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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0043/01 0251315
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251315Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3250
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0226

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000043 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: AU/PING MISSION FAILS TO PERSUADE RAJOELINA 
 
ANTANANARI 00000043  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  AU Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by a 
delegation from SADC, the UN, COI, and the OIF, met with 
Madagascar's political leaders January 21-22 to propose a compromise 
solution for implementing the Maputo and Addis Ababa accords.  De 
facto president Rajoelina immediately rejected Ping's approach, 
although Ping encouraged him to reconsider over the next 15 days and 
hopes he has not heard the HAT's last word.  In a reversal of prior 
statements, both Ping and the French Ambassador said that they 
supported the return of SADC mediator Chissano if Rajoelina was 
willing to re-engage in negotiations.  If Rajoelina definitively 
rejects the olive branch offered by Ping by February 5, the AU is 
likely to move to targeted sanctions against the HAT.  African heads 
of state might take this up during the upcoming AU Summit; if not, 
the issue will wait until the next AU Peace and Security Council 
meeting, to take place by February 15.  END SUMMARY. 
¶2. (U) African Union Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by Peace and 
Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, visited Madagascar January 
21-22 in an effort to encourage Madagascar's leaders to apply the 
agreements that they had signed in Maputo and Addis Ababa in 2009. 
During his stay, he met with de facto president Rajoelina 
(tete-a-tete lunch), co-presidents Andrianirina and Rakotovahiny, 
consensus PM Mangalaza, TGV's PM Vital, other members of the 
Ravalomanana/Zafy/Ratisiraka movements, military and civil society 
leaders, and the local representatives of the International Contact 
Group. 
¶3. (SBU) Ping presented a "compromise solution" to the four 
movements which demanded the application of the signed Maputo I and 
Addis accords, while clarifying a few points of contention regarding 
the roles of the president and co-presidents.  The proposal followed 
a principled approach, in line with the positions of the USG and 
SADC, rather than following the tack of HAT appeasement recommended 
in the French proposal before the visit.  The compromise solution 
maintained the two co-presidents; assigned Ravalomanana's appointed 
co-president to carry out transition goals and Zafy's appointed 
co-president to focus on development issues; allowed acts taken by 
the president in cabinet meetings that were not co-signed by the two 
co-presidents as required by the Addis accord to be reviewed a 
second time by the cabinet for approval; granted the president 
precedence on protocol issues; and empowered the cabinet to 
determine the role of the two co-presidents on protocol matters.  It 
reaffirmed Eugene Mangalaza, dismissed by TGV in December, as the 
consensus prime minister and stated that the fair manner of dividing 
ministerial portfolios among the four movements agreed to in Addis 
should be maintained.  The compromise solution also recommended that 
a constitutional referendum should be held first, followed by 
legislative and presidential elections at the same time no later 
than October.  Finally, the amnesty agreements reached in Maputo 
should be respected, and the amnesty law should be passed by the 
transition senate and congress. 
¶4. (SBU) Although the Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy movements 
appeared pleased by the AU proposal, Rajoelina rejected it 
immediately.  In a likely pre-cooked written statement, Rajoelina 
avowed that "cohabitation" was impossible and requested support for 
rapid elections. 
¶5. (SBU) In a briefing of the ICG members following the first day's 
events, Ping explained that the purpose of his mission was to 
unblock implementation of the Maputo I and Addis accords.  Most 
diplomats were in agreement that the compromise solution would fail 
due to the HAT's rejection.  Ping did not disagree, but said that if 
the Malagasy would like to re-launch negotiations, President 
Chissano would take the lead as mediation was outside the scope of 
Ping's mandate for this visit.  Ping suggested that, given the 
likelihood of a failure of the Maputo process, targeted sanctions 
against the HAT might be discussed at the AU summit in late January, 
or delayed for Peace and Security Council consideration between 
February 5 and 15.  The French Ambassador was visibly upset by the 
suggestion of sanctions and engaged in an undiplomatic exchange with 
Ping on the issue.  Ping asserted that the AU must stick to its 
principles against coups and also respect the SADC's views.  In the 
end, the French Ambassador assured Ping that France would continue 
to support the AU's lead here. 
¶6. (SBU) Following further meetings the next day, Ping again briefed 
the ICG late on Jan 22.  He said that despite the letter from TGV 
rejecting the compromise proposal, which he asserted was mainly for 
domestic consumption, some HAT representatives - even TGV's 
hard-line adviser Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana -- appeared open to 
discussions.  All four movements, even the HAT, discussed the 
establishment of the AU-SADC-OIF-UN follow-up mechanism for 
implementation of the Maputo accords in Madagascar.  However, as 
there is nothing currently in place to monitor, the follow-up 
mechanism will not be implemented, Ping said.   Ping was not overly 
optimistic, but thought that the HAT might be willing to make 
concessions when faced with the now-serious threat of sanctions.  He 
added that the AU did not consider TGV's letter as the HAT's final 
response, but would give them the full 15-day period, through Feb 5, 
to reflect and respond. 
¶7.  (SBU)  The French Ambassador noted that he had received frantic 
 
ANTANANARI 00000043  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
calls from HAT representatives all Friday morning, indicating their 
concern about the possible ramifications (read sanctions) of their 
actions [Comment: from which they now realize the French will be 
unable to protect them.  End comment.]  In a surprising reversal of 
prior statements and/or apparent positions, both the French 
Ambassador and Jean Ping said that they supported the return of SADC 
mediator Chissano if the HAT was willing to re-engage in 
negotiations.  Ping suggested several times that the HAT may be 
willing to re-engage if they can save face by maintaining their 
Prime Minister Camille Vital as the "Consensus Prime Minister" 
called for under Maputo I.  As Vital is known as a "Ratsirakiste" 
and according to prior agreement it was Ratsiraka who provided the 
PM names for approval by the four movements, Ping thought there was 
a possibility of Vital being retained as the new "consensus PM". 
The French clearly also support retention of Vital, their ambassador 
having argued that his presence was key to maintaining stability 
within the military. 
¶8. (SBU) Five representatives of the Zafy movement told the 
ambassador Jan 22 that unilateral elections can not resolve the 
political crisis and asserted that the risk for the country would be 
extremely serious if the three opposition movements were excluded 
from the transition government.  They expressed concern about the 
ambiguous position of France and the actions of certain French 
nationals, suggesting clearly that reprisals against French 
nationals and interests may become frequent if the French do not 
alter their "meddling" approach.  They said the military is the key 
to Rajoelina's power and noted that the opposition movements are 
reaching out to sympathetic military leaders to urge them to not 
support Rajoelina but to "remain neutral".  They argued that the 
Malagasy people and the army react slowly after events, but assured 
us that after some time, they would react "correctly".  Due to the 
lack of rule of law, increase in corruption, rising number of armed 
attacks, and the encouragement of the three opposition movements, 
the people, they argued, would eventually rise up and attack those 
that are benefitting from this crisis. 
¶9.  (SBU) Consensus Prime Minister Mangalaza met with the ambassador 
on Saturday to reaffirm his willingness "to be of service" if 
needed.  He is returning to his home outside Tamatave, for both 
security and financial reasons; he no longer receives any support 
from the government and presumably is having to pay for his hotel 
room and all other expenses himself.  He reported that Vital had 
given Ping a formal letter requesting his designation as "Consensus 
Prime Minister" instead of Mangalaza.  The conversation with 
Mangalaza raised the strong possibility that he had become 
unacceptable not so much to Rajoelina (with whom he never had any 
particular confrontation) as to the French:  Mangalaza recounted 
several instances of attempted French strong-arming, which he 
resisted, much to their chagrin.  At the same time, there is indeed 
a major issue of face-saving involved in the identity of the 
consensus prime minister following Rajoelina's firing of Mangalaza, 
and no individual should be deemed irreplaceable.  A Saturday call 
to the ambassador by a HAT insider also suggested that the HAT may 
be looking at finding a more acceptable substitute for co-President 
Fetison Andrianirina, whose strong public words against Rajoelina 
and the HAT also raise issues of face and compatibility in any 
cohabitation.  That the HAT is examining such potential personnel 
changes gives some small hope that the HAT will opt to resurrect 
Maputo and Addis after all, but such "insider" glimmers generally 
have proven false in the past. 
¶10.  (SBU) A former presidential candidate, not affiliated with the 
four movements, reiterated to Emboff separately that the Malagasy 
are slow to react.  They build up grievances one by one and then 
explode, she explained.  It is unclear when that point may come, but 
she predicted that it might occur once the results of a 
unilaterally-organized presidential election were known.  She would 
like to mobilize people to stop TGV from moving unilaterally forward 
to what she believes will be rigged legislative and presidential 
elections, but complained that she lacks financial resources and 
feels powerless to stop this high speed train. 
¶11. (SBU) Other Malagasy citizens that are paying attention to 
politics - even Ravalomanana supporters -- have told us 
alternatively that they support rapid elections.  Some argue that 
once the elections are held, it will be obvious that TGV lacks a 
support base, while others argue that the crisis will continue until 
elections are held so it would be best to have them as soon as 
possible.  As long as the international community is divided and 
perceived to be supporting both sides (HAT and opposition), each 
side will feel buoyed and will continue to perpetuate the crisis, 
others argue.  Some contacts argue that there will be a civil war if 
elections go forward, while others see civil war as a stronger 
possibility if the crisis drags on without elections.  Ping said 
that certain colonels and generals with whom his delegation met 
implied that they might be pushed into committing a coup d'etat if 
the politicians continued to take the country down a dead-end road. 
He of course advised them to stay in their barracks, but recognized 
that they might not. 
¶12.  (SBU)  Comment and Action Recommendation:  Our view is that the 
 
ANTANANARI 00000043  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
unilateral election plan envisioned by the HAT would in fact 
perpetuate and aggravate the crisis by further postponing national 
reconciliation and forcing a confrontation; reconciliation and 
renewed consensus are the prerequisites to elections, not vice versa 
(as some French may still believe).  However, the international 
community's resistance to early, unilateral elections and its call 
for "inclusiveness and consensus" are not well understood by the 
majority of the population here who just want the crisis to end.  We 
think it unlikely that the HAT will change its tune substantially or 
sufficiently in the next two weeks to avoid AU sanctions. 
¶13.  (SBU) Comment Continued:  While remaining open to the 
possibility of a new negotiated solution under Chissano, we 
recommend that the USG begin preparing for the imposition of 
targeted travel bans and freezing of assets against Rajoelina, 
members of the HAT, and selected others, in coordination with the 
AU, SADC, and - hopefully - the EU.   (Note:  the EU must decide on 
its own "appropriate measures" - sanctions -- before the end of 
February).  For our part, we have started on a draft list of target 
names.  If the HAT responds positively to the AU's compromise 
proposal before Feb 5, negotiations could resume and the 
AU-UN-SADC-OIF follow-up mechanism would be established in 
Madagascar.  However, in the more likely event that the HAT's 
response remains negative, sanctions will be the next step.  End 
comment. 
MARQUARDT