VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0246/01 0311507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311507Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6374
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000246 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ TU
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI CLAIMS DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY 
UNDER CONTROL; PREDICTS APPEALS DECISIONS WITHIN DAYS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  PM Nouri al-Maliki told the Ambassador and 
CG January 28 that the de-Ba'athification controversy had 
"stabilized" and that he expected the specially appointed 
Cassation Chamber to announce its decisions on the 350-odd 
appeals from disqualified candidates within a few days. 
(COMMENT:  Post subsequently learned that the time frame 
could be closer to a week or 10 days from now.  END COMMENT.) 
In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about tensions 
between the Salah ad Din governor and the Provincial Council 
(PC), the PM announced that on February 1 there would be a 
special election for a new governor and a new chairman of the 
Provincial Council.  (COMMENT:  Post has learned that the PC 
has no plans to hold said election.  END COMMENT.)  The 
Ambassador congratulated the PM on recent Council of 
Representatives passage of the budget; he responded somewhat 
glumly that the "budget battle represented a war against the 
government" by some political elements, including ISCI.  The 
PM raised the UN-led fact-finding mission of Oscar-Fernandez 
Taranco into the causes of terrorism and violence in Iraq and 
asked for USG support for a new GOI request for further UN 
help.  General Odierno told the PM he planned to see the 
Turkish General Staff February 3 and would underscore the 
need to work out all military issues, particularly regarding 
action against the PKK, through the trilateral Iraq, Turkey, 
U.S. mechanism.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PM CONFIDENT DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY SUBSIDING 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (C) PM Nouri al-Maliki told the Ambassador and CG January 
28 that the de-Ba'athification controversy had "stabilized." 
He noted that the specially appointed Cassation Chamber had 
received some 350 appeals, and he expected decisions on those 
appeals to be rendered and announced within one to two days. 
(NOTE:  Chief Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud told emboff separately 
that it would take longer than that to issue the decisions. 
END NOTE.) Maliki said that he expected "most" of the 
disqualified candidates to be reinstated, speculating that 
most of these candidates would not have appealed the 
decisions unless they were sure there had been mistakes in 
identity or weak evidence. 
 
¶3.  (C) He insisted that the judges had enough time to 
complete the appeals process, despite the tight electoral 
calendar between now and the March 7 elections.  Maliki said 
that the situation would continue to "calm down" as people 
realized that the de-Ba'athification process was not aimed 
primarily at Sunnis.  "Most of the list were Shias," he 
claimed.  He acknowledged that there had been a lot of 
mistakes made in composing the list of disqualified 
candidates and expressed regret that some people had tried to 
make a political issue of that deficiency.  He predicted that 
despite the recent turbulent developments that the elections 
would run smoothly. 
 
THE "GOVERNORS DISPUTE" IN SALAH AD DIN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about 
tensions between the Salah ad Din governor and the Provincial 
Council (PC), the PM explained his sense of the outlines of 
the conflict.  He said that there had been a complicated 
struggle between the Provincial Council and the Governor that 
had divided the communities of Salah ad Din, Tikrit,and 
Samarra.  The PC had dismissed the Governor for being 
unqualified and the courts had backed up the legitimacy of 
that decision, said Maliki  He further claimed that the 
Qthat decision, said Maliki  He further claimed that the 
Chairman of the PC, the governor's adversary, had separately 
been dismissed by IHEC (electoral council), with the support 
of the rest of the Council, for having furnished a forged 
education certificate that had allowed him to run for the 
office. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that the conflict seemed to have 
all the hallmarks of a local dispute and questioned the PM 
about his decision to get involved.  In particular, he 
questioned the need to dispatch Iraqi army troops to occupy 
the provincial government offices in Tikrit.  The PM 
explained that the citizens of Tikrit had become angered at 
the refusal of the ousted governor to vacate his office, and 
threatened to use force to expel him.  To prevent that 
bloodshed, the national government intervened, since 
maintaining public order is a key function of government, 
insisted Maliki.  (COMMENT:  Until recently, Maliki had 
supported the ousted governor remaining in office.  END 
COMMENT.) 
¶6.  (C) Maliki said he and his office had engaged several 
times in an effort to resolve the dispute but these efforts 
had ultimately not succeeded.  He announced that on February 
 
1 there would be a special election for a new governor and a 
new chairman of the Provincial Council.  In answer to General 
Odierno's question, Maliki acknowledged that the Council had 
already "selected" a new Governor (from the Iraqiya 
coalition), but the selection had divided the people of Salah 
ad Din and had not proven to be a successful way out of the 
local crisis.  That explained the intervention of the PM's 
office and the decision to "freeze everything" until the 
special election.  The PM noted that "anybody" could run for 
the two positions.  (NOTE:  The PC elected a new governor on 
October 27 by a substantial majority.  The PC has no plans to 
hold an election on February 1.  We are not aware of the 
source of the PM's authority to direct that an election be 
held.  END NOTE.) 
 
BATTLE OVER THE BUDGET 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador congratulated the PM on recent Council 
of Representatives passage of the budget and joked that the 
PM had been pessimistic in his predictions during his January 
23 meeting with the Vice President.  The PM replied somewhat 
glumly that the "budget battle represented a war against the 
government."  According to Maliki, ISCI attempted to hold the 
budget hostage to place unjust limits on government 
authorities.  (COMMENT:  The PM seems to be referring to the 
ISCI-led attempt to pass an Electoral Code of Conduct that 
contained problematic assertions of legislative control over 
the caretaker government and over IHEC.  END COMMENT.)  More 
generally, Maliki lamented that he had hoped for passage of a 
"good budget that the people of Iraq could benefit from," 
complaining in particular about politicized and ultimately 
successful effort to remove funding that would have created 
115,000 new jobs.  He described COR consideration of the 
budget as overly politicized and connected to "elections 
business." 
 
SEEKING MORE UN HELP IN TERRORISM INVESTIGATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.  (C) Switching gears, the PM raised the UN-led 
fact-finding mission of Oscar-Fernandez Taranco into the 
causes of terrorism and violence in Iraq.  He described what 
the UN had done so far, producing one visit by Taranco, as 
"quite disappointing."  Maliki acknowledged that 
investigating such a situation could be very complicated, 
and, as in the case of the assassination of Lebanese PM Rafik 
Hariri, could take a long time.  But what mattered most was 
the perception that the UN was helping Iraq in its struggle 
against terrorism and countries that supported terrorism.  He 
said the GOI planned to send another message to the UN asking 
for help and asked the USG to support that effort.  The 
Ambassador responded that the UN had promised "a process" and 
said the USG would be as helpful as possible in this effort 
with the UN. 
 
CONCERN ABOUT TURKEY'S ANTI-PKK INTENTIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) General Odierno told the PM he planned to see the 
Turkish General Staff February 3 and would underscore the 
need to work out all military issues, particularly regarding 
action against the PKK, through the trilateral Iraq, Turkey, 
U.S. mechanism.  Odierno said the Turkish military leadership 
was worried about the drawdown of U.S. forces in the coming 
months and might be contemplating the need to take action 
before that development.  He reported that he would tell them 
the United States would not support any ground incursion 
against the PKK inside Iraq, outside of decisions taken in 
the trilateral framework.  Maliki offered somewhat heated 
Qthe trilateral framework.  Maliki offered somewhat heated 
agreement, insisting that the GOI would not tolerate any 
Turkish army "interference in Iraq" or "intervention on Iraqi 
land," while adding that Iraq would be happy "to negotiate" 
issues through the trilateral framework. 
 
TWO AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ LEADERS RELEASED 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Odierno reported that two al-Qaida emirs had bribed 
their way out of Iraqi detention after USF-I forces had 
originally detained them in November 2009.  The CG said he 
was concerned that the judge who ordered their release may 
not have been shown the evidence against the two.  Maliki 
asked for the specifics and said the GOI would follow up to 
determine where the breakdown had occurred and who had been 
at fault. 
 
CHALLENGES WITH SONS OF IRAQ TRANSITIONING 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Lastly, Odierno raised two other operational issues. 
First, he noted that terrorists in Iraq were changing 
 
tactics, making it more difficult to determine their plans. 
This put a premium on good human intelligence, which would be 
"critical in preventing attacks."  The PM concurred, noting 
that this explained why he had requested USF-I representation 
at "every meeting," using liaison officers to communicate 
real-time exchanges of intelligence, rather than more 
time-consuming written correspondence.  Odierno also raised 
the problem currently faced in some areas surrounding Baghdad 
due to Sons of Iraq (SOI) transitioning into non-security 
ministries without any backfill of Iraqi Security Forces. 
The SOI had been performing a neighborhood watch function, 
which now presented critical gaps in security (and associated 
 intelligence) for the neighborhoods they lived and worked 
in.  The PM expressed his readiness to address this situation 
and said he was willing to allow some of them to return to 
this SOI duty temporarily if CG USF-I would inform him about 
where they were needed.  Odierno committed to getting back to 
the PM with the relevant data. 
 
HILL