VZCZCXRO2429
RR RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBC #0002/01 0311107
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311107Z JAN 10
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0961
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0537
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0999

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/31/2020 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI SCUL KPAO IZ IR SA
SUBJECT: BASRAH ANTI-IRAN DEMONSTRATION: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 112 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 70 
     ¶C. 09 BAGHDAD 3334 
     ¶D. BASRAH 61 
     ¶E. BASRAH 57 
 
BASRAH 00000002  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT, US State 
Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (U) This is a Basrah reporting cable. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: Basrah-based representatives of political 
parties and tribes staged a brief and peaceful protest on 
January 2 at the Iranian Consulate to protest the reported 
December 18 Iranian occupation of the cross-border Al Fakkah oil 
well in nearby Maysan Province.  Initial and unverifiable media 
reports claimed that three hundred or more participants raised 
banners and shouted anti-Iran slogans condemning the "Iranian 
occupation," called for the immediate withdrawal of Iranian 
forces, and condemned the GOI's own "acquiescence."  Two 
prominent journalists provided a starkly different account of 
the demonstration, laughing at reports of "hundreds" of 
protestors.  They characterized the crowd as only around 50-60 
participants at the 30-minute event.  For these journalists, the 
more relevant issue is the struggle between Sunni Saudi Arabia 
and Shi'a Iran to control the future of Iraq.  End summary. 
 
Al Fakkah takeover sparks reported fiery demonstration 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶3. (C) On January 2, Basrah-based representatives of political 
parties and tribes staged a peaceful protest in front of the 
Iranian Consulate to protest the reported December 18 Iranian 
occupation of the cross-border al Fakkah well in nearby Maysan 
Province (refs A-C).  Initial media reports claimed three 
hundred or more participants.  (Note: The PRT's initial 
understanding of the event came from unverifiable media reports. 
 PRTOffs cannot get near the Iranian Consulate without our 
military movement team drawing massive and unwanted attention. 
End note.) 
 
¶4. (C) According to these initial reports, the marchers raised 
banners and shouted anti-Iran slogans condemning "Iranian 
occupation" of the oil wells.  The crowd called for the 
immediate withdrawal of Iranian forces from Iraqi territory in 
defense of Iraqi sovereignty and unity.  One participant 
reportedly referred to the Iranian forces as invaders and 
occupiers of Iraqi resources and sucking Iraq's blood.  The 
group also reportedly threatened further actions including a 
boycott of Iranian imports. 
 
¶5. (SBU) These protestors also reportedly condemned Prime 
Minister Maliki and the GOI for "acquiescence" in failing to 
take action against the "invasion," and demanded a strong GOI 
position against the violation of Iraqi sovereignty.  They 
described the GOI policy as "incredibly weak" and speculated 
that there were those within the GOI who support Iran's policies. 
 
¶6. (C) The event's organizer, Awad al-Abdan, General Secretary 
of the Movement for the Liberation of the South, a small 
quasi-political organization, read a statement "on behalf of the 
masses of Basrah and southern Iraq."  The declaration demanded 
Iranian forces stop interfering in Iraqi affairs and depart 
immediately from the oil well.  For Abdan, the oil well was 
representative of Iraqi sovereignty and wealth. 
 
¶7. (C) Others downplayed the significance of the event. 
Provincial Council member Walid Keitan, a Shi'a member of 
Allawi's Iraqi National Accord, said that the Al Fakkah 
incursion provided Abdan a "target of opportunity and something 
to raise a ruckus about."  He suggested that the demonstration 
did not indicate a significant anti-Iran shift in Basrah. 
 
Other participants 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Working with local journalists and based on discussion 
with Abdan, PRTOffs identified other participants at the 
protest.  They included Hussein Al Sadr, General Secretary of 
the anti-Iran Al-Shaab (Population) party; followers of Vice 
President Tariq al Hashimi's Sunni Iraqi al-Tajdeed party; 
Dialogue Front party followers of Dr. Saleh al Mutlak; and some 
trade unions.  In addition, local tribal sheikhs (and PRT 
contacts) included Mohammed al Bahadli (from Basrah's Hayyaniyah 
neighborhood, ref E), a branch of the Al Bahdil tribe; and 
Mohammed al Zaydawi, from the (anti-Iran) Abu Zayd tribe in 
central Basrah province. 
 
Abdan's outspoken views on Iran 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Al-Abdan, an occasional PRT contact, confirmed on January 
15 that he had led the protest.  Al-Abdan is a frequent and 
harsh critic of what he says is Iran's economic, cultural, and 
political dominance in southern Iraq.  He claims that he seeks 
 
BASRAH 00000002  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to "restore" Basrah's "lost rights."  On the Al Fakkah incident, 
he said that in some ways it was a positive thing showing 
everyone Iran's "true colors."  It is consistent with his view 
that Iran - and its Consul General in Basrah in particular - 
meddles in Iraqi internal affairs (ref D) and floods the local 
market with Iranian goods.  He has twice led boycotts targeting 
Iranian imports.  (Comment:  It is unclear how possible or 
effective any boycott of Iranian goods could be.  Low-priced 
Iranian goods represent a substantial percentage of local goods 
benefiting the Basrawi consumer.  End comment). 
 
Leading journalists describe an entirely different event 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶9. (C) Two prominent journalists offered PRTOffs a starkly 
different version from media accounts of the demonstration and 
Abdan himself.  Mahmoud Bachari, Director of the Ihlas Haber 
Ajansi Turkish news agency in Basrah, characterized Abdan as 
"slippery" and a "charlatan" who is supported by outside 
interests, probably Saudi Arabia.  He said that Abdan has 
unexplained wealth.  Offering to share the video, he said that 
his studio is next door to the Iranian Consulate and he filmed 
the entire event.  He laughed at media reports of "hundreds" of 
protestors and said there were 50-60 paid and transported 
participants at a 30-minute staged event.  He said that Abdan 
paid Iraqi television station Al Sharqiya "around USD 1000" to 
have journalists cover the event and another USD 600 to 
broadcast the coverage.  He suspects Saudi Arabia and/or Kuwait 
support Al Sharqiya.  Subsequent internet accounts of a "massive 
demonstration" were simply recycled from the Al Sharqiya piece. 
 
¶10. (C) Al Fayhaa television journalist Taleb al-Baderi's views 
largely coincided with those of Bachari.  He said that Abdan 
changes his views and alliances and "is not an independent 
player."  He suggested that Abdan receives outside assistance 
and that many Basrawis believe this.  Baderi said that his work 
on the story revealed that demonstration organizers sought a 
permit for the event from Governor Shiltagh, which the latter 
refused to grant despite a direct appeal from GOI VP al-Hashemi. 
 The PRT's Bilingual and Bicultural Advisors working in the 
Provincial Governor's office also heard the same account of the 
events.  Even without the permit, organizers went ahead and a 
quick "hit and run" event occurred before anyone could stop it. 
He added that Abdan "loves the limelight" and makes trouble 
because he and the rest of demonstrators are not benefiting from 
the "new Iraq." 
 
The "real war" in Iraq today: Saudi Arabia vs. Iran 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶11. (C) Journalist Mahmoud Bachari broadened the context of this 
demonstration.  He said it was part of the struggle between 
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran to control the future of Iraq. 
 "The United States always blames Iran for problems in Iraq, but 
it should look more at Saudi Arabia instead.  In fact, it is 
sometimes Saudi Arabia that starts problems here, to which Iran 
reacts."  He noted that at least some elements within Iran are 
trying to help Iraq in a more constructive, non-violent manner. 
As an example, he noted tactical alliances with sheikhs, and the 
provision of essential services - in the style of Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.  Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, "does not want to see 
any Iraq 'democracy model' succeed," and thus is waging a 
"low-key war" against it. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) While the PRT cannot verify all of Bachari and Baderi's 
views, what is clear is that Abdan's "party" and following are 
relatively small.  The PRT has noted a general uneasiness among 
some Basrawis about Iran's perceived outsized economic and 
political influence, but there is no one-size-fits-all "Basrah 
view" of Iran.  Given the vast and complex economic, religious, 
and cultural ties that bind them, there is no easily generalized 
"Basrah view" of Iran.  Most Basrawis are too overwhelmed by the 
daily grind to form more than personal and cursory views of 
Iran. 
 
¶13. (C) As for the protest itself, the PRT does not believe that 
there was great "meaning" to it.  The fact that there is an 
apparent toleration in Basrah's public space for groups to 
peacefully blow off occasional steam is a good thing, 
irrespective of just how "spontaneous" or genuine this 
particular march actually was.  Such events were unthinkable 
under the old regime. 
NALAND