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OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
DE RUEHBR #0019/01 0222231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 222221Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0343
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0006
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000019 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR HAITI TASK FORCE, WHA, USAID 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/22 
TAGS: EAID PREL MASS BR HA
SUBJECT: SENIOR BRAZIL OFFICIALS PRAISE COOPERATION, SEEK CLOSER 
COORDINATION IN HAITI 
 
REF: STATE 06391; BRASILIA 0062 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., State, Embassy 
Brasilia; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) In separate meetings with the Charge on January 22, Chief of 
the Ministry of Defense (MOD) General Staff Admiral Joao Afonso 
Prado Maia de Faria ("ADM Prado Maia") and Foreign Ministry (MRE) 
Under Secretary for Latin America Antonio Simoes both said they saw 
no conflict between the United States and Brazil.  Both saw an 
opportunity for our governments to work more closely together, 
noted that the media was playing up supposed friction between us, 
and stressed their interest in greater coordination.  In advance of 
the Montreal foreign ministers' meeting on January 25, President 
Lula made available 375 million reais (approximately US$208 
million) to support Brazil's relief effort to Haiti, and committed 
to send up to an additional 1300 troops to support MINUSTAH.  End 
Summary. 
 
MOD: GOOD COOPERATION BETWEEN FORCES, HOPE FOR MORE 
 
¶2. (C)  Charge d'Affaires, accompanied by the Defense Attache, 
Military Liaison Office Chief and Air Attache, met with Prado Maia 
(the equivalent in Brazil of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) to discuss Brazilian and United States cooperative 
efforts in the ongoing post-earthquake Haitian humanitarian crisis. 
After receiving U.S. official condolences for the loss of Brazilian 
civilian, diplomatic, and military lives as a result of the 
earthquake, Prado Maia thanked the United States for its 
cooperation with MINUSTAH and Brazil.  According to Prado Maia, in 
a video teleconference held on January 20 with the "Crisis Cabinet" 
stood up by President Lula specifically for the Haiti crisis, 
MINUSTAH Commander Lieutenant General Floriano Peixoto was effusive 
in his praise of U.S. cooperation with MINUSTAH and Brazilian 
forces, as well as of his personal relationship with Lieutenant 
General Keen.  Peixoto had said that coordination and cooperation 
were going extremely well under very trying circumstances.  Prado 
Maia thanked the United States for our efforts to reach out and 
cooperate with MINUSTAH and Peixoto.  He pointed out that the press 
was making much of supposed friction between our two forces, but 
that was clearly untrue, according to Peixoto. 
 
¶3. (C) Prado Maia said Brazil would be replacing its contingent in 
Haiti - despite UN objections - starting this weekend, albeit eight 
days later than originally planned because of the earthquake.  He 
did not see this as a problem given the Brazilian military 
extensively prepares its troops prior to deployment for duty in 
MINUSTAH.  He added that the Brazilian Navy, slow to get into the 
fray, was sending a medical surgical team and one SUPER PUMA cargo 
helicopter to Haiti on an Italian Aircraft Carrier passing through 
Brazilian waters next week en route to Haiti.  Finally, Prado Maia 
closed by expressing the desire of the Brazilian Defense Ministry 
and Armed Forces to coordinate and cooperate more in Haiti with the 
United States as each country built up forces to assist the 
Haitians. 
 
¶4. (C)  Charge, DATT, and MLO Chief briefed Prado Maia on the 
possibilities and benefits of signing an Acquisition and 
Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to facilitate logistics for the 
mission in Haiti.  Prado Maia expressed interest in learning more 
and speculated that the Crisis Cabinet, on which he holds a seat, 
might be a good venue to fast track the agreement if both sides 
could settle the language.  (Note:  Post has a boiler-plate of the 
ACSA in Portuguese and will get it over to Prado Maia first thing 
next week. End note.) 
 
MRE: NO CONFLICT, BUT MORE COMMUNICATION IMPORTANT 
 
¶5. (C) Charge, accompanied by POLCOUNS, began her discussion of 
Haiti with Simoes by delivering points ref A regarding the 
importance of following ICAO procedures in requesting slots at 
Port-au-Prince airport, and encouraged Simoes to come directly to 
her (or to POLCOUNS as back-up) regarding any VIP visitors so she 
could ensure appropriate handling.  Simoes said he understood, and 
would seek to ensure the protocols were followed even as he gave a 
"heads up" to her on critical flights. 
 
¶6. (C) Simoes said he sees in the Haiti relief effort an 
opportunity to further improve U.S.-Brazilian cooperation, and 
noted he had said as much in a recent television interview.  "We 
must seize the opportunity," he said, stressing that Brazil "is not 
competing with the United States" and is very happy with U.S. 
 
BRASILIA 00000019  002 OF 002 
 
 
efforts.  He noted, however, that the media and certain countries 
in the region (he mentioned Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia) were 
seeking to exploit the U.S. presence and small incidents to create 
conflict between us. 
 
¶7. (C) To manage the regional and media perceptions better, Simoes 
stressed the need for "increased channels of communication" so that 
neither Brazil nor MINUSTAH will be surprised by U.S. actions.  He 
noted that the size and actions of the U.S. contingent could create 
problems-he cited the rumors of a U.S. occupation of Haiti and the 
landing of a U.S. helicopter on the lawn of the presidential palace 
as examples-and suggested that greater communication could have 
allowed MINUSTAH and Brazil to better support the U.S. actions. 
Simoes suggested that having an official in State or the White 
House designated to advise other active governments of U.S. actions 
in and regarding Haiti would be one way to improve communication. 
He also suggested that MINUSTAH liaison officers with U.S. 
forces-he specifically mentioned the USS Carl Vinson-could help. 
"The reason is not to change U.S. plans," he stressed, "but to help 
execute them successfully." 
 
LULA RELEASES NEW MONIES TO SUPPORT GOB EFFORTS 
 
¶8. (SBU) In advance of the Montreal Foreign Ministers meeting, 
President Lula made available late on January 21 R$375 million 
(approximately US$ 208 million) to support MOD, MRE, and the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) efforts regarding Haiti.  This includes 
the US$15 million already announced by MRE for relief supplies. 
R$135 million (approximately US$75 million) will go to MOH for ten 
Immediate Care Units and the acquisition of fifty ambulances. 
R$205 million (approximately US$114 million) will go to MOD to 
support the Brazilian troop presence.  Lula has also decided to 
increase Brazil's MINUSTAH contingent by 900 troops, with an 
additional reserve of 400 troops-up to double its current forces in 
MINUSTAH.  Simoes said the Montreal Foreign Ministers meeting would 
be a good opportunity to demonstrate the multilateral nature of 
efforts in Haiti.  He suggested there should be a European 
presence, as well; "we need to open it up and encourage others to 
get involved," he said. 
 
COMMENT:  DESIRE FOR MORE COORDINATION BEHIND THE SMILES 
 
¶9. (C) The meetings between the Charge and both Prado Maia and 
Simoes were friendly and productive, much like those she has held 
with other senior GOB officials this week (ref B).  Both were open 
to forwarding our relationship and sought to be helpful in offering 
suggestions.  Clearly, we have turned a corner on the earlier 
friction caused by coordination problems at the Port-au-Prince 
airport, and the GOB is determined to see this as an opportunity 
both to increase cooperation with the USG and to enhance its own 
leadership standing.  At the same time, the desire for greater 
communication by the USG with MINUSTAH, in the first instance, and 
the GOB in the second, is clear. 
 
¶10. (C) Heading into the Montreal meeting, Brazil believes it has 
earned, through its long-term commitment to leading MINUSTAH and 
its mounting efforts to Haiti in the wake of the earthquake, the 
right to full partnership in the relief and reconstruction of Haiti 
going forward.  The feeling seems to persist that the USG is not 
treating Brazil in that way.  Continued USG acknowledgment of 
Brazil's leadership in Haiti and a commitment to communication and 
coordination will go a long way toward ensuring GOB support for USG 
efforts. 
KUBISKE