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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2030 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM USNC IZ
SUBJECT: KRG OFFICIALS ON ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3229 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with senior leaders of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the Ambassador's Senior 
Advisor for Northern Iraqi (SANI) emphasized U.S. support for 
a negotiated, consensus-based solution to Kirkuk.  SANI 
stressed to Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Kamal Kirkuki 
and Kurdistan Regional Government Deputy Prime Minister Azad 
Barwari that deliberate, careful consultations between all 
parties were needed to avoid exacerbating tensions in the 
disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) areas, including Kirkuk. 
Kirkuki, a hardliner, claimed the Kurds had compromised on 
the election law based on perceived promises in the 
POTUS/VPOTUS calls to KRG President Barzani and the White 
House statement of December 7.  He insisted on implementing 
Article 140 in accordance with the Kurds' interpretation (a 
census followed by "up or down" referendum on Kirkuk), 
claimed any other approach would engender civil war and 
"another genocide" for Iraq's Kurds, and threatened to 
boycott the national elections.  Barwari was more measured, 
saying he saw "nothing new" in the White House statement and 
that while the election law compromise was not ideal, it had 
allowed Iraq to move forward.  Barwari expressed concern that 
mounting tension between the Kurdish PUK and Goran Movement 
parties could lead to political violence in the run-up to 
national elections. He also said the merger of KDP and PUK 
peshmerga elements was moving forward, and he offered that 
"unhealthy" U.S. policies in the region were such that Iran 
would continue to benefit as long as discussions over its 
nuclear program continued.  Barwari denied that Kurds in 
Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran aspire to a unified, independent 
Kurdish state, and cautioned that Iraq and other states with 
significant Kurdish populations needed to protect Kurds' 
rights.  Kirkuki's hardline, emotional reaction to our view 
on Kirkuk -- especially the need for negotiated consensus as 
a precursor to any referendum under Article 140 -- highlights 
the difficulties in resolving Kirkuk's status through a 
negotiated process, instead of the less consensual approach 
favored by the KRG.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SANI CLARIFIES U.S. POSITION ON ARTICLE 140 & KIRKUK 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq 
(SANI) met with the Speaker of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament 
(IKP), Kamal Kirkuki, on December 20 in Erbil. (Note: 
Kirkuki, a member of the KDP's politburo and a former 
peshmerga general, is a hardliner on Kurdish national 
interests, particularly Kirkuk.  End note.) SANI conveyed 
reftel points, clarifying that U.S. support for 
implementation of Article 140 of Iraq's constitution 
envisions a referendum to confirm a negotiated, 
consensus-based resolution of Kirkuk's status (a 
"confirmatory referendum"), not/not an "up or down" 
referendum to decide among possible solutions for Kirkuk's 
status.  He noted Ambassador Hill's experience in the 
Balkans, where several types of referenda -- including those 
to affirm consensus agreements -- contributed positively to 
the resolution of complex and difficult political situations. 
 As the WH statement of December 7 made clear, the U.S. is 
ready to support the GOI's effort to conduct an accurate 
census as one element in support of future provincial and 
national elections.  From the U.S. perspective, there was 
flexibility with respect to the timing and sequence of the 
Qflexibility with respect to the timing and sequence of the 
census, all-party negotiations, and a subsequent referendum 
to affirm a negotiated solution on Kirkuk. 
 
KIRKUKI REJECTS ALTERNATE APPROACHES 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Kirkuki pushed back strongly, claiming the U.S. 
committed in the POTUS/VPOTUS telcons with KRG President 
Barzani on December 6, and in the WH statement on December 7, 
to implement Article 140 according to the "normal" Kurdish 
intepretation, e.g., census followed by a straightforward 
referendum offering two options: Kirkuk Province either: A) 
becomes part of the KRG, or; B) becomes a regular province 
with no affiliation to the KRG.  If the U.S. was not faithful 
to its original promise, he said, there would be "a crisis 
for the Kurds".  He rejected "completely" that there could be 
any flexibility in applying Article 140, arguing that it 
clearly called for a census followed by a referendum on 
whether Kirkuk would become part of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region (IKR).  In a long, emotional presentation, Kirkuki 
conveyed the following points: 
 
- The KRG would reject any attempt to use Article 142 to 
amend Article 140. 
- KRG leaders were under heavy pressure to avoid concessions 
on Kirkuk.  The Kurdish opposition (i.e., the Goran Movement) 
claimed the U.S. "deceived" KRG leaders into accepting an 
election law compromise unfavorable to Kurdish interests and 
that KRG leaders had "betrayed" the Kurdish people, limiting 
KRG leaders' room for maneuver. 
 
- It was unfair to expect the IKR's inhabitants to remain 
part of Iraq without having their constitutional rights 
(i.e., implementation of Article 140 according to the Kurdish 
formulation) protected.  Kurds "would not understand this". 
 
- Claiming Kurds "had not had justice" in Iraq, Kirkuki 
alleged that former PM Allawi, former PM Jaafari and current 
PM Maliki had all promised to implement Article 140 (again, 
according to the "normal" Kurdish formulation), but none had 
done so. 
 
- Arabs were "extremists" who would exploit power to 
"slaughter" other groups.  The U.S. was mistaken if it 
believed the Arabs would be "wiser now" with respect to the 
Kurds than in the past, when they had deployed chemical 
weapons against Kurdish civilians. 
 
- If Kirkuk's status was not resolved "according to Article 
140 and the constitution" (i.e., the Kurdish formulation of 
normalization, census and up/down referendum, in that order), 
there would, "for sure", with 100 percent certainty be a 
civil war. 
 
- If Article 140 and the constitution are not implemented, 
there will be "another Kurdish genocide" after the drawdown 
of U.S. forces, which KRG leaders cannot permit. 
 
- In a Kurdish language aside to his assistant, Kirkuki said 
that if the SANI's message accurately reflected U.S. policy, 
KRG leaders should instruct Kurds to boycott the March 2010 
national elections. 
 
¶4. (C) Pushing back, SANI stressed that the POTUS/VPOTUS 
calls to Barzani reflected the U.S. commitment to its 
friendship with the KRG and the Kurdish people.  Even after 
the withdrawal of its forces, the diplomatic and political 
efforts of the U.S. would continue. It was important to make 
progress in the coming period on Kirkuk and other problems in 
the disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas.  U.S. leaders 
understand Kirkuk is a complicated issue, but a civil war 
would hurt Kurdish interests, undo the IKR's achievements and 
jeopardize Iraq's unity.  SANI asked for commitment to a 
step-by-step process that would allow all parties to proceed 
in a deliberate, careful manner.  The U.S. view was that such 
a process should comprise the following elements: 1) holding 
on-time national elections; 2) conducting, with U.S. support, 
a census in 2010, and; 3) negotiating a consensus-based 
agreement on Kirkuk's status.  He urged continued close 
consultation between KRG and U.S. leaders, aimed at 
preserving Kurdish rights and Kurdish achievements within a 
unified Iraq. 
 
¶5. (C) Saying the U.S. views resembled those of UNAMI, which 
employed many Arabs and was "biased against the Kurds", 
Kirkuki asked whether SANI's message represented the view of 
the Embassy and UN, or also that of the White House.  Noting 
he had been at the White House on the day Iraq's election law 
was adopted and the December 7 WH statement had been drafted, 
SANI assured Kirkuki that he conveyed a unified U.S. 
position.  The U.S. closely consulted with UNAMI and viewed 
it as neutral.  Iraqi unity was an overarching priority; 
there should be a constructive solution for Kirkuk that 
strengthened the Iraqi nation.  Building a stronger, more 
autonomous KRG with an eye toward independence was dangerous. 
 Claiming that Arabs interpreted "a strong Iraq" to mean a 
Q Claiming that Arabs interpreted "a strong Iraq" to mean a 
well-armed, centralized government, Kirkuki stressed that 
unless the DIBs were resolved before the U.S. drawdown, there 
would be "a valley of problems".  He urged SANI to focus on 
implementing Article 140 (in accordance with the KRG's 
formulation) and to refrain from any further discussion of a 
negotiated, consensus-based agreement on Kirkuk's status. 
 
PESHMERGA MERGER 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Kirkuki confirmed media reports that there had been 
progress in merging the KDP and PUK-affiliated wings of the 
peshmerga.  Barzani had issued instructions that the 
peshmerga, which previously had separate KDP and 
PUK-affiliated headquarters in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah, 
respectively, should be integrated into a single entity with 
a shared command structure and operating protocols.  The 
budget for the peshmerga would eventually come from the Iraqi 
Ministry of Defense. (Note: Media reports claimed that during 
his recent visit to Baghdad, KRG DPM Barham Salih discussed 
with PM Maliki the status of the peshmerga merger.  There are 
unconfirmed reports that Maliki will soon travel to Erbil to 
meet with Barzani and sign an agreement for the eventual 
integration of the merged peshmerga into the Iraqi Army (IA). 
 End note.) 
 
KRG DPM BARWARI LESS STRIDENT ON KIRKUK 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In a subsequent meeting on December 26, KRG Deputy 
Prime Minister (DPM) Azad Barwari was more measured in his 
analysis of the POTUS/VPOTUS calls with Barzani and the 
December 7 WH statement.  (Note: Barwari is a senior member 
of the KDP's politburo; it is widely reported that Barzani 
installed him as DPM to closely watch KRG Prime Minister (PM) 
Barham Salih, a PUK member.  End note.) On the statement, 
Barwari said he "saw no problems with it" and nothing in it 
that represented new U.S. policy.  The election law 
compromise was not ideal, but it was a solution that allowed 
the country needed to move forward.  He anticipated problems 
registering out-of-country voters (OCVs), and urged that an 
accurate national census be conducted in accordance with the 
December 7 WH statement to mitigate demographic questions and 
facilitate future elections. 
 
IRAN WINS AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to SANI's observation that KRG PM Salih was 
visiting the "Iranian brothers" in Tehran, Barwari carefully 
noted they were "not brothers, but cousins". (Note: A 
reference to President Talabani's familiar dictum that the 
Kurds can choose their friends (e.g., the U.S.), but cannot 
choose their neighbors any more than a person can choose the 
members of his/her family.  End note.) Referring to the 
recent takeover by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
troops of an oil well in the al-Fakkah field on the Iraq-Iran 
border, Barwari said if he had been in Salih's place, he 
would have postponed visiting Tehran.  He lamented the "bad 
timing" of dissident Iranian cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein 
Ali Montazeri's death, saying it could hurt efforts to 
moderate Iran's behavior.  Noting Montazeri's criticism of 
Iran's nuclear ambitions and its defiance of the 
international community, Barwari claimed that "Iran never won 
in a war, but it wins by politics".  The Iranian account was 
"complicated", but U.S. policy in the region - characterized 
by contentious issues like Pakistan, Yemen's Houthi rebellion 
and Iraq - was "unhealthy" and ultimately benefited Iran. 
For its part, Iran was unclear about its policy goals and 
pursued maximalist negotiating positions, which was 
unhelpful.  On balance, as long as discussions with the 
international community continued, Iran won. 
 
KDP FEARS VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN GORAN AND PUK 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶9. (C) On upcoming national elections, Barwari said delaying 
polling until March, when better weather was expected, would 
facilitate greater turnout in the IKR.  Conceding that the 
open list system would change electoral dynamics, he said 
Kurdish parties, accustomed to party lists and strict voter 
discipline, were working to adjust.  KDP leaders "feared" 
competition between the PUK and Goran ("Change") Movement in 
Sulaimaniyah.  It was not important which of the parties 
prevailed, but that they did not destroy the political system 
in the process by fomenting political violence.  There was 
"no evidence" that either party had planned such 
provocations; however, based on past experience, Barwari 
Qprovocations; however, based on past experience, Barwari 
predicted violent clashes between the PUK and Goran in the 
run-up to the March elections.  He characterized Goran's 
candidates as being "slightly more confident" than the PUK's, 
but said the PUK also believed it would do well. (Comment: It 
is clear the KDP is not entirely comfortable with Goran's 
threat to the traditional bipolar KDP/PUK order; Barwari's 
remark about PUK candidates' confidence may have represented 
a triumph of hope over analysis.  End comment.) 
 
PESHMERGA MERGER A "VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (C) Barwari characterized progress on merging KDP and PUK 
peshmerga elements as a "very positive development". 
According to Barwari, USF-I CG Odierno had visited the IKR 
several times to discuss the effort and there was a good 
plan, captured in a draft law, to implement the merger.  The 
IKP's Council of Ministers needed to approve the draft law, 
which also addressed the proposed merger of KDP and PUK 
Assayesh elements.  It would then go to the full IKP for 
approval.  It would be problematic if the peshmerga remained 
divided into politically-affiliated camps; the merger would 
mitigate the potential for political violence in the IKR. 
The SANI asked about reports that PM Maliki would soon visit 
Erbil to follow up on recent meetings in Baghdad with KRG PM 
Salih and, according to press reports, sign agreements 
related to the eventual integration of the peshmerga into the 
IA.  Barwari claimed to have no knowledge of dates, but noted 
that it would be "natural" for Maliki to visit since the IKR 
was part of Iraq and therefore fell within his bailiwick. 
 
NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE AND KURDISH ASPIRATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶11. (C) Barwari questioned whether the IA's capacity and 
authority were equal to the challenge of implementing the 
joint security architecture in the DIBs areas.  Kurdish 
forces would help lend capability to those forces within the 
context of the joint checkpoints and joint patrols.  The IKR 
was part of Iraq, but Arab Iraqis claimed the Kurds were 
working to achieve independence.  The IKR needed to be a 
"real partner" in Iraq; it would be helpful for the Iraqi 
national parliament to clarify the interpretation of key 
dispute articles of the constitution to reduce friction 
between the IKR and the rest of the country.  Agreement on 
those interpretations should be achieved through democratic 
consensus, not by the dictates of the majority. 
 
¶12. (C) Acknowledging sectarian and ethnic tensions, Barwari 
stressed that Iraq needed to move beyond those.  Noting that 
there would always be problems if Kurds' constitutional 
rights were denied, Barwari stressed that Kurds in Syria, 
Turkey, Iraq and Iran did not/not aspire to a unified, 
independent Kurdish state.  The prevailing political culture 
in the states with significant Kurdish populations was such 
that they wanted to contain what they perceived as a Kurdish 
threat to their territorial integrity.  It was therefore 
incumbent on the Kurds to be mindful of the perceived threat 
they posed and be "a bit patient" in their demands.  Noting 
that one of the only points of agreement between those states 
was a desire to oppress the Kurds, Barwari expressed hope 
that the issue of Kurdish rights could be successfully 
resolved as it had been in Iraq. 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT: The difference in Kirkuki and Barwari's tone 
in discussing implementation of Article 140 underscores that 
views within the KRG are not homogeneous.  That said, Kirkuk 
remains a highly emotive issue and the KRG's moderates feel 
constrained in their ability to advocate for less contentious 
approaches.  Kirkuki's emotional reaction to the U.S. 
position on Kirkuk highlights the difficulties we will surely 
face when the time comes to press in earnest for resolving 
Kirkuk's status through a negotiated, consensual process, 
instead of the up-or-down, instant decision by referendum 
approach that has become the default position of the KRG. 
More sophisticated Kurdish interlocutors, such as Barzani 
chief of staff Fuad Hussein, readily acknowledge the need for 
a negotiating process with Arab, Turkoman and other minority 
communities as part of the any "settlement" of Kirkuk 
(details septel).  We will need to promote a negotiated, 
consensus-based approach in our discussions with KRG leaders 
in the months ahead to prepare the ground for an eventual 
diplomatic push to resolve Kirkuk's status. 
HILL