VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3387/01 0011302
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011302Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5982
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003387 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM KJUS IZ
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: PRT SALAH AD DIN: GOI INTERFERENCE 
IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR STANDOFF 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3181 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 2847 
 
Classified By: CDA Robert Ford for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Salah Ad Din reporting cable. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY:  Following a two month standoff with the GOI 
central Government, the Salah Ad Din (SaD) Provincial Council 
(PC) is poised to forcibly remove the former Provincial 
Governor (PGOV) of SAD--which it voted from office on October 
27--from the official residence the PGOV is still occupying. 
The PC has waited in vain for the GOI Presidency Council to 
issue the statutorily required decree authorizing the new 
governor to take office.  Since there has been no action by 
the GOI, the PC is considering forcibly removing him, perhaps 
before January 1.  The PC believes the GOI 
inaction--orchestrated primarily by Sunni Tawafuq members in 
parliament--to be motivated in part by a desire to support 
the ousted Governor in hopes of garnering additional votes in 
the March 7 elections.  Amid confusion as to the Presidency 
Council's role and obligation, Embassy will ask Higher 
Judicial Council President Judge Medhat to clarify to the 
Presidency Council that all legal questions have been 
resolved, and their duty is to adhere to the law. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
TENSIONS RATCHET UP 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) PRToff and partnered U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 
Commander met with PC Chair Ahmad Abd Allah Abd (aka Abu 
Mazin) and his legal advisor on December 21-22 to stress the 
importance of resolving the dispute with ousted PGov Mutashar 
Hussein Illawee in the Iraqi Court system (refs A and B). 
They encouraged Abu Mazin to appeal to the Federal Supreme 
Court (FSC) to rule on the Presidency Council's refusal to 
issue a Presidential Degree confirming the election of the 
new governor.  (NOTE: Article 26 of the Provincial Powers Law 
(PPL) states: "A Presidential Decree for the appointment of 
the Governor shall be issued within 15 days from the date of 
his election." END NOTE).  However, the PC Chair and most PC 
members said that they believe they have allowed their legal 
system enough time to resolve this peacefully and want to 
take action. 
 
¶4. (C) The PC held two press conferences on December 21 and 
22, announcing that they had had decided to remove Mutashar, 
by force if necessary.  In several private meetings with the 
PC Chair over December 22-27 PRToff and BCT Commander 
stressed that proper legal procedure requires the PC to 
obtain an enforcement order from the FSC for Mutashar's 
disregard for its ruling.  SaD Chief Criminal Judge Faisal 
told PRToff on December 28 that no judge in SaD would touch 
the entire matter, and that anything court-related would have 
to go through Baghdad. 
 
¶5. (C) PC Chair Abu Mazin asked PRToff and BCT Commander to 
tell their respective chains of command that the PC has 
decided to act and needs U.S. help to pressure the GoI to "do 
the right thing."  He continued that he was ready to give the 
order to the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) Hamid (IIP) 
soon to test his loyalties.  (NOTE: It is not clear that PC 
Chair has authority to order police to take such action since 
this is an executive branch power. End note). The BCT 
Commander believes Hamid would indeed execute such an order, 
but in meetings with PCoP and General Salah of the 4th 
Infantry Division of the Iraqi Army on December 23 BCT 
Commander persuaded both to stand down to preserve Rule of 
Law and peace.  He believes these actions, along with other 
discussions he has had with Abu Mazin, have bought some time 
to work toward a peaceful resolution to the dispute. 
Qto work toward a peaceful resolution to the dispute. 
 
POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) PC member and retired BG Abdullah Hussein Jebara told 
the BCT Commander and PRToff on December 23 that he was very 
nervous about the PC moving against Mutashar and the 
potentially violent implications they would have for Tikrit 
and the province.  He told the BCT Commander in English 
"General Odierno knows me.  Please tell him that we are 
serious about this."  (NOTE: General Abdullah knows General 
Odierno from when the latter was 4th Infantry Division 
Command in SaD. END NOTE.) 
 
BAGHDAD INTERFERENCE 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The faceoff between the ousted PGOV and the PC 
follows two months of central government opposition to the 
removal of the Governor.  This opposition has included an 
October 28 letter from the PM purporting to reinstate the 
Governor and the refusal of the GOI Presidency Council to 
issue the required presidential decree for the appointment of 
the new Governor within 15 days of his October 27 election. 
In response, the PC has sent four separate official requests 
to the Presidency Council between October 27 and December 13 
requesting that the Presidency Council issue the required 
decree affirming the election of the new governor.  On 
December 9 Presidency Council official Nasser al-Ani told 
Poloff that it is deferring action at the request of the COR 
Speaker to allow the COR to take unspecified action in this 
matter. 
 
¶8. (C) On December 22 PRToffs spoke with the U.S. Institute 
for Peace Iraqi Representative Ra'ad Khutab, who has been 
part of the behind-the-scenes effort to resolve the 
differences between Mutashar, Abu Mazin, the Provincial 
Council, and the IIP.  Khutab claims that the PC has drafted 
a resolution under which Mutashar resigns his position and 
remains out of politics for five years in exchange for no 
further action against him, which the former governor soundly 
rejects.  According to Khutab, the IIP has indicated that 
they intend to keep Mutashar in office until at least 
February so that he can pull in the Samarra vote for the 
party in national elections in order to gain seats in the 
COR.  According to Khutab, this is all a part of the 
political strategy of the big players in Baghdad, including 
COR Speaker Samarra'ie and PM Maliki, to maintain influence 
in the north.  SaD appears to be a key piece to that 
strategy, as the religious parties have more or less sewn up 
Diyala, but have no influence anywhere else in the north 
except SaD.  In other words, if the Governor goes, so does 
the IIP hope for influence in SaD. 
 
WHERE IS THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE TO END THIS ? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) On December 30, the Charge met with Naseer al-Ani, 
Chief of Staff of the Presidency Council.  Al-Ani reported 
that he had the Presidency Council decree confirming Khalid 
Hassan Mahdi Salih as the new PGov ready, but the President 
and two Vice Presidents do not want to sign off on it yet. 
First, he claimed, the legal situation is unclear.  Charge 
noted the situation seemed very clear with the Supreme Court 
ruling, and it was hard to understand why the Presidency 
Council would not back the Court's ruling by issuing the 
decree.  He acknowledged the Supreme Court ruling but said 
that there is also an appeal underway against that decision 
in a Baghdad Federal Court based on alleged fraud by PC Chair 
Abu Mazin. The Presidency Council was awaiting resolution of 
that case so that the legal situation would be clearer. 
Al-Ani added that CoR Speaker Samarrai'e had written to 
President Talabani urging that the Presidency Council not 
issue the required decree for the new PGov, saying that the 
CoR wanted to review the SaD Provincial Council's actions. 
Charge noted that the CoR appeared to have no role; the 
Provincial Powers Law of 2008 laid out the process.  Al-Ani 
responded that the CoR was the ultimately source of 
legitimacy for all the provincial councils' authority (not 
the Provincial Powers Law).  Moreover, he cautioned, the 
Presidency Council would not want to move forward on the 
decree until both legal and political blockages are cleared. 
Qdecree until both legal and political blockages are cleared. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) We need to help resolve this Iraqi dispute so as to 
forestall a potential outbreak of violence in SaD governorate 
which used to be plagued by insurgency and terrorism and has 
been far quieter over the past two years. Less than two years 
after the enactment of the PPL, the provincial government in 
SaD was just beginning to make significant strides toward 
defining its role and asserting itself vis-a-vis Baghdad. 
The PC is doing its best to adhere to legal and political 
processes, but election-year politics coupled with a history 
of centralized government are stiff headwinds for an 
inexperienced PC.  Dethroned SaD Governor Mutashar claims 
that the PC's vote to remove him is invalid due to Abu 
Mazin's lack of education qualifications and criminal past. 
The Federal Supreme Court had this information when it ruled 
on October 27 that the PC's decision was valid (ref B). 
Higher Judicial Council President Medhat told Embassy officer 
on December 27 that under Article 7, Section 8, paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Provincial Powers Law a Presidential decree is 
not needed to remove the Provincial Governor, and that 
politics was impeding implementation of the Supreme Court 
 
order and application of the rule of law to the SaD 
governor's case. We will try to convince Medhat to send a 
letter to the Presidency Council informing them that for the 
purposes of installing the new governor all legal questions 
have been resolved.  Meanwhile, our PRT will encourage all 
parties to follow the legal recourse available to them while 
emphasizing the need for a peaceful resolution.  FORD 
FORD