VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0243/01 0310717
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 310717Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6371
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SA
SUBJECT: VP HASHEMI REVIEWS DE-BA'ATHIFICATION ISSUE, 
REGIONAL RELATIONS WITH A/S FELTMAN 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  VP Hashemi reviewed with NEA A/S Feltman 
January 24 the current state of play on the 
de-Ba'athification controversy. He expressed the hope that 
USG interlocutors would convince PM Maliki that the 
de-Ba'athification decisions of the Accountability and 
Justice Commission (AJC) should not stand.  Regarding the 
draft Electoral Code of Conduct, Hashemi said he supported 
the proposal in general and viewed it as a responsible check 
on abuses of government power during the campaign season.  He 
was unaware of a provision that would allow possible 
interference with the caretaker government in the 
post-election period.  Hashemi expressed the hope that he 
would be able to use his upcoming visit to Washington to 
focus the attention of U.S. policymakers on the importance of 
developing a strategic relationship with Iraq.  Hashemi 
blamed the poor state of relations with Saudi Arabia on the 
continued presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and Saudi 
resentments about the rise of Shia political influence.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) VP Tariq al-Hashemi (Sunni) reviewed with NEA A/S 
Feltman January 24 the current state of play on the 
de-Ba'athification controversy.  Hashemi noted that there had 
been a meeting the evening before between President Talabani, 
PM Maliki, and Speaker Samarrai'e.  He said that Talabani had 
told him he planned to remind the Speaker of the Presidency 
Council's 2008 letter in which the they questioned the 
legality of the Accountability and Justice Commission (given 
that the Council of Representatives (COR) had not approved 
any members for the Commission).  Talabani also planned to 
urge the Speaker to facilitate COR action to approve a new 
slate of AJC commissioners, according to Hashemi.  The Vice 
President told A/S Feltman he hoped that the new members of 
the AJC would be independent and less sectarian and partisan 
than their predecessors on the Ahmed Chalabi-led 
de-Ba'athification Commission.  Hashemi expected to see three 
Shia, two Sunnis, and two Kurds appointed. 
 
¶3.  (C) Hashemi urged the USG to support remain active on 
this issue, and expressed appreciation for the efforts of the 
Ambassador and the Vice President.  He expressed the hope 
that USG interlocutors would convince PM Maliki that the 
de-Ba'athification decisions of the Accountability and 
Justice Commission (AJC) should not stand.  A/S Feltman 
underscored that the USG supported full implementation of 
Article 7 of the Iraqi Constitution, calling for 
de-Ba'athification efforts but at the same time remained 
convinced that it was important for the credibility of the 
elections that the vetting be viewed as fair and part of a 
transparent process.  Hashemi called attention to the 
influence the USG had, with its power to question the 
legitimacy of the election results if the process was not 
credible. 
 
ELECTORAL CODE OF CONDUCT 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Regarding the draft Electoral Code of Conduct, 
Hashemi said he supported the proposal in general, viewing it 
as a responsible check on abuses of government power -- 
particularly via access to money, media, and security forces 
-- during the campaign season.  In response to A/S Feltman' 
expression of concern about possible interference the draft 
contemplates with the caretaker government, post-elections, 
Hashemi indicated he was not aware of such provisions in the 
Code of Conduct.  He said he would check on the provisions of 
the draft law to verify the full extent of the draft 
Qthe draft law to verify the full extent of the draft 
legislation and noted that the law was not intended "to 
paralyze" the government. 
 
THE PRESIDENCY COUNCIL NO MORE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) The Vice President explained that the Presidency 
Council would disappear with the election and formation of a 
new Council of Representatives.  The Presidency Council's 
veto would similarly disappear, he noted.  The new President 
would be ceremonial.  He could postpone signing legislation 
for 15 days, after which it became law automatically. 
Hashemi expressed a degree of concern with this coming 
reality, indicating that Iraqis needed "a highly placed 
figure" able to exercise the veto and check the power of the 
COR.  He supported the idea of a single president having the 
veto authority. 
 
U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Hashemi expressed the hope that he would be able to 
use his upcoming visit to Washington to focus the attention 
of U.S. policymakers on the importance of developing a 
strategic relationship with Iraq, and to avoid being overly 
consumed in tactical maneuvering on issues of the day.  He 
said that many Iraqis worried that the U.S. would gradually 
lose interest in Iraq as the U.S. continued ramping up its 
activity in Afghanistan.  "We want to be assured that the 
relationship with the U.S. will continue," said Hashemi.  A/S 
Feltman encouraged this approach and said he was confident 
that Hashemi would hear U.S. officials focusing on the 
long-term strategic relationship with Iraq and open to his 
suggestions.  A/S Feltman added that the President is 
committed to a long-term relationship with Iraq. 
 
RELATIONS WITH SAUDI; IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Regarding Iraq's relations with its influential 
neighbor, Saudi Arabia, Hashemi said Saudi leaders blamed the 
poor state of relations on PM Maliki but that was an excuse. 
Offering an explanation we have not previously heard, Hashemi 
said the Saudis were much more focused than commonly believed 
on the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq.  He predicted they 
would not allow relations to improve until U.S. troops were 
fully withdrawn.  Hashemi acknowledged that the Saudis were 
also obsessed with what they perceived to be a Shia takeover 
of control in Iraq.  He said Saudi officials had asked him 
why he and others have sat back "and let the Americans 
deliver the country to the Shia," implying that his 
continuing presence in Iraq and in the government was 
unacceptable.  The Vice President said he had made clear that 
reality had to be accepted and wanted to add "Where do you 
want me to go?  I am Iraqi.  This is the reality in Iraq 
now."  Regarding Iran, Hashemi described the neighboring 
country's influence on Iraqi government structures and 
decision-making as so pervasive that it fed the worst sort of 
conspiracy theories about how it happened and who planned it. 
 
 
¶8.  (U) A/S Feltman has reviewed this cable. 
HILL