VZCZCXRO7577
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0731/01 3501038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161038Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9735
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000731 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND S/WCI; THE HAGUE FOR OLC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ICTY HR
SUBJECT: GOC SAYS ALL LEADS ON ICTY DOCUMENTS POINT TO 
GOTOVINA DEFENSE TEAM; WANTS POSITIVE ASSESSMENT BY ICTY 
 
REF: A. ZAGREB 727 
     ¶B. ZAGREB 726 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolEcon Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) 
& (d). 
 
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY:  Davor Stier, foreign policy advisor to PM 
Kosor, briefed the Ambassador on December 14 regarding the 
latest developments in the GoC's search for the artillery 
documents sought by ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz.  Stier 
said that the searches conducted by the special Task Force on 
December 9 were "aggressive, but in accordance with Croatian 
law."  The GoC would respect the ICTY-ordered freeze on the 
investigation.  However, the GoC was concerned that the Task 
Force investigation was now stymied at a moment when there 
still had been no positive movement in assessments of 
Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY by either Brammertz or 
key EU states.  Given domestic political pressures, PM Kosor 
needs to see some positive response to the latest Croatian 
efforts, and hoped that the US might weigh in with the 
British or Dutch.  The Ambassador noted that Brammertz, 
London and The Hague were still digesting the latest 
developments, and that we needed to wait a few weeks to 
assess their reactions.  A key indicator might come at the 
December 16 ICTY hearing on Croatia's cooperation.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) Stier stressed that the December 9 searches of 
eleven suspects' properties, which had turned up some 10,000 
pages of potentially suspect documents, had been initiated by 
Croatian state prosecutors, and performed with valid search 
warrants issued by the county courts.  Underlining the 
legality of the procedure, he noted that the Task Force had 
requested warrants to search property belonging to one 
additional suspect, a lawyer of an ICTY indictee, but that 
the court denied the request.  The mere fact that such a 
large volume of suspect material had been found "justified 
such a broad police action," according to Stier. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Stier noted that the ICTY Trial Chamber had ordered 
a freeze on Dec. 11 of inspection of documents and computers 
seized from three key suspects who are or were members of the 
Gotovina defense team.  He said analysis of the findings 
prior to the freeze indicated that the documents wanted by 
the ICTY were not among the 10,000 pages seized, although 
many documents were official, classified state archives 
materials that were apparently illegally in the possession of 
the individuals searched.  The seized computers had not yet 
been investigated, as police were awaiting the local court's 
order when the ICTY injunction was issued. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) The Task Force's investigation so far had 
established the following scenario.  In 1998, Croatian CHOD 
Pavao Miljavac ordered that all copies of documents related 
to Operation "Storm" be destroyed, and the originals 
transferred to the central Archives.  In direct contravention 
of that order, Gen. Rahim Ademi, who was then in Knin, held a 
certain number of documents back, even as he claimed all 
files were transferred.  (Investigators presume that these 
include documents demanded by the ICTY.)  Later, probably in 
2000, when Gotovina was Inspector General and Ademi was his 
deputy, Ademi had ordered another officer close to Gotovina, 
Zeljko Hucic, to go to Knin, retrieve the documents, and 
bring them back to Zagreb.  Hucic had apparently done so, and 
the Task Force believes that he then gave them either to 
Ademi or to Gotovina.  That is where the investigative trail 
ends. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) The GoC would fully respect the ICTY's injunction, 
Stier said.  But it left the GoC investigation in a difficult 
spot.  All leads from the Task Force's work to date suggest 
that any missing documents that still exist are in the 
possession of Gotovina's lawyers.  But now the Croatian 
police have been blocked from pursuing that avenue of 
investigation.  Stier admitted that the documents were 
unlikely to be in the offices or homes searched in Croatia. 
But the hope was that investigation of the computers could 
turn up additional leads or information perhaps confirming 
whether the defense team had the documents, who might have 
them now, or what had been done with them.  (Note: Dutch 
authorities earlier rejected a GoC request to search the 
Gotovina defense team's office in The Hague.) 
 
¶6. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked what was new about the Task 
Force's conclusions, given that the GoC had previously 
theorized that the missing documents had been stolen or 
destroyed by persons associated with General Gotovina.  Stier 
replied that the Task Force had been able to connect the dots 
and to prove what had heretofore been merely affirmed or 
 
ZAGREB 00000731  002 OF 002 
 
 
surmised.  He attributed this to searching and even hostile 
questioning of military witnesses, which he noted could not 
have been easy for police investigators.  Stier also freely 
admitted, when pressed by the Ambassador, that a 
professional, police-led investigation could have been 
mounted earlier by the GoC.  He explained that GoC 
seriousness was principally the result of Kosor's accession 
as Prime Minister and her willingness to take tough decisions. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  Stier acknowledged that, from a legal standpoint, 
and in relation to the Gotovina case, it was not a problem 
for Croatia to wait for the Trial Chamber's decision about 
how to handle the seized documents and computers.  But the 
politics of the issue were more complicated.  Stier said that 
Kosor's opponents within the ruling HDZ led by ex-Prime 
Minister Sanader, already resistant to her effort to allow 
damaging anti-corruption cases to move forward, were now 
using complaints (including accusations of treason) from 
veterans' groups about the searches to weaken her position. 
Kosor's message to the investigators was clear:  go to the 
end and do everything you legally can to find the documents. 
But Kosor needed to be able to show that this newly 
aggressive approach was being recognized in an improved 
assessment of Croatia's cooperation by Brammertz or in 
unblocking Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) of 
the EU negotiations.  So far no such signal had been 
received.  The only response had been an order from ICTY to 
freeze the investigation, which some were portraying as a 
"humiliation" of both Brammertz and the GoC.  Stier said that 
PM Kosor was hoping that the USG might weigh in with the UK 
to explain that the GoC effort was credible, noting that a 
positive response to the investigation would help ensure it 
is sustained. 
 
¶8. (C/NF) The Ambassador urged patience, noting that the US 
had already, in the UNSC and in the Secretary's meeting with 
FM Jandrokovic, praised the GoC's improved efforts in 
searching for the documents, and called on Croatia to 
continue.  Both Brammertz and the EU FMs had signaled an 
increasing readiness to accept that a credible investigation 
could establish that the documents were truly beyond the 
reach of the GoC.  Moreover, the Ambassador continued, less 
than a week had passed since the GoC's raids.  Observers, 
including Brammertz and the British, were still considering 
what these events signified.  The hearing called by the Trial 
Chamber for December 16 to discuss the request for documents, 
and its subsequent ruling (likely to be issued in January), 
will also influence Croatia's chances for opening Chapter 23. 
 We intend to follow these events closely and review where 
the issue stands by mid-January. 
 
¶9. (C/NF) COMMENT:  We understand a debate is currently going 
on in London regarding whether the GoC is doing enough to 
merit opening of Chapter 23.  Clearly, this issue would be 
easier to resolve if the Prosecution came to the view that 
Croatia's increased efforts since late September represent a 
credible investigation, and that Croatia is fully cooperating 
with the ICTY, even though it has been unable to locate all 
of the 23 documents in question.  There is a chance, even if 
the Prosecutor does not express this view, that the Trial 
Chamber could find that Croatia is responding adequately.  In 
any case, we believe that parties will be more open to 
re-evaluating their positions only after the Dec. 16 hearing 
and its aftermath at the ICTY.  In the interim, we are urging 
the GoC to continue its investigations, although the 
injunction against searching further among Gotovina's defense 
team circumscribes what additional efforts the Task Force can 
undertake.  END COMMENT. 
FOLEY