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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MARR MASS TH CH CB
SUBJECT: A/S SHAPIRO VISIT: DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL ISSUES, 
THE RISE OF CHINA, AND ASEAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. During a January 13-15 visit, Assistant 
Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro 
discussed a range of regional issues during meetings with 
senior Thai officials.  The rise of China was viewed benignly 
by Thai officials, who stressed that Beijing was more 
interested in supporting trade and economic development in 
the ASEAN region than in attending to security issues. 
Heightened tensions with Cambodia were universally 
characterized as a political issue rather than a security 
threat, and DPM Suthep Thaugsuban said that he expected that 
relations with Cambodia would improve this year.  The Vice 
Foreign Minister stressed that Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva would not visit Burma until a meeting with Aung San 
Suu Kyi was permitted, and that the PM firmly supported the 
release of all political prisoners.  Ministry of Defense 
Permanent Secretary Apichart Penkitti underscored to A/S 
Shapiro Thailand's desire for the U.S. to join the ASEAN 
Defense Ministers Meeting Plus arrangement. 
 
¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Shapiro stressed to a wide range 
of Thai interlocutors the Obama Administration's commitment 
to engagement in Southeast Asia and in Thailand in 
particular.  With the rise of China of interest to the entire 
international community, the U.S. wanted close relations with 
Southeast Asia in order to insure that Beijing utilized its 
growing role in a way that supported regional security. End 
summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment.  A/S Shapiro's visit highlighted to the RTG 
U.S. interest in engaging on regional and strategic issues, 
particularly in advance of the U.S.-Thai Strategic Dialogue. 
We were struck by the Thai interest in economic issues, even 
in their discussions with the A/S for Political/Military 
affairs.  Reflecting that orientation, Thai views on China 
were surprising in that there was a universal lack of concern 
over whether China's rise could potentially disrupt regional 
security.  Of course, this lack of worry also likely is the 
product of Thailand lacking a territorial dispute with 
Beijing.  That said, Thai officials continue to encourage the 
U.S. to participate in ADMM Plus, a grouping that could 
otherwise likely be dominated by China.   End comment. 
 
CHINA'S RISE: A NATURAL EVENT, FOCUSED ON ECONOMICS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (C) During a January 15 meeting, Deputy Prime Minister 
Suthep Thaugsuban told A/S Shapiro and the Ambassador that he 
believed that U.S. policy had in recent years moved towards 
restricting imports.  In contrast to the U.S. approach, 
Beijing was working to improve trade with Southeast Asia and 
to promote economic development in ASEAN.  In particular, 
China had promised ASEAN large amounts of financial 
assistance for transportation and development projects and 
had become a leading investor in the region.  Suthep 
recommended that the U.S. look for ways to improve economic 
relations while also supporting regional security. 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Shapiro asked about Thailand's view of China's 
increasing international role during a January 14 meeting 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Panich Vikitsreth.  Panich 
said the RTG wanted to continue to work closely with the 
U.S., but had no option but to develop closer relations with 
China as well.  According to Panich, China's interests in 
Southeast Asia were primarily economic.  Foreign investment 
in Thailand had in the past been predominantly Japanese, but 
China had recently become one of the largest foreign 
investors in Thailand, Panich said.  That said, the RTG was 
watching with caution Chinese engagement in Burma. 
 
¶6. (C) During a January 14 meeting, Ministry of Defense 
Permanent Secretary General Apichart Penkitti told A/S 
Shapiro and the Ambassador that the rise of China was not a 
concern because the Chinese were focused on good relations 
with ASEAN and on promoting economic development in the 
region.  In regard to bilateral relations with Beijing, 
Apichart said it was natural for the Thai-Chinese 
relationship to progress.  That said, the PLA had pressed 
Thailand to initiate large scale bilateral exercises, but the 
 
BANGKOK 00000186  002 OF 003 
 
 
Thai military had insisted that exercises should be limited 
to Special Forces training, such as the ones held in 2007 and 
2008, as well as the commencement of an annual naval and 
marine exercise this year. 
 
¶7. (C) Assistant Secretary Shapiro January 15 asked Royal 
Thai Armed Forces Chief of Defense Forces General Songkitti 
Jaggabatra for his views of the rise of China and its 
influence in the region.  A/S Shapiro said that while the 
U.S. wanted to work closely with China, as evidenced by the 
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the USG wanted to 
strengthen relationships in Asia in order to maintain 
stability in the event that China's rise proceeded in a way 
that could compromise regional security.  General Songkitti 
commented that due to its size and history, it was normal for 
China to gain a more influential role in Asia.  With Laos and 
Cambodia heavily influenced by China, it was important for 
Thailand to develop good relations with Beijing as well in 
order to insure against being sidelined in the region. 
Songkitti said that Thai relations with the U.S. were much 
stronger than those with China -- due to historically strong 
economic and educational bonds -- but that the RTG would 
pursue closer relations 
 with Beijing as Thailand could not escape its geographic 
reality. 
 
¶8. (C) A/S Shapiro asked Songkitti about the planned 
Thai-Chinese naval and marine exercise scheduled to be 
initiated in 2010.  Songkitti said the exercise was still in 
the planning stage, but commented that it would be 
small-scale due the Thai military's lacking budgetary 
constraints.  Songkitti explained that Thailand did not need 
another large scale exercise because the annual multilateral 
Cobra Gold exercise already met the need for such an event. 
That said, the Thai military leaders believed that it was 
necessary to develop relationships with their Chinese 
counterparts. 
 
¶9. (C) RTARF J3 LTG Suraphan Wongthai told A/S Shapiro that 
Thailand had a natural desire for close relations with the 
U.S.  This was the result of U.S. efforts after World War II 
to shield Bangkok from British and French demands for 
reparations from Thailand, and shared experiences during 
conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  That 
said, in recent years the Thai military had found it more 
difficult to maintain the relationship with the U.S. 
military.  Suraphan said this was because few junior officers 
in the Thai military had the opportunity to attend 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) courses 
in the U.S. as funding levels had not yet reached pre-2006 
levels.  Also, the Thai military had found it increasingly 
difficult to purchase U.S. weapons.  In contrast, LTG 
Suraphan said that China appeared eager to find ways to 
interact with the Thai and were very willing to sell weapons 
systems.  A/S Shapiro told Suraphan that while budget 
increases would be difficult, the Political-Military Bureau 
would explore possibilities for increased IMET funding for 
the Thai. 
 
ABHISIT WAITING TO VISIT BURMA 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) VFM Panich told A/S Shapiro that Prime Minister 
Abhisit Vejjajiva considered Burma policy a top priority. 
The PM wanted free and fair elections, and the release of 
political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK). 
Abhisit had also decided to hold off on visiting Burma until 
he could meet ASSK.  Nonetheless, Thailand was willing to 
work closely with the U.S. as Thailand was a close dialogue 
partner on Burma.  During a January 15 lunch meeting with Dr. 
Panitan Wattanayagorn, Deputy Secretary General for Prime 
Minister Abhisit and Acting RTG Spokesman, Panitan confirmed 
to A/S Shapiro that the Prime Minister would wait to visit 
Burma until the regime permitted a meeting with ASSK.  Burma 
was a key issue for the RTG as the two nations' long border 
led to significant narcotics trafficking and illegal labor 
problems, Panitan said. 
 
ASEAN AND ADMM PLUS 
------------------- 
 
BANGKOK 00000186  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) VFM Panich told A/S Shapiro that the Thai government 
was proud of its accomplishments as ASEAN Chair, particularly 
efforts to raise regional awareness of human rights and to 
initiate ASEAN Connectivity.  Dr. Sarasin, CP Group Executive 
Vice President and a former high-ranking Thai diplomat, told 
A/S Shapiro that he thought the RTG should re-examine its 
policy in regards to ASEAN.  With its foreign policy focused 
on ASEAN, an organization dependent on consensus, Thailand 
had in the past twenty years lost standing in the 
international community.  Sarasin commented that, as it took 
much time to convince other ASEAN nations to take action, 
Thailand often found itself unable to focus on important 
international issues. 
 
¶12. (C) Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Apichart told 
A/S Shapiro and the Ambassador that ASEAN had not yet decided 
on the composition of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 
Plus (ADMM Plus) grouping.  Apichart said the expanded 
arrangement would include the ASEAN plus six nations or the 
ASEAN plus eight nations.  (Note: It is our understanding 
that "plus six" would include Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea and the "plus eight" 
would include Russia and the U.S. as well. End note.) 
Apichart told A/S Shapiro that the RTG wanted the U.S. to be 
a part of ADMM Plus. 
 
REGIONAL RELATIONS DEPEND ON CAMBODIA-THAKSIN 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) During their January 15 meeting, A/S Shapiro asked 
DPM Suthep about the Thai government's views of regional and 
strategic challenges.  Suthep said that Cambodian Prime 
Minister Hun Sen's relations with former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra would be a key factor in efforts to 
improve the regional political environment.  With Burma, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam strongly aligned, it was 
important that Thailand improve relations with Phnom Penh. 
The DPM said that he was confident that relations would 
improve as Thaksin's challenge to the Thai government faded 
over the coming year. 
 
¶14. (C) VFM Panich told A/S Shapiro that Thai-Cambodian 
relations along the border were fine, but the appointment of 
Thaksin as an advisor to Hun Sen was unacceptable to the Thai 
government.  As such, Hun Sen's act had led to heightened 
political tensions.  While  tensions were not as high as in 
October and November of last year, the appointment continued 
to be an obstacle to improving government to government 
relations, Panich said. 
 
¶15. (C) General Apichart emphasized to A/S Shapiro that the 
tensions with Cambodia were entirely political, adding that 
military relations along the border were good and the two 
sides communicated often and had close cooperation.  RTARF J3 
LTG Suraphan laughed off recent reports that military 
tensions had risen along the border and instead stressed the 
greater concern posed by Burma purchasing more advanced, 
long-range weapons. 
 
¶16. (U) Assistant Secretary Shapiro cleared this cable. 
JOHN