributions are under consideration.  Australia reiterated 
its stance that it will not assume Lead Nation Status in 
Oruzgan Province after the Dutch withdraw in August 2010 and 
that their current troop levels are "about right."  Australia 
plans to reassess the composition of its forces in 
Afghanistan and significantly increase its civilian presence 
 
CANBERRA 00000053  003 OF 003 
 
 
there.  Takamizawa said that the new Japanese government 
wants to make a unique contribution to Afghanistan, but has 
ruled out sending military forces.  Japan is unlikely to make 
any decision about involvement in Afghanistan in the near 
future beyond its November 2009 pledge of $5 billion for 
disarmament, reintegration, and civilian security sector 
assistance.  In Pakistan, Australia highlighted expanded 
training of Pakistani police forces and Japan its civilian 
aid program. 
 
Missile Defense Cooperation 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The three countries expressed optimism for future 
cooperation on bilateral missile defense.  Takamizawa and 
Deputy ASD Robert Scher both hoped that the U.S. and Japan 
would be able to broaden their cooperation on missile 
defense.  Takamizawa said that in the near future missiles 
based in Japan may help keep the U.S. safe due to the 
increasing range of North Korean missiles, and that it may be 
time to debate changing Japan's interpretation of its 
constitution to allow this.  Australia was more cautious on 
missile defense, stating that it supports it so long as it 
does not upset the regional balance of power.  Australia will 
host the Trilateral Missile Defense Forum in the first half 
of 2010. 
 
Maritime Security 
----------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The conference acknowledged the great successes that 
the three countries have had working together on maritime 
security and called for improved coordination.  The three 
delegations praised the success of anti-piracy efforts in the 
Gulf of Aden, where all three countries are engaged.  Each 
country outlined its current maritime security efforts in the 
Asia-Pacific and stressed the need for improved coordination 
of these efforts.  There was a consensus that building the 
capacity of Asia-Pacific nations to deal with their own 
maritime security concerns is key to this effort. 
 
Counter-Proliferation 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The group praised the success of the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) and discussed proliferation 
concerns in North Korea and Burma.  DAS Tony Foley of the 
Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation 
complimented both Japan and Australia for their strong 
leadership role in the PSI and stressed the need for them to 
continue in that regard.  He highlighted President Obama's 
call to make PSI an enduring international institution and 
emphasized that this did not mean the PSI would evolve to a 
traditional international organization and that PSI would 
retain its flexibility.  He stated that the United States is 
developing the terms of reference to implement its role as 
the PSI Point of Contact and would share that with the OEG 
states.  Responding to his query regarding hosting of the PSI 
Operational Experts' Group meeting, the Japanese side stated 
it had committed to do so but could not confirm yet that it 
would as the budgetary request has not yet been approved. 
Foley announced that Burma had recently agreed to implement 
UN Security Council Resolution 1874. 
 
¶13.  (U) This cable has been cleared by DOS/PM, DOS/ISN, 
DOS/EAP, DOS/S/SRAP, DOD/OSD. 
BLEICH