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Viewing cable 10BRUSSELS106, EMBASSY CONTINUES VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN OF AWARENESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BRUSSELS106 2010-01-27 16:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brussels
VZCZCXRO2728
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBS #0106/01 0271603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271603Z JAN 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9952
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD, EUR/RPM, SCA/A AND S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV EAID BE AF
SUBJECT: EMBASSY CONTINUES VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN OF AWARENESS 
ON AFGHANISTAN IN ADVANCE OF LONDON CONFERENCE 
 
REF: A. 09 BRUSSELS 1737 
     B. 09 BRUSSELS 1739 
 
BRUSSELS 00000106  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) Summary: Embassy Brussels, and particularly Ambassador 
Gutman, have intensified their efforts to raise Belgian 
public and official awareness, understanding and support for 
the President's strategy on Afghanistan since the new year. 
The strategy has included a vigorous round of media 
interviews, discussions with government and opposition 
politicians, and an unprecedented appearance before a joint 
committee of the Belgian parliament.  His arguments appeal to 
Belgium's international credibility as an important tool in 
rallying support across Europe to do more to achieve peace 
and stability in Afghanistan as envisaged by the President's 
recently announced Afghanistan strategy.  In meetings with 
the severest critics of Belgium's already proportionately 
strong military engagement in Afghanistan, the Ambassador 
found significant support for more civilian assistance to the 
country.  Using requests for military protection we have 
received from the Belgians for their aid workers in Haiti as 
a metaphor, he began to develop sympathy and understanding 
for why security forces are needed in Afghanistan.  Prime 
Minister Leterme, however, remains a hard sell, although even 
he feels the January 28 London Conference on Afghanistan 
could generate "new views."  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) The Belgian government, in the persons of Defense 
Minister Pieter De Crem, Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere, 
Minister of Development Cooperation Charles Michel, Interior 
Minister Annemie Turtelboom and Justice Minister Stefaan De 
Clerck, appeared before the Belgian parliament on January 13. 
 These appearances did not break new ground, but they 
confirmed the Belgian government's intention to maintain its 
current commitment through the end of 2010.  Essentially, 
this consists of providing security for Kabul Airport, six 
F-16's with pilots and support personnel based at Kandahar, 
participation in a German-led PRT in Kunduz and two OMLT's on 
the ground in Kunduz.  The Belgians also recently deployed a 
contingent as part of NATO Allied Land Component 
Headquarters, led by Major General Hubert De Vos as Deputy 
Commander for Resources, from Heidelberg to Kabul.  The 
debate in Parliament was an opportunity for those who oppose 
the current Belgian commitment to Afghanistan, and even more 
bitterly oppose an increase in that commitment, to again make 
their views known.  Key among these are Flemish Socialist 
Dirk Van Der Maelen (Sp.a) and Flemish green party member 
Wouter DeVriendt (Groen!).  Their attitude is that "the war 
in Afghanistan cannot be won".  Other skeptical 
parliamentarians include Hilde Voetmans (Open VLD) and former 
Defense Minister Andre Flahaut (PS), although their 
objections are more practical and political than 
ideologically or categorically opposed. 
 
3. (U) Defending government policy, De Crem pointed out 
successes in Afghanistan so far, and Vanackere noted that the 
government's critics had not presented any other policy 
solutions.  Vanackere said that it is not a good idea to 
present a timetable for withdrawal because it will give the 
Afghan people the impression that Belgium is giving up on 
them.  Although there seemed to be some support for extending 
Belgium's participation in ISAF beyond 2010, there was no 
mention of the possibility of doing more than the measures 
announced in early December by the government.  These consist 
of 2-3 police trainers and a magistrate, and an intention to 
increase development aid if the Karzai government can show 
progress in good governance and anti-corruption efforts. 
 
4. (U) With the President's recently announced Afghanistan 
strategy in mind, and with the January 28 conference in 
London fast approaching, the Ambassador and the Embassy 
wished to energize public discussion of Belgium's role in 
ISAF and Afghanistan.  During a public panel discussion on 
January 13 hosted and reported by the center-left Dutch 
language daily De Morgen, and amplified at a luncheon held 
for all major media outlets in the country the following day, 
the Ambassador laid out an argument for an increased Belgian 
military and civilian presence in Afghanistan.  He said that 
he finds broad agreement that terrorism is a real threat to 
Europe and to Belgium.  He then told the journalists that he 
wished to clear up some misconceptions in the public mind 
about President Obama's strategy.  First, he said, the 
President is well aware that a purely military solution to 
terrorism is not possible.  He knows that sustainable social 
and economic development and an integrated civilian and 
military approach is necessary.  It is necessary to put into 
 
BRUSSELS 00000106  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
place enough security to permit development assistance to 
have an effect.  This is the reason for the "surge" of 30,000 
U.S. and an expected 7,000 ISAF partner troops.  The 
Ambassador urged Belgium to consider sending 50, 75, or 100 
troops to the theater, although he stressed there is no 
specific ask in that regard.  "Something like 100 troops 
would be noticed by the Allies," he said.  He said that he 
recognizes that Belgium's financial and manpower resources 
are smaller than other European partners'.  However, he said 
that Belgium's participation is important because of 
Belgium's credibility as a country without a particular ax to 
grind in international affairs.  If Belgium participates, it 
is and example of moral leadership that sends a strong 
message to other partners in Europe and elsewhere that a 
unified and determined response to the problem of Afghanistan 
is needed.  The Ambassador repeated this message in public 
media and private meetings with key officials over the next 
week to ten days. 
 
5. (U) The Ambassador's words at the media luncheon evoked a 
strong reaction.  The Belgian wire service Belga issued a 
news alert headlined "U.S. Ambassador Asks for 100 Troops for 
Afghanistan" within 15 minutes of the journalists leaving the 
Ambassador's residence.  The story under the headline 
correctly reported that the numbers mentioned by the 
Ambassador were symbolic and that no formal or explicit 
request has been made by the United States.  Nevertheless, 
the headline spread and other media issued similar reports 
based on the Belga dispatch.  Coverage of the Ambassador's 
message about Belgium's credibility and moral leadership 
dominated the evening television news and the next day's 
print media.  MP's Van Der Maelen and De Vriendt both issued 
press releases.  De Vriendt's said "the U.S. Ambassador's 
proposal to send 100 troops to Afghanistan is absurd."  "I do 
not believe we will solve the problems in Afghanistan with 
more troops," said Van Der Maelen.  On Monday, January 18, a 
key francophone Socialist minister, Laurette Onkelinx, said 
flatly that "there will not be anything additional for the 
time being given that we are already massively present in 
that country." 
 
6. (U) At this point, the Embassy intensified the 
Ambassador's press appearances and his schedule of private 
meetings with politicians, especially those opposed to an 
increase.  It also issued a press release pointing out that 
in essence, we agree that there is no purely military 
solution to the problems in Afghanistan and emphasizing that 
"given Belgium's immense credibility within the partnership 
of nations, Belgium's participation in the increased civilian 
reconstruction and law enforcement efforts, and in the 
increased military effort designed to provide the security 
framework to allow such reconstruction efforts to proceed, 
would be very meaningful."  The press release also offered to 
discuss Afghanistan at length with members of Parliament.  On 
January 18, the Embassy received a call from the 
parliamentary committees that deal with foreign relations and 
defense inviting the Ambassador to address a joint session of 
the House and Senate Committees on Defense and Foreign 
Relations on January 20. 
 
7. (U) Also on January 18, the Ambassador appeared on a 
leading late-night political talk show, "Phara".  The other 
guests in the round-tableinister of 
Defense and the newly appointed Archbishop of Belgium.  That 
night, "Qhara's" audience of 200,000 viewers heard the 
Ambassador's explanation of Belgium's potential ole in 
Afghanistan directly. 
 
8. (C) JanuarQ 20 the Ambassador had an active schedule whch 
included a meeting in the city of Mons wiQh the head of the 
francophone Socialist Party ragraph 5.  However, he toldQ 
Di Rupo how during the weekend the Belgian B-Fst team sent 
to assist in Haiti had run id called the State Department 
operations center and obtained additional protection from the 
U.S. troops in Haiti.  The situation was analogous to 
Afghanistan, the Ambassador said, in that it was impossible 
to provide the needed humanitarian assistance without proper 
security.  This idea hit home with Di Rupo and also with the 
Belgian politicians the Ambassador talked with over the next 
few days.  A greater Belgian effort is "very difficult", Di 
Rupo told the Ambassador, but "not impossible".  Di Rupo 
emphasized mainly the cost of such an effort, but said he 
would "propose something to Prime Minister Leterme" because 
Belgium should show it is ready to help.  The Ambassador's 
visit to Mons was well-covered by the local and regional 
 
BRUSSELS 00000106  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
newspapers and television stations. 
 
9. (C) Later on January 20, the Ambassador met with the 
Groen! party's De Vriendt.  He then appeared before the 
Senate and House Foreign Affairs and Defense committees, once 
again emphasizing that the important thing in the Afghanistan 
debate is what Belgium brings to the table in credibility and 
support, and only secondarily in numbers of troops.  De 
Vriendt and Vandermaelen stated their opposing views in 
detail.  De Vriendt did say, however, that 2010 will be a 
"year of truth" and a new strategy will have to be developed 
based on results.  MP Georges Dallemagne (CdH) echoed some of 
the themes sounded by Di Rupo.  He said that Belgium needs to 
work hard in cooperation with the U.S. to convince other 
European countries that Afghanistan is important to global 
security.  Belgium should participate in the Afghan mission 
in proportion to what it can contribute, he said, which 
should include "a more important civilian contribution".  At 
the same time, he said that such support must be efficient 
and the Afghan government must show it is willigt combat 
corruption.  Dalltings, one 
with Afghanistan critic Dirk Van Der Maelen (Sp.a) and the 
other with the president of the Belgian Senate, Armand De 
Decker (CdH).  De Decker, who is a former Minister of 
Development Cooperation (2004-2007) in the Verhofstadt 
government, said that there is still no good policy at the EU 
level for development in Afghanistan.  The Ambassador 
discussed the need for more military and civilian help at 
length.  When the meeting ended, De Decker told the 
Ambassador that he would be making an announcement that would 
be pleasant to his ears.  In fact, later in the day, De 
Decker released a press statement that called on Belgium to 
explore leading a PRT.  The press reaction to De Decker's 
statement noted that De Decker's new strategy followed a 
lengthy meeting with the Ambassador. 
 
13. (C) Van Der Maelen was more difficult to convince. 
However, the Ambassador and Van Der Maelen developed a warm 
personal relationship and found several areas of agreement: 
that one cannot leave the problem of terrorism unaddressed, 
that the solution to Afghanistan is not a military one, that 
there is a need for development in the country to achieve 
peace and security.  Van Der Maelen said he would support the 
idea of more development aid for Afghanistan.  However, he 
simply does not believe the West can succeed in making 
Afghanistan secure.  His alternative suggestion is that 
troops from Muslim countries replace American and European 
soldiers and that a regional conference of Afghanistan's 
neighbors and the Taliban be held to seek a negotiated peace. 
 
 
14. (C) On January 25, the Ambassador met with Andre Flahaut 
(PS) in his office.  The Ambassador discussed his various 
meetings over the previous week, noting that in spite of 
differences, he had found areas of agreement.  Flahaut said 
that he had not heard a clear statement of a need for troops 
from the Minister of Defense.  He added that he thought 
leading a PRT would be a good way Belgium could contribute 
more.  He sees a need for a thorough re-thinking of Belgium's 
contributions to Afghanistan that will bring not only the 
 
BRUSSELS 00000106  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
government but also the Flemish Socialists into agreement. 
Flahaut suggested that perhaps Belgium could do more, 
including adding one or two C-130 transport aircraft, medical 
teams, demining experts, and reinforcement of a PRT with more 
people.  At the same time, he reiterated his misgivings about 
De Crem, criticizing his lack of "transparency" in putting 
his plans for Afghanistan into effect. 
 
15. (C) Later that same day, the Ambassador met with Prime 
Minister Leterme to stress the points he had been making in 
the press and to other Belgian politicians.  Leterme told the 
Ambassador that the decision on the Afghanistan deployment 
had been made after President Obama's Afghanistan speech.  He 
defended the size of Belgium's deployment as proportional to 
Belgium's social, military and economic weight.  However, he 
did say that Foreign Minister Vanackere's report from the 
January 28 London Conference could "bring new views." 
 
GUTMAN 
 
GUTMAN 
 
.