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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0044/01 0251412
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P 251412Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3253
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0229

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000044 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: AU/PING MISSION FAILS TO PERSUADE RAJOELINA 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  AU Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by a 
delegation from SADC, the UN, COI, and the OIF, met with 
Madagascar's political leaders January 21-22 to propose 
a compromise solution for implementing the Maputo and Addis 
Ababa accords.  De facto president Rajoelina immediately 
rejected Ping's approach, although Ping encouraged him to 
reconsider over the next 15 days and hopes he has not heard 
the HATQs last word.  In a reversal of prior statements, both 
Ping and the French Ambassador said that they supported the 
return of SADC mediator Chissano if Rajoelina was willing 
to re-engage in negotiations.  If Rajoelina definitively 
rejects the olive branch offered by Ping by February 5, the AU 
is likely to move to targeted sanctions against the HAT. 
African heads of state might take this up during the upcoming 
AU Summit, or it will wait until the next AU Peace and Security 
Council meeting, to take place by February 15.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) African Union Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by Peace 
and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, visited Madagascar 
January 21-22 in an effort to encourage Madagascar's leaders 
to apply the agreements that they had signed in Maputo and 
Addis Ababa in 2009. During his stay, he met with de facto 
president Rajoelina (tete-a-tete lunch), co-presidents 
Andrianirina and Rakotovahiny, consensus PM Mangalaza, TGV's 
PM Vital, other members of the Ravalomanana/Zafy/Ratisiraka 
movements, military and civil society leaders, and the local 
representatives of the International Contact Group. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ping presented a "compromise solution" to the four 
movements which demanded the application of the signed Maputo 
I and Addis accords, while clarifying a few points of contention 
regarding the roles of the president and co-presidents.  The 
proposal followed a principled approach, in line with the 
positions of the USG and SADC, rather than following the tack 
of HAT appeasement recommended in the French proposal before 
the visit. The compromise solution would maintain the two 
co-presidents; assigned Ravalomanana's appointed co- president 
to carry out transition goals and Zafy's appointed co- 
president to focus on development issues; allowed acts taken 
by the president in cabinet meetings that were not co-signed 
by the two co-presidents as required by the Addis accord to 
be reviewed a second time by the cabinet for approval; granted 
the president precedence on protocol issues; and empowered the 
cabinet to determine the role of the two co-presidents on 
protocol matters.  It reaffirmed Eugene Mangalaza, dismissed by 
TGV in December, as the consensus prime minister and stated that 
the fair manner of dividing ministerial portfolios among the 
four movements agreed to in Addis should be maintained. 
The compromise solution also recommended that a constitutional 
referendum should be held first, followed by legislative and 
presidential elections at the same time no later than October. 
Finally, the amnesty agreements reached in Maputo should be 
respected, and the amnesty law should be passed by the transition 
senate and congress. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although the Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy 
movements appeared pleased by the AU proposal, Rajoelina 
rejected it immediately.  In a likely pre-cooked written 
statement, Rajoelina avowed that "cohabitation" was impossible 
and requested support for rapid elections. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a briefing of the ICG members following the 
first day's events, Ping explained that the purpose of his 
mission was to unblock implementation of the Maputo I and 
Addis accords. Most diplomats were in agreement that the 
compromise solution would fail due to the HAT's rejection. 
Ping did not disagree, but said that if the Malagasy would 
like to re-launch negotiations, President Chissano 
would take the lead as mediation was outside the scope of 
Ping's mandate for this visit.  Ping suggested that, given the 
likelihood of a failure of the Maputo process, targeted 
sanctions against the HAT might be discussed at the AU summit 
in late January, or delayed for Peace and Security Council 
consideration between February 5 and 15. The French Ambassador 
was visibly upset by the suggestion of sanctions and engaged 
in an undiplomatic exchange with Ping on the issue.  Ping 
asserted that the AU must stick to its principles 
against coups and also respect the SADC's views.  In the 
end, the French Ambassador assured Ping that France would 
continue to support the AU's lead here. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Following further meetings the next day, Ping again 
briefed the ICG late on Jan 22.  He said that despite the 
letter from TGV rejecting the compromise proposal, which 
he asserted was mainly for domestic consumption, some HAT 
representatives - even TGV's hard-line adviser Norbert Lala 
Ratsirahonana -- appeared open to discussions. All four 
 
ANTANANARI 00000044  002 OF 003 
 
 
movements, even the HAT, discussed the establishment of the 
AU-SADC-OIF-UN follow-up mechanism for implementation of the 
Maputo accords in Madagascar.  However, as there is nothing 
currently in place to monitor,the follow-up mechanism will 
not be implemented, Ping said. Ping was not overly optimistic, 
but thought that the HAT might be willing to make concessions 
when faced with the now-serious threat of sanctions.  He added 
that the AU did not consider TGV's letter as the HAT's final 
response, but would give them the full 15- day period, through 
Feb 5, to reflect and respond. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The French Ambassador noted that he had received 
frantic calls from HAT representatives all Friday morning, 
indicating their concern about the possible ramifications 
(read sanctions) of their actions [Comment: from which they 
now realize the French will be unable to protect them. 
End comment.] In a surprising reversal of prior statements 
and/or apparent positions, both the French Ambassador and Jean 
Ping said that they supported the return of SADC 
mediator Chissano if the HAT was willing to re-engage in 
negotiations.  Ping suggested several times that the HAT 
may be willing to re-engage if they can save face by maintaining 
their Prime Minister Camille Vital as the 
"Consensus Prime Minister" called for under Maputo I.  As Vital 
is known as a "Ratsirakiste" and according to prior agreement 
it was Ratsiraka who provided the PM names for approval by the 
four movements, Ping thought there was a possibility 
of Vital being retained as the new "consensus PM".  The 
French clearly also support retention of Vital, their ambassador 
having argued that his presence was key to maintaining 
stability within the military. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Five representatives of the Zafy movement told the 
ambassador Jan 22 that unilateral elections can not resolve the 
political crisis and asserted that the risk for the country would 
be extremely serious if the three opposition movements were 
excluded from the transition government.  They expressed concern 
about the ambiguous position of France and the actions of certain 
French nationals, suggesting clearly that reprisals against French 
nationals and interests may become frequent if the French do 
not alter their "meddling" approach.  They said the military 
is the key to Rajoelina's power and noted that the opposition 
movements are reaching out to sympathetic military leaders to 
urge them to not support Rajoelina but to "remain neutral". 
They argued that the Malagasy people and the army reactQowly 
after events, but assured us that after some time, they 
would react "correctly".  Due to the lack of rule of law, 
increase in corruption, rising number of armed attacks, and 
the encouragement of the three opposition movements, the 
people, they argued, would eventually rise up and attack 
those that are benefitting from this crisis. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Consensus Prime Minister Mangalaza met with the 
ambassador on Saturday to reaffirm his willingness "to be of 
service" if needed. He is returning to his home outside 
Tamatave, for both security and financial reasons; he no 
longer receives any support from the government and presumably 
is having to pay for his hotel room and all 
other expenses himself.  He reported that Vital had given Ping a 
formal letter requesting his designation as "Consensus Prime 
Minister" instead of Mangalaza.  The conversation with 
Mangalaza raised the strong possibility that Mangalaza had 
become unacceptable not so much to Rajoelina (with whom he 
never had any particular confrontation) as to the French: 
Mangalaza recounted several instances of attempted French 
strong-arming, which he resisted, much to their chagrin. 
At the same time, there is indeed a major issue of face-saving 
involved in the identity of the consensus prime minister 
following RajoelinaQs firing of Mangalaza, and no individual 
should be deemed irreplaceable.  A Saturday call to the 
ambassador by a HAT insider also suggested that the HAT may 
be looking at finding a more acceptable substitute for 
co-President Fetison Andrianirina, whose strong public words 
against Rajoelina and the HAT also raise issues of face and 
compatibility in any cohabitation.  That the HAT is examining 
such potential personnel changes gives some small hope 
that the HAT will opt to resurrect Maputo and Addis after all, 
but such "insider" glimmers generally have proven false in 
the past. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) A former presidential candidate, not affiliated 
with the four movements, reiterated to Emboff separately 
that the Malagasy are slow to react.  They build up 
grievances one by one and then explode, she explained. 
It is unclear when that point may come, but she predicted 
that it might occur once the results of a unilaterally- 
organized presidential election were known.  She would like to 
 
ANTANANARI 00000044  003 OF 003 
 
 
mobilize people to stop TGV from moving unilaterally forward 
to what she believes will be rigged legislative and presidential 
elections, but complained that she lacks financial resources 
and feels powerless to stop this high speed train. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Other Malagasy citizens that are paying attention to 
politics - even Ravalomanana supporters -- have told us 
alternatively that they support rapid elections.  Some argue 
that once the elections are held, it will be obvious that 
TGV lacks a support base, while others argue that the crisis 
will continue until elections are held so it would be best to 
have them as soon as possible.  As long as the international 
community is divided and perceived to be supporting both sides 
(HAT and opposition), each side will feel buoyed and will 
continue to perpetuate the crisis, others argue. Some contacts 
argue that there will be a civil war if elections go forward, 
while others see civil war as a stronger possibility if the 
crisis drags on without elections.  Ping said that certain 
colonels and generals with whom his delegation met implied that 
they might be pushed into committing a coup d'etat if the 
politicians continued to take the country down a dead-end road. 
He of course advised them to stay in their barracks, but 
recognized that they might not. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Comment and Action Recommendation:  Our view is that 
the unilateral election plan envisioned by the HAT would in fact 
perpetuate and aggravate the crisis by further postponing national 
reconciliation and forcing a confrontation; reconciliation and 
renewed consensus are the prerequisites to elections, not vice 
versa (as some French may still believe).  However, the 
international community's resistance to early, unilateral 
elections and its call for "inclusiveness and consensus" are 
not well understood by the majority of the population here who 
just want the crisis over.  We think it unlikely that the HAT 
will change its tune substantially or sufficiently in the next 
two weeks to avoid AU sanctions. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Comment Continued:  While remaining open to the 
possibility of a new negotiated solution under Chissano, we 
recommend that the USG begin preparing for the imposition of 
targeted travel bans and freezing of assets against Rajoelina, 
members of the HAT, and selected others, in coordination with 
the AU, SADC, and hopefully - the EU.   (Note:  the EU must 
decide on its own "appropriate measures" - sanctions -- before 
the end of February). For our part, we have started on a draft 
list of target names.  If the HAT responds positively to the 
AU's compromise proposal before Feb 5, negotiations could 
resume and the AU-UN-SADC-OIF follow-up mechanism would be 
established in Madagascar.  However, in the more likely event 
that the HAT's response remains negative, sanctions 
will be the next step.  End comment. 
 
MARQUARDT