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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000073 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY:  ADDED SPACES TO SEPERATE PARAGRAPHS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AF/C AND EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2029 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG BU RW BE
SUBJECT: DEPUTY GREAT LAKES ENVOY JIM YELLIN'S MEETING WITH 
BELGIAN MFA 
 
BRUSSELS 00000073  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Richard M. Eason for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
Introduction and Summary 
------------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) James Yellin, Deputy to the U.S. Special Advisor for 
Africa,s Great Lakes region, met with Belgian MFA Africa 
Division officials on December 18 after returning from his 
travel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Burundi, and Rwanda with Roeland van de Geer, the EU Special 
Representative for the Great Lakes Region.  The meeting was 
hosted by Africa Director General Renier Nijskens.  Also 
present were Foreign Minister Vanackere,s Africa Advisor 
Karl D,haene, Congo Desk Officer Hugues Chantry, Jean-Michel 
Dumont from van de Geer's office, and Poloff. 
 
¶2. (C) Yellin said the U.S. places importance on 
collaborating with the EU and Belgium on peace processes in 
Africa.  With regard to Burundi, he said that international 
observers should be present before, during and after the 
elections in 2010.  The Belgian MFA officials agreed and said 
they would examine the possibility of increasing the number 
and length of stay of Belgian election observers. 
 
¶3.  (C) Dumont remarked that the FDLR had reorganized 
effectively in the wake of the military operations against 
them and had the initiative in eastern Congo.  He said that 
CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda seemed to be consolidating his 
power over military units and the populace in Masisi to 
protect himself in the event the Congolese government t@nder his International 
CrimmaryQ` July 26, second round of presidential elections if 
needed; July 28, Senate elected by Communal Councils; 
September, lections for the Communal Councils and Hill 
CQuncils.  End note) 
 
¶6. (C) Nijskens commented that Youssef Mahmoud, the head of 
the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), was concerned 
about security during the elections and had asked UN planners 
to come up with options for dealing with possible emergencies. 
 
Congo 
----- 
 
¶7. (C) Dumont from the office of the EU Special 
Representative described the situation in North and South 
Kivu as tense.  He said the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) had reorganized into an efficient 
organization in the wake of the military operations against 
them and had the initiative in the Kivus.  Although they had 
lost important cassiterite mines, he noted, they continued to 
exploit gold, timber, and charcoal.  He suggested that MONUC 
target military operations against FDLR military leaders in 
the DRC. 
 
¶8. (C) Dumont said the integration of the National Congress 
for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and other armed groups 
into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) had not taken place 
as foreseen by the  GoDRC-CNDP agreement of March 23, 2009.. 
 
BRUSSELS 00000073  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
(Note:  The March 23 agreement specifies that the CNDP will 
transform itself into a political party and integrate its 
fighters into the Congolese army and police.  The GoDRC, for 
its part, is required to establish a National Follow-Up 
Commission and grant prominent government positions to CNDP 
officials.  Although the commission exists, its meetings have 
been largely unproductive, and no CNDP officials have been 
given national-level jobs in the GoDRC.  End Note.) 
 
¶9. (C) Dumont said the supposedly integrated army units 
appear to be loyal to Bosco Ntaganda, not to the GoDRC. 
Bosco seems to be pursing a two-pronged strategy of trying to 
maintain good relations with both Kinshasa and Kigali, while 
increasing his own control over local forces.  According to 
Dumont, Bosco has been delivering speeches in Masisi in North 
Kivu asking the people of the province to rise up and join 
him should he be arrested as required by the ICC warrant. 
Dumont said that Bosco has access to funds from local 
&taxation8 of approximately 250 thousand dollars per month. 
Bosco's influence has risen in the east, Dumont said, while 
Congolese central government authority, especially in Masisi, 
has waned. 
 
¶10. (C) Nijskens said that some governments, which he did not 
specify, were uneasy with the perceived U.S. goal of 
arresting Bosco soon and thought that it would be better to 
wait.  Dumont said he was told by GoDRC contacts that Bosco 
would be arrested when the timing was convenient for the 
GoDRC, and that Kinshasa might use his arrest as a 
justification for withdrawing its opposition to an extension 
of the mandate of MONUC.  Dumont said that the government of 
Rwanda was against Bosco's arrest at this time. 
 
¶11. (C) Nijskens noted that Congolese president Kabila had 
promised to hold local elections in February 2011 and 
parliamentary and presidential elections on September 4, 
¶2011.   However, Nijskens continued, Congolese planning for 
the elections is slow, and the government will be unable to 
put in place the administrative and logistical mechanisms 
needed to keep to this schedule.  Dumont, by contrast, 
believed that it would be possible to put in place the 
necessary mechanisms but that the government would use 
administrative and logistical problems as an excuse to delay 
elections. 
 
Rwanda 
------ 
 
¶12. (C) The Belgian MFA officials said that Kagame is 
concerned about the morale and loyalty of senior francophone 
Tutsi army officers.  To reduce the uneasiness of the Tutsi 
francophone elite, Nijskens observed, Kagame had 
reestablished diplomatic relations with France the same day 
that Rwanda had joined the British Commonwealth. 
 
¶13. (U) This message has been cleared by Yellin. 
 
GUTMAN