VZCZCXRO2524
OO RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0254/01 0311701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311701Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6386
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000254 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS KURDISH OPPOSITION LEADER 
NAWSHIRWAN MUSTAFA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his first meeting with a U.S. Ambassador, 
the leader of the Kurdish opposition Goran ("Change") 
Movement, Nawshirwan Mustafa, made the following points: 1) 
U.S. observers will be critical in ensuring the legitimacy of 
upcoming national parliamentary elections; 2) Goran expects 
to take 15 or more seats and President Talabani's Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) will win only eight to 10; 3) which 
Iraqi leaders are chosen as  president, prime minister and 
speaker of the parliament is less important than good 
policies; 4) PUK harassment of Goran supporters continues, 
and the USG can help by conveying to the PUK that it must 
stop or Goran will not cooperate with the PUK on Kurdish 
issues in a new government; 5) Goran's appeal stems from its 
platform of anti-corruption and changing the hidebound 
Kurdish political system; 6) Goran (unlike the PUK and 
Kurdish Democratic Party)  favors a strong central government 
in Baghdad; 7) the election law compromise threatens the 
consensus-based approach and potentially allows for 
majoritarian rule; and 8) Goran believes special status for 
Kirkuk for a period of some years may be the best available 
solution (NOTE: This is a position unpopular with Kurds that 
Mustafa has not articulated publicly. END NOTE.).  The 
Ambassador reiterated U.S. desire for a strong relationship 
with the Kurds in the context of a united Iraq, encouraged 
stronger ties between Erbil and Baghdad, made clear U.S. 
support for a consensus-based resolution to the final status 
of Kirkuk, and underscored the importance of the full 
integration and professionalization of the peshmerga. 
Mustafa impressed us with his grasp of detail, clear-eyed 
assessment of Kurdish internal politics, and national 
perspective.  How Goran would perform as a governing, vice 
opposition, party remains to be seen, but its message is 
resonating with the many Kurdish voters dissatisfied with the 
status quo.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S. EFFORTS CRITICAL TO ELECTIONS' LEGITIMACY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) In his first meeting with a U.S. ambassador, the 
leader of the Kurdish opposition Goran ("Change") Movement, 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, said January 26 that U.S. assistance and 
monitoring will be critical in ensuring that upcoming 
national elections are fair, transparent and democratic. 
Mustafa was joined by Mohammed Tawfiq, deputy leader of 
Goran.  The Ambassador was joined by RRT Erbil Team Leader, 
PolCouns, Deputy PolCouns and Poloff.  The Ambassador said 
the USG would provide observers, and noted that a good 
bellwether of a democracy is not the behavior of the winners, 
but of the losers, who typically complain they were 
ill-served by the system.  Mustafa said Goran had prepared 
its candidate to compete in Suleymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk, 
Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Baghdad, and that, 
unlike the current government, most of its candidates were 
educated technocrats who would help govern effectively. 
 
GORAN EXPECTS TO BEST PUK 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) On elections, Mustafa predicted that Goran would take 
about 15 of the Kurdish seats, and that the PUK would get 
eight to 10.  He predicted that the KRG President Barzani,s 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) would win fewer than 35, but 
would likely get most of the seats in Erbil, Dohuk and 
Qwould likely get most of the seats in Erbil, Dohuk and 
Kurdish areas of Ninewa.  Mohammed Tawfiq said Goran could 
take as many as 18-20 seats, depending on results in Erbil 
and Dahuk, traditional KDP strongholds.  Tawfiq complained 
that the allocation of seats per the December election law 
would mean that the Kurds would win only 60 (18.5%) out of a 
total 325 seats, compared to the current 58 (21.1%) out of 
¶275.  He predicted winning six or seven seats from Kirkuk 
province, two from Diyala, eight to 10 from Ninewa and one or 
two from Baghdad, totaling 60-64 seats.  Mustafa noted that 
over half a million Kurds lived in Baghdad, but claimed most 
are Shi'a and would vote for the Islamic Supreme Council of 
Iraq (ISCI). (Note: During the election law debate, UNAMI 
projected that the Kurds could win as many as 70 seats.  End 
note.) Previously, it was virtually impossible to achieve a 
two-thirds majority without the Kurdish bloc.  In the new 
parliament, Shi'a and Sunnis could more easily do so, Mustafa 
said, threatening consensus and potentially allowing 
majoritarian rule, an approach Iraq was not politically 
mature enough to adopt. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that more important than the 
number of seats is the fact that unless a constitutional 
 
BAGHDAD 00000254  002 OF 004 
 
 
amendment is adopted, the Presidency Council (PC) will 
expire, potentially leaving the president and vice president 
without veto authority.  The Ambassador added that the PC 
arrangement had helped guarantee that major ethno-sectarian 
groups' interests were not overlooked.  Mustafa agreed that 
the PC was an important balancing mechanism, but was 
skeptical that a constitutional amendment and referendum 
ratifying it could be adopted before the current parliament's 
term expires. (Note: There is debate about whether a 
constitutional amendment adopted before the current 
parliament's term ends would have to be put to a referendum. 
End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) In an aside with Deputy PolCouns, Mustafa predicted 
the following rank-order finish for the major blocs: 1) ISCI; 
2) State of Law (SLA); 3) al-Iraqiya; and 4) the KAL.  He 
said the stock of ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim - whom he 
described as "a reasonable person" - was rising, and that PM 
Maliki had so alienated Iraq's political class that another 
term as PM was "highly unlikely."  Mustafa said he foresaw a 
proliferation of smaller parties in the next parliament, 
creating greater opportunity for cooperation across party and 
ethno-sectarian lines, but also a more fractious process. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Mustafa told the Ambassador Goran would wait until 
after the elections to talk with potential government 
coalition partners, and would focus on policy formulation in 
the interim.  By contrast with most Iraqi political leaders, 
Mustafa downplayed the importance of who is chosen as 
president, prime minister, or speaker of the parliament.  He 
observed that it was more important that Kurds be "real 
partners" in formulating policy in Iraq through the rights 
they enjoy as citizens than to achieve short-term gains 
through ephemeral political deals.  Mustafa stressed that it 
was more important to have effective ministers in "service 
ministries" (education, health, agriculture, industry and 
oil) than in "power ministries" (foreign affairs, defense and 
interior) in the next government. 
 
PUK-GORAN CONTRETEMPS 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Despite KRG President Barzani's recent public 
statement calling for calm, Mustafa said the PUK continued to 
threaten and intimidate Goran candidates, supporters and 
their relatives, particularly in the traditional PUK 
strongholds of Suleymaniyah and Kirkuk.  Tawfiq said the PUK 
recently escalated its efforts, pressuring homeowners not to 
rent space to Goran to use as campaign headquarters during 
the election.  Mustafa claimed that Goran, unlike the PUK, 
had avoided personal political attacks and had not mentioned 
KRG President Barzani or President Talabani by name.  He 
argued that for Goran to soften its political message, as 
Barzani had urged, would mean remaining silent about 
corruption and the lack of basic services in the KRG, which 
would be "dishonest."  Mustafa underscored that with a single 
television and radio channel and one weekly newspaper, Goran 
was already at a significant disadvantage with respect to the 
PUK and KDP, which collectively own some 400 media outlets. 
 
¶8. (C) Mustafa claimed that Talabani -- embarrassed by the 
results of the PUK's failed campaign in the July 2009 KRG 
parliamentary election, which he (Talabani) had personally 
overseen -- was the force behind the harassment of Goran. 
There were signs that some PUK leaders, including KRG PM 
QThere were signs that some PUK leaders, including KRG PM 
Barham Salih and KRG VP Kosrat Rasoul, had moderated their 
position on Goran; however, die-hard Talabani loyalists 
refused to do so.  Mustafa asked the USG to urge the PUK to 
cease its use of threats and intimidation; otherwise, Goran 
would not cooperate with the PUK on Kurdish issues in 
Baghdad. (Comment: This is a significant shift - Goran 
leaders previously told us they would campaign separately 
from the KAL, but support it after elections on core Kurdish 
issues.  End comment.) 
 
PUK AND KDP NOT SUITED TO GOVERN 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) While tension between Goran and the PUK was more 
acute, Mustafa underscored, the PUK and KDP were part of the 
same system.  Both were well-suited as guerrilla movements, 
but poorly equipped to govern.  Referring to the warlord 
mentality of the PUK/KDP leadership, Mustafa said that senior 
party leaders' salaries were 100 times greater than those of 
 
BAGHDAD 00000254  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
the KRG's civil servants, and that KRG PM Barham Salih's 
discretionary spending fund totaled some USD 250,000 per 
month.  Mustafa claimed the KDP and PUK received USD 35 
million each month from the KRG central budget for 
operational expenses.  Faced with a lack of basic services, 
people were angered by over-compensated and under-performing 
KRG leaders, Mustafa said. 
 
GORAN'S PLATFORM AND APPEAL 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question on why voters 
supported Goran, Tawfiq stressed the appeal of the party's 
platform of anti-corruption, transparency, rule of law, and a 
desire to change the hidebound Kurdish political system. 
Nepotism, cronyism and dissatisfaction with basic services 
were common complaints, he said.  Goran's leaders had 
co-founded the PUK in the 1970s to help topple the Ba'ath 
Party and did not want to live under a dictatorial PUK/KDP 
political order.  Describing the extent of PUK/KDP dominance, 
Mustafa claimed it was impossible to obtain a civil service 
job in the KRG without membership in the PUK or KDP, a 
serious constraint since most jobs in the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region (IKR) were in the public sector.  Even in the IKR's 
private sector, many companies were linked to the PUK or KDP 
and party membership was essential to secure jobs in them, he 
said.  In another recent example, Tawfiq said Erbil 
businessmen had built a mosque, only to have KDP and PUK 
leaders quarrel over who would appoint the imam. 
 
¶11. (C) Lack of drinking water, regular electricity, and 
education were persistent problems, Mustafa said.  Some 
primary and secondary schools were forced to run four shifts 
of two and half hours each a day (far less than was needed) 
to accommodate the number of students they serve. (Comment: 
This has as much to do with Kurdistan's explosive population 
growth as with poor KRG governance.  End comment.)  Tawfiq 
characterized graduates of public Kurdish universities, who 
were educated largely in Kurdish and taught by Soviet-bloc 
trained professors, as "useless" and anachronistic. 
 
CENTRALIZED VS. REGIONAL POWER 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Mustafa said Goran's support for a strong, democratic 
central government also differed from the PUK and KDP, which 
remained suspicious of centralized power and favored stronger 
provincial/regional governments.  Mustafa believed a mature 
multi-party system, a more independent judiciary, and greater 
press freedom in the rest of Iraq would serve the Kurds' 
long-term interests.  Most Kurds, he said,understood that as 
long as the Iraqi parliament and central government remained 
viable, there was no longer an existential threat against 
Kurds. (Comment: This is perhaps an over-generalization of 
Kurdish sentiment.  End comment.) The Ambassador underscored 
that politics, like war, could become total, and that it was 
important to have political structures resistant to that 
tendency. 
 
PESHMERGA MERGER 
---------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about 
peshmerga funding, Mustafa flatly said he was not confident 
that a real merger of PUK- and KDP-led peshmerga militia 
elements would occur as long as the PUK and KDP remained in 
power.  The forces might come to wear the same uniform, be 
funded from common sources and notionally respond to the same 
chain of command, but peshmerga elements ultimately remained 
Qchain of command, but peshmerga elements ultimately remained 
personal militias loyal to their political masters.  Mustafa 
said a priority for Goran in the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament's 
next session would be adopting measures - including paying 
the salaries of retired and injured peshmerga out of the 
KRG's budget, not party funds - to promote peshmerga loyalty 
to the KRG.  The Ambassador noted that the new KRG budget 
would reflect integration of KRG and PUK peshmerga and 
stressed the importance of full integration and unity of 
command. 
 
ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK 
---------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) On Article 140 implementation, Mustafa commented that 
the issue of Kirkuk had been exploited by all parties - 
including the Kurds - for selfish political reasons.  He 
characterized Kirkuk as the "least developed city in Iraq" 
and complained that municipal and provincial governance were 
held hostage by national Arab-Kurd tensions.  Mustafa 
 
BAGHDAD 00000254  004 OF 004 
 
 
emphasized that Goran viewed Turkomans, Christians, and Arabs 
as groups with valid national identities who should not be 
pressured to determine Kirkuk's final status.  It was 
important that a process move forward after elections to 
determine whether Kirkuk would be linked to Erbil or Baghdad, 
or enjoyed special status.  Tawfiq cautioned against 
expecting that the status of Kirkuk and other disputed 
internal boundary (DIBs) areas would be solved in the 
near-term, saying he expected them to remain "frozen 
conflicts" for some time.  Mustafa added that DIBs-related 
issues could create problems, but need not constitute an 
existential threat for Kurds and others.  Responding to the 
Ambassador's comments on possible ways ahead on Kirkuk, 
Mustafa said it may be that special status for a period of 
some years would the best available solution.  The Ambassador 
made clear that the USG would only support a referendum to 
adopt a politically negotiated consensus-based resolution. 
 
15.(C) COMMENT: Mustafa impressed us with his grasp of 
detail, clear-eyed assessment of Kurdish internal politics, 
and national perspective.  His emphasis on Kurdish 
participation in a viable, democratic central government is 
consistent with our argument that the Kurds' interests are 
best-served by remaining closely engaged with Baghdad.  His 
identification of special status as the best available option 
for Kirkuk is also consistent with our view; however, outside 
observers assess that for him to publicly say that would be 
political suicide.  Goran's private moderation on DIBs issues 
has not been consistent with the intermittent cheap shots 
Mustafa and others have taken at Barzani and Talabani for 
having compromised on the election law.  How Goran would 
govern - as opposed to serving as an opposition party - 
remains to be seen, but it is clear that the party's message 
strikes a chord with the significant number of Kurdish voters 
dissatisfied with the current PUK/KDP system. 
HILL