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DE RUEHBR #0086/01 0271444
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R 271442Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0359
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

UNCLAS BRASILIA 000086 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV ECON EAGR MCAP SOCI BR
SUBJECT: Controversy Over New Human Rights Program Subsides, for Now 
 
REF: 08 BRASILIA 1120 
 
¶1.  Summary:  President Lula was caught off guard by the surge of 
controversy, including within his own government, which followed 
the GOB's public release of the Third National Program of Human 
Rights in a December 21 presidential decree.  The program in fact 
is far-reaching, calling for, among other things:  establishment of 
a National Truth Commission to examine human rights violations 
committed during the period of military rule, 1964-1985; mediation 
between landowners and those who invade their land before the 
police forcibly remove the invaders; and creation of a national 
ranking of media according to their adherence to human rights 
standards, along with penalties for media that violate human 
rights.  There are a total of 521 "programmatic actions" 
recommended by the government, most requiring Congressional action 
or action by the judiciary, public ministry or states.  Even 
Minister of Human Rights Paulo Vannuchi, the principal proponent of 
the program, admitted that implementation "can take years." 
Meantime, however, the press reported that Minister of Defense 
Nelson Jobim and the commanders of the Armed Forces, claiming that 
the Truth Commission was "revanchist," threatened to resign. 
President Lula ordered Jobim and Vannuchi to iron out their 
differences, which they did on January 13, agreeing to change the 
language creating the Truth Commission but maintaining its 
essential powers.  End summary. 
 
Culmination of a 7-year process 
 
¶2.  Since President Lula decreed the Third National Program of 
Human Rights on December 21, controversy has swelled in the media, 
in the military and amongst his own ministers.  The plan consists 
of a total of 521 "programmatic actions" recommended by the federal 
government but often requiring action on the part of Congress 
(e.g., passing a law) or the judiciary, public ministry 
(prosecutors) or states before they can be implemented.  It is the 
third such program, the first two having been devised and adopted 
by the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1996 and 2002, 
each program superseding the last. 
 
¶3.  Perly Cipriano, National Under Secretary for the Promotion and 
Defense of Human Rights, told poloff on January 15 that the plan 
was the culmination of a process begun in 2003.  It involved over 
50 national-level thematic conferences (on subjects like racial 
equality, women's rights, food security, etc.) and 137 municipal 
and regional meetings in which a total of 14,000 people 
participated.  The program that Lula finally decreed was derived 
from a number of resolutions passed by participants of the Eleventh 
National Conference of Human Rights in December 2008.  During the 
last year, Cipriano and his colleagues in the Special Secretariat 
of Human Rights, under the direction of Minister Paulo Vanucchi, 
reorganized the resolutions and used them to craft the Third 
National Program of Human Rights.  The program not only specifies 
actions to be taken, but names those organs of government that are 
responsible. 
 
Truth Commission controversy 
 
¶4.  According to Cipriano, 30 ministries have committed to working 
to fulfill the terms of the program.  Significantly, however, it 
appears that the Ministry of Defense did not participate actively 
in the elaboration of the plan and, unlike most ministers, Minister 
of Defense Jobim did not put his signature on the presidential 
decree.  In the weeks following issuance of the decree, Jobim was 
the highest profile and most powerful of the program's critics, 
reportedly threatening to resign along with the three commanders of 
the Armed Forces if the provision to establish a National Truth 
Commission was not changed. 
 
¶5.  The Truth Commission, according to the terms of the December 21 
decree, would "promote the verification and public explanation of 
human rights violations committed in the context of political 
repression" by the military regime of 1964-1985.  The measure 
called for a bill creating the commission to be submitted to 
Congress by April 2010.  Vannuchi has noted that truth commissions 
have worked well in Latin American countries like Chile and 
Argentina and outside Latin America in South Africa.  He wrote in 
an op-ed piece in the December 21 "Correio Braziliense" that the 
commission would undertake "historical, political, ethical and - if 
the judicial power so decides - also criminal proceedings with 
respect to all episodes of torture, assassination and 
disappearances of political dissidents."  He added that the purpose 
was "not to open wounds of the past, but to guarantee necessary 
healing in the spirit of reconciliation." 
 
¶6.  Particularly troubling to the military and Defense Minister 
Jobim was the suggestion of criminal prosecutions of the military 
and members of the 1964-1985 military regime, which they call 
 
"revanchist."  To them the measure effectively overturned the 1979 
Amnesty Law, which provides broad protections against prosecution 
for crimes committed during the military era, whether by the 
military or by left-wing guerrilla groups.  They also pointed out 
that the measure in the Human Rights Program was one-sided, in that 
it called for investigation only of abuses committed by the regime, 
and not those committed by their left-wing enemies (some of whom 
are in government today). 
 
¶7.  The controversy was fully aired in the press with Vannuchi 
reportedly threatening to quit the government if the Truth 
Commission were dropped from the Human Rights Program.  President 
Lula ordered Vannuchi and Jobim to work out their differences.  In 
a meeting on January 13, lasting only 50 minutes, Vannuchi and 
Jobim arrived at a compromise:  the words "promote the verification 
and public explanation of human rights violations" were changed to 
"examine human rights violations" and the words, "in the context of 
political repression" were deleted; the essential powers of the 
Truth Commission and the timeline for submitting a bill to Congress 
remain unchanged.  While Jobim has expressed satisfaction with the 
compromise, the military leadership has not.  As noted in reftel, 
any change to the Amnesty Law provisions will meet with strong 
military opposition. 
 
Boost to the Landless Movement 
 
¶8.  Also dividing the government, though not nearly as severely as 
the Truth Commission, was a measure in the Human Rights Program 
that requires mediation between landowners and those who invade 
their land before the police forcibly remove the invaders.  Such 
mediation would take place in the presence of the public ministry 
(prosecutors), local officials, "specialized governmental organs," 
and the Military (that is, uniformed) Police. 
 
¶9.  Opposition Senator Katia Abreu, who is also president of the 
National Confederation of Agriculture, told the press that the 
measure, by complicating and delaying evictions, will encourage and 
strengthen organizations like the Landless Movement which seize 
farmland illegally.  Appearing to echo Abreu's sentiments, Minister 
of Agriculture Reinhold Stephanes said that the measure will 
"increase insecurity in the countryside."  Stephanes was then 
publicly contradicted by Minister of Agrarian Development Guilherme 
Cassel who noted that Stephanes, along with all other ministers, 
had four months to ponder the draft Human Rights Program and raise 
any objections they might have had.  Cassel said that mediation, 
"especially for rural questions, is correct because it leads to 
negotiated solutions." 
 
Media to be monitored by government 
 
¶10.  The Human Rights Program calls for creation of "a national 
ranking of vehicles of communication that promote human rights 
principles, as well as those that commit violations." Radio and 
television broadcasters would be subject to "administrative 
penalties such as warning, fine, suspension of programming and 
cancellation, in accordance with the seriousness of the violations 
committed."  Presumably, the media will be measured against "a 
national system of human rights indicators," which is called for in 
a section of the plan on "mechanisms of social control." 
 
¶11.  The Brazilian Association of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters, National Association of Magazine Editors and National 
Association of Newspapers issued a joint note to the press on 
January 8 calling the GOB's proposal "a threat to freedom of 
expression."  They said that "mechanisms for control of 
information" are "flagrantly unconstitutional."  Brazil's newspaper 
of record, "O Estado de S. Paulo," went even further in a January 
19 editorial, seeing the plan in the context of a broader effort on 
the part of the Lula Government "to liquidate the rule of law and 
install in Brazil an authoritarian regime." 
 
Abortion, civil unions, religious symbols 
 
¶12.  Other controversial proposals in the Human Rights Program are 
to decriminalize abortion, support civil unions of same-sex couples 
and ban the display of religious symbols on all federal government 
buildings - all actions opposed the National Conference of 
Brazilian Bishops of the Catholic Church.  Lula has indicated that 
he may backtrack on the decriminalization of abortion issue but has 
not publicly commented on civil unions or religious symbols on 
public buildings. 
 
Comment 
 
¶13.  The Human Rights Program is a statement of government policy 
and a plan of action; by itself it changes nothing.  Cipriano, a 
former member of the Brazilian Communist Party and a political 
 
prisoner from 1970 to 1979, called the plan "an orientation."  The 
GOB must now begin the long and arduous task of persuading allies 
and, if possible, some opponents of the wisdom of such an 
orientation.  Even in the estimation of Vannuchi, the plan's main 
proponent, implementation "can take years."  Because the plan is 
vast, divisible and controversial, and was announced in the last 
year of the Lula government, much of it may never be implemented. 
Nonetheless, the plan has already exposed several unresolved 
fissures in Brazilian society:  between the military and civilians 
with regard to abuses that occurred during the military regime, 
between landholders and a still potentially troublesome landless 
movement, between those who champion freedom of the press and those 
who see the media as often irresponsible in the exercise of that 
freedom, and between Brazil's traditional conservative morals and 
its principled support for tolerance and human rights.  Whether or 
not the plan is taken up by the new Brazilian government that takes 
office January 1, 2011, these fissures are are unlikely to end with 
significant disruptions in Brazilian society or politics, but will 
remain a source of friction, and occasional headlines, for years to 
come. 
KUBISKE