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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: PM ABHISIT AT THE ONE-YEAR MARK: A MOSTLY POSITIVE 
POLITICAL REPORT CARD 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 3283 (A TOUGH YEAR) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 3129 (WEAPONS SEIZURE) 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 3067 (RED SHIRTS SET THEIR SIGHTS) 
     ¶D. BANGKOK 287 (THAKSIN STICKS FOOT IN MOUTH) 
     ¶E. BANGKOK 2723 (ASEAN ROUNDUP) 
     ¶F. BANGKOK 2587 (NEWIN,S FIEFDOM) 
 
BANGKOK 00000003  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) One-year into his term as Prime Minister, Abhisit 
Vejjajiva has lasted in office far longer than most political 
prognosticators ever thought possible.  Through this sheer 
act of survival in the rough and tumble world of Thai 
politics, he has confounded his detractors and rebutted -- in 
the most effective way possible -- those who disparaged his 
political instincts and discounted his mettle.  Remaining on 
top has come at a price, however, as Abhisit has had to 
expend considerable energy tending to his fractious party, 
appeasing rapacious coalition partners, and counteracting a 
relentless opposition, an exhaustive undertaking that at 
times has compromised Abhisit's ability to focus on carrying 
out his agenda.  As a result, the PM's overall political 
report card for his first year was somewhat mixed, with his 
high marks for efforts with Burma, Thailand's initiatives as 
ASEAN Chair, the North Korean weapons seizure, and 
aspirations for peace in the south outweighing the less 
stellar ones for his management of relations with Cambodia, 
the Lao Hmong repatriation, failing to deliver on southern 
reconciliation efforts, and his inability to break Thailand's 
debilitating political logjam.  This is one of two cables 
examining PM Abhisit's first year in office; REF A explored 
his economic achievements. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: As the PM evaluates his first year in office, 
he can take some comfort in knowing that his political future 
is in many ways more secure than when he first assumed 
office.  There are clouds on the horizon to be sure, 
including a likely January no-confidence vote in Parliament 
and the prospect of more energized red-shirt protests in the 
New Year, but Thaksin's recent political missteps (REF D) and 
Puea Thai's decision to drop its support for the 
constitutional reform effort means there is neither an 
obvious trigger for elections in the near future, nor a huge 
outcry for them.  In fact, it is no longer outlandish to 
suggest that Abhisit could manage to stick it out until close 
to the natural expiration of his term in December 2011, a 
notion that would have seemed laughable just months ago. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment cont'd: From a USG perspective, on balance the 
PM has been a reliable partner and has delivered a level of 
stability -- lacking since the 2006 coup -- that has allowed 
many of our bilateral initiatives to get back on track and 
close to where they stood pre-coup.  While there have been 
exceptions to this rule -- most notably in the form of last 
week's Lao Hmong repatriation -- U.S.-Thai relations have 
largely been well served during this administration and we 
suspect that will continue to be the case as long as PM 
Abhisit remains in power. 
 
POLITICAL GROUNDHOG'S DAY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) One-year into his term, Prime Minister Abhisit has had 
little success translating his eloquent words about political 
reconciliation into concrete action.  Public opinion polls 
have consistently shown that the Thai people are more 
interested in progress on political reconciliation than just 
about any other issue save the economy, and yet the PM has 
failed to change the underlying political dynamic in any 
appreciable way.  Red-shirts still take to the streets with 
regularity to protest the government, while the yellow shirts 
wait in the wings, ever ready to assemble at the slightest 
provocation.  The PM has freely admitted that he has failed 
to address the issue, telling a reporter on December 21 that 
 
BANGKOK 00000003  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
he had been "unable to tackle the political crisis." 
 
¶5. (C) Of course, PM Abhisit does not have the capacity to 
engineer reconciliation on his own.  Former Prime Minister 
Thaksin, like PM Abhisit, has also repeatedly paid lip 
service to the idea of reconciliation, though his actions 
have mostly suggested he is more interested in toppling the 
Prime Minister.  From his revolutionary rhetoric and tacit 
support for violence in April, to his Times Online interview 
and most recently his Cambodia gambit, Thaksin's actions have 
consistently exposed his words about reconciliation as 
hollow. 
 
KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE AND COALITION PARTNERS CLOSER 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (C) Aside from the never-ending political chess match with 
Thaksin and his allies, one of the most consistent irritants 
for PM Abhisit has been coalition management in general, and 
the Phumjai Thai party in particular.  As reported in REF F 
and elsewhere, godfather of the Phumjai Thai party Newin 
Chidchop has milked Phumjai Thai's Kingmaking role in the 
coalition for all that it's worth.  Phumjai Thai controls the 
Ministries of Interior, Commerce, and Transport, and at times 
has treated these ministries like bureaucratic ATM machines. 
 
¶7. (C) The level of corruption in Phumjai Thai's bureaus has 
been significant enough -- even by Thai standards -- to raise 
eyebrows and partially sully the Prime Minister by 
association.  As Deputy House Speaker Apiwan Wiriyachai told 
us December 22, no one questioned Prime Minister Abhisit's 
credentials as a clean reformer.  According to Deputy Speaker 
Apiwan, the problem was that PM Abhisit and the Democrats 
made a Faustian pact with Phumjai Thai to form the 
government, and there was very little the PM could do to rein 
in Newin's wheeling and dealing.  Apiwan noted that Phumjai 
Thai held all the cards, as any concerted effort by the PM or 
the Democrats to bring Phumjai Thai to heel could cause 
irreversible damage to the already fragile coalition. 
 
¶8. (C) Despite all the headaches associated with managing 
Phumjai Thai, the coalition appears to be on reasonably solid 
footing moving into year two of the Abhisit administration. 
Deputy Government Spokesman and Phumjai Thai stalwart 
Suphachai Jaismut has told us repeatedly that although 
Phumjai Thai was not always satisfied with PM Abhisit's 
leadership, overall the party was eager to maintain the 
status quo for as long as possible.  The same could be said 
for the Chart Thai Pattana party, the fourth largest party in 
the coalition.  Chart Thai Pattana MPs frequently disparage 
PM Abhisit and the Democrats on one hand, while conceding 
they have no interest in new elections on the other.  Chart 
Thai Pattana MP Chada Thaiset's comments to us December 8 
reflected this dynamic.  Chada told us that PM Abhisit failed 
to do the dirty work necessary to keep the coalition running 
smoothly and that the Democrats were unpleasant to work with. 
 Yet, when we asked him if he thought the coalition was in 
danger of fragmenting, he told us he did not think so and 
that he wanted to see the coalition stay together. 
 
BURMA 
------ 
 
¶9. (C) By most measures, Thailand acquitted itself favorably 
on the Burma issue during PM Abhisit's first year in office. 
He set a positive tone from the start, beginning with the 
February lead-up to the ASEAN Summit when he met with Burmese 
exiles and a group of 1990 Burmese MPs-elect.  He has also 
repeatedly delayed his plans for an official visit to Burma 
pending the regime's willingness to authorize a meeting with 
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), and instructed the Thai Embassy in 
Rangoon to engage more energetically in Rangoon with the 
opposition NLD party.  Perhaps most importantly, Thailand 
demonstrated leadership on Burma policy as ASEAN Chair, 
repeatedly pressing reluctant/recalcitrant members on issues 
such as ASSK's release from prison. 
 
 
BANGKOK 00000003  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
ASEAN TENURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Regrettably for Thailand, most people will likely 
remember red-shirts breaching the security at the ASEAN 
Summit in Pattaya far more readily than other aspects of 
Thailand's tenure as ASEAN Chair.  While there is little 
question Pattaya represented a low point in the RTG's 
chairmanship, the fact remains Thailand still managed to 
carve out a legacy to be proud of on several fronts, 
including the launch of the ASEAN Charter in February, and 
its work championing a more aggressive posture on Burma. 
 
¶11. (C) In October, at the 15th ASEAN Summit in Thailand, 
ASEAN launched the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR), a landmark achievement given ASEAN 
dynamics and the need for buy-in from "new ASEAN" members 
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.  Though it remains to be 
seen just how effective the AICHR will prove to be, the very 
existence of a human rights mechanism within the ASEAN 
framework represented forward progress and provided a 
foundation to build upon.  Thailand also worked hard to place 
civil society engagement at the center of its 18 month 
Chairmanship of ASEAN, going so far as to use the term a 
"people-centric ASEAN" as one of the themes of its 
chairmanship. Other RTG initiatives were ASEAN Connectivity, 
a plan that aims to intensify the idea of a SE Asian 
community, and the promotion of a defense officials dialogue, 
specifically in regard to disaster relief and peacekeeping 
capabilities. 
 
¶12. (C) Under PM Abhisit's leadership, Thailand announced its 
candidacy for the United Nations Human Rights Council for the 
term 2010-2013 and helped spearhead the adoption of the Terms 
of Reference for the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children.  Thailand 
also appointed a new slate of commissioners to its national 
Human Rights Commission, making it one of only four ASEAN 
countries to have such a commission.  Finally, Thailand 
positioned itself as a leader on international initiatives to 
combat violence and discrimination against women, a fact 
probably best illustrated by the Ministry of Justice and 
Princess Bajrakitiyabha Mahidol's proposed Draft UN Rules for 
the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures 
for Women Offenders. 
 
NORTH KOREAN WEAPONS SEIZURE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) As reported in REF B, on December 11 Thailand became 
the first country to successfully carry out an air-related 
interdiction of North Korean weapons.  The RTG seized over 35 
tons of North Korean arms in an action that both fulfilled 
its obligations under UNSCR 1874, while simultaneously 
underscoring Thailand's invaluable role as a strategic USG 
partner on bilateral and multilateral issues.  Thailand 
seized the weapons despite an aversion to precedent setting 
and meddling in the affairs of others. 
 
CAMBODIAN KERFUFFLE 
------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Relations between Thailand and Cambodia -- typically 
strained under the best of circumstances -- fell to the 
newest lows in recent memory under PM Abhisit.  Cambodian PM 
Hun Sen's public embrace of Thaksin triggered a round of 
harsh back and forth rhetoric between Bangkok and Phnom Penh, 
retaliatory Ambassadorial withdrawals, and accusations from 
both sides of meddling in cross border domestic politics. 
 
¶15. (C) While Hun Sen's decision to appoint Thaksin as an 
advisor was clearly intended as a provocation, it was Abhisit 
who allowed himself to be manipulated and drawn into a cross 
border war of words.  Notwithstanding the fact that Abhisit 
received a temporary popularity boost as a result of 
heightened cross border tensions, the decision to engage with 
Hun Sen and Thaksin and "wallow in the mud with pigs" as some 
 
BANGKOK 00000003  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
pundits have said, has only served to elevate Thaksin's 
profile while straining ties with Cambodia at the same time 
Thailand is navigating complicated relationships with its 
other neighbors.  Thaksin's most recent visit to Cambodia was 
met with substantially less rancor and acrimony in Thailand, 
a possible sign that the RTG has recognized the perils of 
overreacting, but the damage has already been done and 
Abhisit will be hard pressed to improve relations with Hun 
Sen anytime soon. 
 
ABHISIT AND THE SOUTH 
------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) When PM Abhisit assumed office just over one year 
ago, he repeatedly pointed to resolving the southern 
insurgency as one of his administration's foremost 
priorities.  Right out of the gates, he developed a plan to 
reinvest civilian officials with authority over the southern 
insurgency, and considered lifting the draconian security 
laws that allow security forces to detain and hold suspects 
without charges or trial.  He also launched a "Southern 
Cabinet" to oversee relevant budget and policy issues, and 
vowed to establish a new organization with overall 
responsibility for the south.  In addition, the PM signaled 
he would consider a special administrative zone in southern 
Thailand to deal with issues of governance, and noted that he 
would entertain the possibility of "peace talks" to end the 
violence. Unfortunately, none of Abhisit's initiatives has 
translated into any visible changes on the ground yet. 
 
 
JOHN