VZCZCXRO1102
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0089/01 0290811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290811Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6425
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4298

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MEPP KPAL SY IS LE
SUBJECT: S/E MITCHELL RULES OUT FORCED NATURALIZATION OF 
PALESTINIANS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George 
Mitchell affirmed to Lebanese President Michel Sleiman, 
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and Foreign Minister Ali 
Chami that the U.S. opposes the forced naturalization of 
Palestinians in Lebanon under any circumstance.  During his 
January 19-20 visit to Beirut, S/E Mitchell also reiterated 
that no regional peace deal would come at the expense of 
Lebanon.  All of his Lebanese interlocutors highlighted the 
importance of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal to the 
stability of the rest of the region.  Sleiman and Berri, in 
particular, criticized Israel's perceived lack of commitment 
to stability in the region and argued for continued U.S. 
support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.  UN Special Coordinator 
for Lebanon Michael Williams assessed that Israeli withdrawal 
from northern Ghajar in Lebanon could be a catalyst for 
advancing other regional initiatives, but cautioned that 
either "we move forward or we move backwards; a decision has 
to be made."  Lebanese interlocutors again raised concerns 
about new Transportation Security Administration guidelines 
and H.R. 2278.  (Special Envoy Mitchell's conversation with 
PM Hariri is reported septel.)  End Summary. 
 
S/E MITCHELL: U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT TAWTEEN 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Special Envoy Mitchell reassured President Sleiman, 
Speaker Berri and FM Chami that the U.S. would not conclude 
any regional peace agreement at the expense of Lebanon.  S/E 
Mitchell reiterated that Lebanon was a valued ally and friend 
of the U.S. and the U.S. would continue its full support for 
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence.  To that end, S/E 
Mitchell expressly confirmed that the U.S. would not support 
the forced naturalization ("tawteen") of Palestinians in 
Lebanon.  (Note: S/E Mitchell first raised U.S. opposition to 
tawteen with PM Hariri.  End note.)  This issue, he said, 
would be for the GOL to decide.  Sleiman and Chami responded 
positively to these assurances and thanked the U.S. for its 
continued support.  Speaker Berri, in contrast, said that 
while he appreciated the U.S. position, it would have no 
bearing on how Lebanon's 18 recognized sectarian groups would 
seek consensus among themselves for how to deal with the 
status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 
 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT NECESSARY FOR REGION 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3. (C) Sleiman, Berri and Chami agreed that solving the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the most important item on 
the regional agenda to maintain stability.  Sleiman 
encouraged U.S. leadership and persistence to get the parties 
to reach an agreement.  S/E Mitchell advised that this was 
exactly his mandate and, complexities notwithstanding, the 
most important next step was to have the sides return to 
negotiations.  He advised that the U.S. had adopted 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's position that 
the issue of borders should be the first issue to be 
discussed.  However, the current challenge was to have both 
sides commit to restart talks, even if they begin at lower 
levels. 
 
¶4. (C) Speaker Berri reported that when Abbas visited Beirut 
in late December, Abbas was "humiliated" because of Israel 
and worried about Arab public opinion.  S/E Mitchell 
acknowledged that both Abbas and PM Netanyahu had experienced 
personal setbacks in their efforts, but emphasized that the 
current environment was not sustainable for Israel, the 
Palestinians, or the region.  Once a Palestinian state came 
into existence, it must be viable and sustainable from the 
first day, S/E Mitchell continued.  To that end, the U.S. is 
pursuing the "bottom-up" track in parallel with the political 
track.  FM Chami asserted that he was confident in the 
ability of the U.S. to move negotiations forward and that the 
region was counting on its efforts.  Speaker Berri recalled 
that it was U.S. pressure on Israel that made the Madrid 
conference -- and later the Oslo Accords -- possible, and he 
deemed it critical that the U.S. apply similar pressure now. 
 
GHAJAR 
------ 
 
¶5. (C) UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams 
informed S/E Mitchell that Israeli withdrawal from northern 
Ghajar at the earliest opportunity could yield other positive 
results in the region.  The status of Ghajar as Lebanese 
territory was indisputable and Israel had virtually 
"abandoned" the territory in 2000 when it first withdrew, 
Williams reasoned.  He urged S/E Mitchell to encourage Israel 
 
BEIRUT 00000089  002 OF 002 
 
 
to withdraw once again, as it would be an easy 
confidence-building measure, especially because Ghajar does 
not represent any political obligations or debts to be paid 
from the Israeli domestic point of view.  However, not 
withdrawing from Ghajar or continued delay in doing so has 
spillover effects in other regional matters, Williams warned. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Williams summarized that the Lebanese political 
context had changed significantly.  The biggest change, he 
noted, was the improved bilateral relationship -- albeit 
still tentative -- between Lebanon and Syria.  With the 
change in the political environment, some Lebanese 
politicians had "defected" from PM Hariri's camp and moved 
closer to Syria, Williams explained, but with little 
practical impact.  However, Williams surmised that if Israel 
did not withdraw from Ghajar soon, it would weaken PM Hariri 
and strengthen the "ideology of resistance."  On Ghajar, "we 
either move forwards or backwards now," he said.  Other 
issues that would also impact regional peace efforts included 
the status of Shebaa Farms and continued Israeli overflights 
of Lebanese territory, Williams enumerated.  Resolving 
Ghajar, though, could be a crucial, positive first step to 
dealing with the more difficult issues, he insisted. 
 
LAF NEEDS CONTINUED SUPPORT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) S/E Mitchell congratulated President Sleiman for 
recently making his first trip to south Lebanon to visit the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and informed him that the U.S. 
would continue to support efforts of the GOL to exert its 
control over all Lebanese territory by providing needed 
resources to the LAF.  Sleiman thanked the U.S. for its 
military assistance.  He added that the LAF required more 
assistance to find an effective method to assert effective 
control along Lebanon's borders, and he explained that no one 
in Lebanon had the intention to enter a conflict with Israel. 
 Hizballah's weapons would be a matter for discussion during 
the National Dialogue, Sleiman insisted.  While he expressed 
concern over Hizballah's arsenal, Sleiman also raised concern 
that Israel actively took steps to prevent "a stable 
Lebanon."  He encouraged the U.S. to discuss with Syria ways 
to prevent further smuggling of weapons to both Hizballah and 
Palestinian groups, and he claimed the GOL would do the same. 
 
 
TSA LIST AND H.R. 2278 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) As they have done in a number of recent meetings with 
U.S. officials, S/E Mitchell's Lebanese interlocutors also 
raised their concerns about new Transportation Security 
Administration procedures that list Lebanon as a "country of 
concern" following the failed bomb attempt in the U.S. in 
late December.  To assuage concerns, S/E Mitchell explained 
that TSA's policies were designed for the safety and 
protection of everyone entering the United States and in no 
way were targeted against Lebanon or the Lebanese people. 
The policies are constantly under review and changed 
according to the information available at that time, S/E 
Mitchell emphasized.  Similarly, Sleiman, Berri and Chami 
expressed disappointment with U.S. House Resolution 2278, 
which would target satellite and other media providers if 
they distribute content deemed to incite violence against 
Americans.  H.R. 2278 -- which would apply to Hizballah's 
radio and television outlets -- was contrary to freedom of 
the press and expression, they argued.  S/E Mitchell 
responded that he would advise President Obama of their 
concerns. 
 
¶9. (U) Special Envoy George Mitchell's staff has cleared this 
cable. 
 
SISON