VZCZCXRO3677
RR RUEHKW RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHWR #1178/01 3350705
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010705Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9207
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 5084
INFO RUEHKW/AMCONSUL KRAKOW 2333
RUCNEEC/EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 WARSAW 001178 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP (RBILLINGS) 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC PL
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - POLAND 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 074840 (B) STATE 074840 (C) KYIV 01687 
 
WARSAW 00001178  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
------------------- 
Country Conditions 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Although the Polish economy is slowing due to the global 
economic crisis, it has proven to be more resilient than other 
European economies.  After 2008's 4.9 percent growth, Eurostat 
predicts Poland's GDP will drop to 1.2 percent in 2009.  In 
comparison, the EU as a whole is expected to see a 4 percent drop in 
GDP. 
 
¶2.  (U) Upon accession to the European Union in 2004, Poles began to 
leave Poland for work in countries like Britain and Ireland.  This 
trend began to slow down over the last two years and may now reverse 
as host countries face mounting economic challenges.  According to 
Eurostat, as of August 2009, the unemployment rate in Poland was 8 
percent, slightly under the 9.1 percent EU-wide unemployment rate. 
Unemployment rates vary across the country with rural areas 
experiencing much higher levels than cities. 
 
¶3.  (U) Poland's failure to qualify for the Visa Waiver Program 
represents a significant bilateral irritant, even if the GOP does 
not continue to raise the matter.  Post continues to engage the GOP 
on security-related aspects of VWP membership, including Lost and 
Stolen Passport (LASP) and HSPD-6 reporting. 
 
---------- 
NIV Fraud 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (U) B Visas: Consular officers encounter very low levels of 
material fraud.  The fraud primarily involves applicants who do not 
disclose previous overstays in the U.S. or who misrepresent the 
length of their previous stays.  Access to DHS ADIS records has 
provided critical information for making accurate visa adjudications 
and significantly improved the quality and turnaround time of 
validation studies conducted by Mission Poland.  Post's most recent 
B-visa validation studies indicated a surprisingly low rate of 
overstays for Polish applicants (less than 3 percent), a trend 
supported by ad hoc evaluations.  Approximately a dozen applicants 
in Krakow have "forgotten" arrests and convictions that would make 
them ineligible under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  Cooperation with Polish 
authorities often reveals such arrests in Poland while IAFIS has 
been instrumental in identifying American arrest records.  While 
there is no indication of an increased trend in these incidents, 
Post continues to be vigilant. 
 
¶5.  (U) J Visas: Post has seen a very small number of questionable 
J1 Trainee Exchange programs that seem designed to circumvent H visa 
requirements, especially in the hospitality and agriculture 
industries.  While most J1 Trainee Exchange program applicants are 
highly qualified, a minority has presented training plans that are 
thinly veiled attempts to disguise jobs as waiters, gardeners, or 
hotel maids.  Post cooperates with Compliance (ECA/EC/CU) to better 
monitor and enforce regulations on umbrella sponsoring 
organizations. 
 
¶6.  (U) Validation studies indicate the overstay rate for Polish 
students participating in the Summer Work & Travel Program is 
marginal (approx 1 percent of such travelers do not return to 
Poland).  Overstay rates for third country nationals applying for J 
visas in Poland vary by country of citizenship, and can be 
exponentially larger depending on the country. 
 
--------- 
IV Fraud 
--------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Warsaw processes all IV petitions in Poland, as well as IV 
petitions from Latvia and Belarus.  The Department has preliminarily 
approved Embassy Riga's request to begin processing IVs.  This is 
currently scheduled to begin January 1, 2010.  Post does not see 
significant fraud involving family-based petitions.  For the small 
number of employment based visa applications that Warsaw receives, 
however, there are a significant amount of fraudulent work documents 
for alien worker petitions.  This is one type of visa that the fraud 
prevention unit monitors closely. 
 
--------- 
DV Fraud 
--------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Warsaw continues to encounter significant fraud in DV 
applications from citizens of Ukraine.  Approximately 85 percent of 
 
WARSAW 00001178  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Ukrainian DV entries are submitted by agencies, often without the 
knowledge or permission of the applicant named in the entry.  This 
often results in mistakes that could disqualify the applicant, such 
as not submitting the names of spouses or children.  These agencies 
then charge lottery winners up to $20,000 for their services, which 
sometimes includes the provision of documents to hide such mistakes. 
 While use of an agency to submit the application to the lottery is 
not illegal under the INA, the methods these agencies utilize to 
collect debts are of concern to U.S. law enforcement entities. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The agencies usually use one of three methods to collect 
their money from applicants.  The first method is coercing the 
beneficiaries to work for a company or person connected to the 
agency for low wages until the debt is repaid.  The second is 
requiring the beneficiary to sign a contract in Ukraine promising to 
repay the money.  In this way, if the beneficiary does not repay the 
debt after immigrating to the United States, the agency can use 
governmental organs to enforce the contract, usually garnishing 
wages or appropriating the property of a co-signer who is still in 
Ukraine.  The third method involves the agency compelling the DV 
winner to marry someone who has paid the agency to be added to a 
winning applicant's package.  Investigating these so-called pop-up 
marriages makes up a large part of Warsaw and Kyiv's fraud 
prevention workload. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In October 2008, the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) began 
using a matrix to pre-screen DV applications.  The matrix scores 
applications on factors such as agency involvement, divorce and 
remarriage in less than three months, whether passports were issued 
since the date of the marriage, etc.  Cases are then flagged to 
alert the interviewing officer to likely lines of questioning.  A 
matrix score above a certain threshold triggers FPU involvement. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Post has also seen a growing number of instances in which 
agencies have failed to list a DV applicant's dependants on the DV 
entry form. Agencies profit from these omissions by charging winners 
a fee for the provision of documents to conceal these omissions.  In 
cases where a legitimate spouse is left off the initial DV entry, 
for example, agencies provide fraudulent divorce and re-marriage 
certificates.  In cases where the principal applicant is not seeking 
an immigration benefit for family members omitted from the entry 
form, agencies provide false death and divorce certificates to make 
it appear that the applicant had no immediate relatives at the time 
of lottery entry to avoid 5A ineligibility. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Warsaw FPU continues to work closely with Kyiv-RSO and 
Kyiv-FPU to research cases, share information and track fraud 
trends.  Recent visits between the two Posts have helped to solidify 
this cooperation.  This has led to fewer unqualified applicants 
actually making it to through the interview process.  The combined 
efforts have also helped more qualified applicants to proceed 
through the diversity lottery process without being coerced or 
threatened by these agencies. 
 
--------------------- 
Polish Passport Fraud 
--------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In May 2009, an applicant in Krakow submitted a valid 
Polish passport with a false identity and received a tourist visa. 
The incident was identified through law enforcement and Krakow 
continues to work with the GOP to determine the extent of any 
passport or supporting document fraud ring in the consular district. 
 Krakow will report on the incident by Septel.  This single incident 
is not likely to be an indicator of weakness in Polish passport 
security measures, which Krakow has reviewed.  The GOP has been very 
open in cooperating on this case, providing fingerprint reviews and 
photo identification of the subject, who is in custody in the United 
States. 
 
--------------------------- 
ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (U) There was only one confirmed ACS fraud in FY2009.  It was 
an attempt to obtain a CRBA and U.S. passport for a child by an 
American citizen who was not the child's biological father.  He 
legitimated the child, and he was listed as the father on the Polish 
birth certificate.  However, during the interview he declined to 
answer a question whether he was the biological father of that child 
and refused DNA testing.  The CRBA application was denied. 
 
--------------- 
Adoption Fraud 
--------------- 
 
 
WARSAW 00001178  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶15.  (U) Adoption Fraud:  Warsaw has not seen any recent adoption 
fraud trends. 
 
-------------------- 
Use of DNA Testing 
-------------------- 
 
¶16.  (U) In past years, Warsaw has utilized DNA testing in a limited 
number of cases usually involving questions of parentage in the DV 
lottery process. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) Warsaw processes a small number of asylum cases and has no 
fraud to report at this time regarding Visas 92/93 cases.  Warsaw 
does receive a few reports of lost or stolen I-551s and reports 
those promptly to DHS. 
 
------------------------------- ------------------------------- 
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
------------------------------- ------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (U) Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist 
Travel:  Poland is a Tier 1 country and is a source, transit and 
destination country for trafficked persons, primarily women and 
girls, but to a lesser extent, boys and men.  Persons were 
trafficked to and through Poland from countries in Eastern Europe, 
Asia and Africa.  Ukraine continued to serve as the largest source 
of persons trafficked through the country.  Citizens and foreigners 
were trafficked to other EU countries and Israel.  The majority of 
trafficking victims are for the purpose of sexual exploitation; 
however other forms of trafficking for forced labor occurs, 
particularly in the agricultural and other economic sectors. 
According to the most recent Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, 
Poland fully complies with the minimum standards for the elimination 
of trafficking, and demonstrated progress in its overall law 
enforcement efforts. 
 
¶19.  (U) There is not currently any evidence of patterns of 
terrorist travel in Poland.  In December 2007, Poland joined the 
Schengen zone for all forms of travel. This has allowed for free 
travel between Poland and other Schengen countries.  Post RSO 
therefore regularly monitors travel patterns both within the 
Schengen zone and with non-Schengen border countries. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (U) Warsaw has cooperated closely with Embassy Kyiv in their 
investigation of agencies facilitating entry into the DV lottery for 
citizens of Ukraine.  The ongoing investigation focuses primarily on 
domestic U.S. connections and fees paid by winners of the DV lottery 
in Ukraine in connection with the services of those agencies.  There 
are three cases involving DS investigations in Krakow.  The first 
case is related in paragraph 13 above, the second is a visa fraud 
case with a fugitive and the third involves a report of intended 
document fraud that is under investigation (both to be covered by 
Septel). 
 
----------------------------------- ------------------------- 
Host Country Passport, Identity Documents and Civil Registry 
----------------------------------- ------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (U) The Polish government has good control over its national 
documents. Post rarely sees illegally obtained original birth 
certificates, marriage and divorce certificates, passports, or 
national IDs.  It is possible to obtain fake diplomas, student IDs, 
and proof of enrollment on black markets in Warsaw and Krakow, but 
these documents are usually of poor quality and consular staff are 
able to recognize them easily. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶22.  (U) Cooperation with Host Government Authorities: Both Warsaw 
and Krakow enjoy good cooperation with Polish border guards, 
immigration officials, and local and federal law enforcement. 
Traditionally, both FPUs in Poland are in frequent contact with such 
officials, resulting in cooperation that leads to reducing visa and 
passport fraud.  We are, however, frequently unable to provide visa 
records to the Polish police for investigations, as the Polish 
authorities are unable to give assurances that those documents will 
 
WARSAW 00001178  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
not be used by prosecutors and other judicial authorities in court 
proceedings without our consent. 
 
¶23.  (U) The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border 
Protection Agency established an Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) 
at Warsaw's Okecie Airport in September 2004.  IAP pre-screens 
passengers on direct flights to the U.S. in order to reduce the 
number of Polish citizens turned around at U.S. ports of entry 
because of invalid visas or previous immigration violations.  The 
IAP has enhanced cooperation on fraud prevention and deportations of 
wanted persons, and has improved our already strong working 
relationships with Polish authorities. 
 
--------------------------- 
Areas of Particular Concern 
--------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (U) One area of particular concern is Ukrainian DV applicants 
being exploited by agencies which charge large sums for processing 
and translating applications and related documents, and fraudulently 
obtaining civil documents to hide the true family status of 
applicants.  Embassy Kyiv has launched a vigorous campaign to inform 
the population about DV procedures and to educate successful 
applicants about avenues to deal with coercion in the U.S. 
 
 
---------------------- 
Staffing and Training 
---------------------- 
 
¶22.  (U) Warsaw's Fraud Prevention Unit is comprised of one 
full-time LES staff member, one full-time EFM consular assistant and 
one ELO.  The IV Unit Chief supervises the FPU, while the ELO, who 
is currently in the IV unit, manages the FPU.  A new ELO rotates 
into this position annually at the beginning of September.  Krakow's 
FPU consists of one part-time FSI-trained officer, working under the 
supervision of the NIV unit chief.  The consular section chief is an 
FSI-trained FPM and covers the ACS section and major cases.  Krakow 
has one part-time EFM and one part-time LES dedicated to fraud 
prevention. 
 
FEINSTEIN