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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020 
TAGS: PREL GPGOV IR GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN AMB. IN IRAN: TRANSITION TO "NORMAL" 
DICTATORSHIP 
 
BERLIN 00000095  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Political M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  Germany's new Ambassador to Iran, Bernd 
Erbel noted that he had not been warmly received by the 
Iranian government and that most European diplomats are 
finding the environment in Tehran increasingly difficult to 
work in.  His impression after his first two and a half 
months was that the regime remained too weak to make any 
concessions internationally, and was focused on consolidation 
of domestic power bases.  He saw the regime shifting its 
basis of legitimacy away from the theological towards a more 
"normal" power-centric dictatorship based on an established 
spoils system with the IRGC serving as the backbone of a 
Supreme Leader/Ahmadinejad focused dictatorship.  He 
criticized the opposition for lacking a clear leader or 
clearly defined goals and predicted the current regime would 
be able to maintain technical control of the country for the 
foreseeable future.  Erbel cautioned that almost any 
sanctions would have a negative effect on the Iranian 
population, and that one should be careful in devising 
sanctions not to inadvertently pour more money into 
IRGC/government coffers.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
IRI - Less Islamic, Less Republican, More Dictatorial 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In discussions with Poloff on January 21, Erbel said 
he thought the Iranian leadership, which he defined as 
limited to Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) and Ahmadinejad, was 
in the process of consolidating its domestic power base.  He 
noted that almost all recent appointments to high-level 
positions reflected former classmates of Ahmadinejad's or 
close colleagues from his IRGC days.  He said the 
SLK-Ahmadinejad alliance was not based on ideological 
sympathy or any deeper loyalty, but was rather a "marriage of 
convenience" in which each partner needed something from the 
other.  He said that "legitimacy" was less important to the 
new power structure which was moving toward a "normal" 
dictatorship with primary focus on maintenance of power 
through financial incentives.  The government was not 
supported by clerical or moral legitimacy nor by 
revolutionary ideology - but rather by cohorts within the 
IRGC who receive sufficient benefits to keep them happy and 
loyal (jobs, houses, University admission, healthcare, tax 
free shopping privileges, etc.)  He noted that not even the 
Iranian constitution has much import any more.  The Iranian 
system of "checks and balances" with its many councils and 
assemblies -- flawed as it may have been -- is now all but 
meaningless. 
¶3.  (C) He said this doesn't mean the government won't call 
on religion as a source of legitimacy when they think it can 
be useful, but fundamentally they no longer care if they 
are/are not truly religious or moral.   Thus, he predicted 
that treatment of citizens was likely to get worse in the 
near future as long as the government thinks that will help 
them centralize their power. 
 
---------------------------- 
Gov't Weak - But Here to Stay 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Despite the weaknesses within the regime which he 
thinks will prevent any kind of negotiated settlement to the 
nuclear crisis -- as was seen during the domestic debate 
around the TRR deal-- Erbel is convinced the government 
remains technically in control of the country and will remain 
so for the foreseeable future.  He doesn't see regime change 
as credible for the next few years, barring some sort of 
catastrophic, unexpected event (death of SLK, assassination 
of Ahmadinejad, emergence of a true leader from the 
opposition.) 
---------------------------------- 
Weak Opposition - Also Here to Stay 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Erbel call the opposition movement "headless" and 
lacking a common goal, but noted they were not going to go 
away either.  He said the opposition seeks more intervention 
on the human rights front, but he is not sure the government 
is susceptible to much pressure on this front. 
 
--------------------------- 
Nuclear-Issue and Sanctions 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Erbel didn't offer much insight into how to resolve 
the nuclear issue, though he thought Iranian ambitions were 
limited to achieving "breakout capability."  Erbel noted in 
passing that the Iranian Ambassador in Berlin, Ali Reza 
Sheikh Attar, as recently as January 21, tried to convince 
 
BERLIN 00000095  002 OF 002 
 
 
him that the Iranian government really is ready to reopen 
talks on the TRR and would be willing to discuss the whole 
"1200 kilograms being transferred in one shipment."  Erbel 
brushed off such comments (which he said tracked with what 
Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Soltaneih also whispered in 
private to his German counterparts) as desperate attempts to 
try to buy more time by those who have little say in the 
Tehran decision making structure . 
 
¶7.  (C) Erbel did caution that almost any sanctions will have 
a negative effect on the Iranian population, and that given 
the IRGC's domination of the economy, an attack on the IRGC 
is also an attack on the economy at large.  He added that one 
should be careful in devising sanctions not to inadvertently 
pour more money into IRGC/government coffers by making the 
black market more lucrative, given that the IRGC had a 
monopoly on smuggling (from drugs/alcohol to high end 
machinery.)  On measures to target regime elites he 
questioned whether it was wise to cut off all EU travel since 
that would in effect cut-off any chances for dialogue or 
engagement. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Government Intimidation Is Scaring Away Contacts 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8.  (C) Erbel, who arrived in Tehran in October 2009 is an 
Arabist and has served primarily in the Middle East, with his 
most recent assignments being Ambassador to Baghdad and 
Cairo.  Erbel complained that it is hard to get meetings with 
Iranians.  People are increasingly wary of contact with 
Western Embassies.  He said the photographing of Embassy 
guests as they entered the residence for Germany's October 3 
National Day celebrations sent a stark warning to many 
Embassy contacts.  While the Embassy's language school is 
still heavily visited he said Iranians have started turning 
down scholarships to study in Germany for fear of government 
reprisals. 
DELAWIE