VZCZCXRO1068
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0002/01 0051709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 051709Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1118
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0259
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0125
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0362
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0375
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0274
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0214
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0563
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0552
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0196
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0539
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1413

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000002 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR JPEKKINEN 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF CT
SUBJECT: FURTHER ATTACKS TARGETING NGOS IN NE CAR MARK TROUBLING 
TREND 
 
REF: A - 09 BANGUI 272 
 
BANGUI 00000002  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The December 22 and 23 targeted attacks on 
International Medical Corp (IMC) facilities, in northeastern 
Central African Republic (CAR) continue a disturbing pattern in 
this lawless and unstable part of central Africa (Ref A).  The 
recent discovery of the three IMC vehicles for sale in Am 
Dukhan, Sudan may shed more light on the perpetrators of the 
attack, and it is increasingly clear that paramilitary groups in 
the region have identified NGOs with vehicles, satellite phones, 
and potential hostages as lucrative targets. Given the Central 
African army's lack of capacity to control the territory, more 
NGOs may be forced to leave a region already suffering from 
insurgency, food insecurity, and a lack of government services. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The late December attacks in northeastern CAR were 
brazen in scope. After attacking the IMC office in Ouanda Djalle 
and killing two civilians, the attackers set upon Sam Ouandja, 
site of 3,500 Darfuri refugees.  There, the group attacked with 
100 UFDR militia members based just outside of town and as units 
of the Central African Army (FACA) were doing a detachment 
change over - meaning there were up to 30 soldiers in the 
proximity. Multiple sources confirm that the FACA were alerted 
to the possibility of an assault, but after maintaining watch 
from four am until eight am, the FACA were caught on a shift 
change and apparently fled their barracks when the assailants 
attacked. Remarkably, the whole operation took less than 45 
minutes, with the assailants escaping with three IMC vehicles. 
Post contacts reported that one FACA installation was pillaged 
and seven AK-47s were stolen. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Perhaps even more troubling, IMC appears to have been 
deliberately targeted. IMC is a U.S. based healthcare and 
development NGO that receives 40 percent of its funding in the 
CAR from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. IMC 
currently operates in multiple locations in the region. In 
addition to the three vehicles, IMC offices in both Sam Ouandja 
and Ouanda Djalle were pillaged for communications equipment and 
supplies. According to the NGO, the assailants inquired about 
the whereabouts of one western expatriate employee in Ouanda 
Djalle, and for the western expatriate country director in Sam 
Ouandja - fortunately both had left days before. MINURCAT 
reports that while 15 militants went into Ouanda Djalle, 30 
left, suggesting significant reconnoitering and pre positioning 
of personnel. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On January 4, IMC reported to Post that their three 
vehicles were spotted for sale over the weekend in Am Doukoun, 
Sudan, located 20 km from the CAR/Sudan border. POLOFF informed 
the Sudanese Charge (SCDA) of the information and the SCDA said 
he would pass on the details to the competent authorities right 
away. He did admit that if the vehicles were in the hands of 
criminals, it may be difficult to recover them. 
 
¶5. (SBU) So far, the two most credible hypotheses vis a vis the 
identity and motive of the culprits are: 
 
--  The attack was planned by a shadowy figure named Omar 
Yulusse, also known as Omar Sodiam (NOTE: SODIAM is the acronym 
for a Central African diamond trading company. END NOTE), who is 
a diamond merchant and former member of the Union of Democratic 
Forces for Unity militia (UDFR), and carried out by Sudanese 
mercenaries. Yulusse may be seeking to take control of the 
lucrative diamond trade from the UFDR, which nominally controls 
the region with the consent of the CARG. It is also thought that 
this is the same ``Sudanese'' mercenary group was responsible 
for the kidnapping of French NGO workers in Birao, CAR in 
November 2009 (Ref A). This time, the group is working for a 
different person, Yulusse, with a different agenda (diamonds) 
 
BANGUI 00000002  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
but the attacks were startlingly similar in their effective use 
of local intelligence, speed of action, and their modus 
operandi. Also, one contact on the ground claims that Yulusse's 
brother was part of the armed band. 
 
-- Another contact with close links to the FACA speculated that 
Chadian rebels, very likely those discussed in Ref A, 
perpetrated the attacks to replenish stocks of weapons, cash and 
other vitals after previous conflict with the government of 
Chad. This may explain their desire to perpetrate kidnapping for 
ransom, the theft of weapons, and the speed and unusual 
professionalism of their attack. 
 
¶6. (SBU) It is worth noting that most informed contacts in 
Bangui believe there is no connection between these attacks and 
the attacks of December 11that left two UFDR members and a third 
person dead. (The third person was identified by the UFDR as a 
refugee from the camp.) As a result of the meeting between 
MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo and President Bozize in Bangui at 
the end of December, UFDR leader Zakaria Damane pledged not to 
attack the refugees or stop humanitarian aid from reaching the 
camp. This was met with wide acclaim in the media, but it should 
be noted that the UFDR has increased its presence in Sam 
Ouandja, and more than one contact has commented on the clear 
intention of the UFDR to pressure the refugees into leaving the 
area.  (NOTE: While Bozize's probable pressure upon Damane, 
along with the blood price paid by the Sudanese refugees for the 
killing of the UFDR members, appears to have calmed the 
situation, Post has little faith that the two sides have found a 
lasting solution. Additionally, the UNHCR in Geneva is now 
considering the case of moving the refugees further into the 
CAR. No word yet on how the CAR government (CARG) will react to 
this. END NOTE). 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: Northeastern CAR has been continuously 
destabilized for several years by internal conflict related to 
control of resources and the general lawlessness that prevails 
throughout the tri-border region. Furthermore, these recent 
attacks targeting NGO resources and expatriates also further 
imperil Darfuri refugees camped at Sam Ouandja and the local 
Central African population by driving away the few NGOs that 
provide food, shelter, and medical services.  Although willing 
to react and provide information, the small UN peacekeeping 
force in the region, MINURCAT, does not currently have the 
mandate or the resources to counter the attacks. 
 
¶8. (SBU) According the SCDA, there is a CARG delegation in Sudan 
to discuss border defense. This is a positive step in a region 
that is in desperate need of security and stability. Short term 
stability will be enhanced by MINURCAT, which sent a platoon of 
Nepalese soldiers to Birao on December 26 to augment the 300 
Togolese currently stationed in the town. None the less, only 
robust Sudanese and Central African government measures will 
stabilize the region. END COMMENT. 
COOK