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UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: RM ECON DDD CPU CCC BBB AAA
SUBJECT: UNGA FOURTH COMMITTEE: PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS 
 
REF: USUN 65 
 
¶1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  This year's annual general debate on 
peacekeeping in the Fourth Committee (special political and 
decolonization), from October 23 - 29, was largely 
uneventful, which is a positive step forward from the past 
few years' negative atmosphere and polemical divides between 
North and South. Countries from the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the European Union (EU) expressed acquiescence if 
not support for the general thrust of the "New Horizon" 
reform agenda proposed by the Heads of the UN Departments of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS), U/SYG 
Alain LeRoy and U/SYG Susana Malcorra, respectively.  Major 
troop contributing countries (TCCs), which in years past used 
the occasion to harangue the Security Council and the 
Secretariat for failing to heed their concerns, this year 
actually acknowledged steps by the Council and the U.S. to 
reach out to them. They urged the Security Council and the 
Secretariat to continue in that direction, as the 
"trilateral" consultations (between the Security Council, the 
Secretariat and TCCs) remained among their highest concerns. 
The NAM, in its statement, also formally commended the U.S. 
for meeting its financial obligations for peacekeeping. 
 
¶2. Notwithstanding, several delegations from the South laid 
down clear markers that they were not ready to give the 
Secretariat a blank check on the reform proposals to be 
formally considered in the Feb-March 2010 session of the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34).  They 
were expecting to receive and review very carefully the 
details of any proposals for peacekeeping reform, 
particularly on the protection of civilians and robust 
peacekeeping. Major financial contributors from the developed 
countries gave similar indications with respect to the field 
support strategy.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
DPKO and DFS presentations 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. U/SYG Le Roy offered impressions from his visits to the 
field during his first year in office and outlined next steps 
in the implementation of the DPKO/DFS non-paper issued in 
July, entitled "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New 
Horizon for UN Peacekeeping Operations."  He foresaw four 
main themes addressed in "New Horizon" to be developed and 
presented to the membership for consideration at the 
Feb-March 2010 session of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). First, there was a need to 
develop policy guidance on key aspects of modern-day 
peacekeeping, notably to protect civilians, conduct "robust 
peacekeeping" and undertake critical peace-building 
activities. Second, new efforts would be required to provide 
the missions with the capabilities needed to do the job, 
including the necessary performance standards, training, 
equipment, and specialized units. Third, stronger UN field 
support arrangements (e.g. personnel, finance, budgeting, 
procurement, logistics, information and communications 
technology) would need to be put in place. And fourth, it was 
essential to ensure more consultative and effective 
arrangements for mission planning and oversight. 
 
¶4. Elaborating on the field support strategy, U/SYG Malcorra 
said she was focused on getting the right staff on board, 
securing sufficient funding, and providing the necessary 
equipment and logistical services in the field as quickly as 
possible. A more responsive model of field support was 
required not only for the 15 peacekeeping missions run by 
DPKO, but another 13 special political missions, largely run 
by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the AU-led 
mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  She envisaged moving from a 
mission-centric approach to a "global and integrated delivery 
system."  This new strategy would need to balance the 
operational risk and opportunity costs of deployment delays 
with the financial risk inherent in further delegation and 
decentralization of authority to the field. The new support 
strategy would ultimately seek to be more responsive to field 
 
personnel's needs and security considerations; and more 
cognizant of the economic and environmental impact of 
large-scale deployments on the local communities. 
 
Blocks statements about core issues 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. The Swedish Representative, speaking for the European 
Union, expressed concurrence with the priorities outlined by 
U/SYG LeRoy, urged the Secretariat to implement those of New 
Horizon's recommendations within its purview and signaled 
readiness to consider others requiring legislative approval. 
Sweden, on behalf of EU, "encouraged the Security Council and 
the Secretariat to further develop consultation procedures, 
in accordance with the PRST of 5 August 2009, including when 
deciding on new peacekeeping mandates." It also called for 
attention on: civilian peace-building capacities; elaboration 
of strategic direction for UN policing operations; 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security; 
the socio-economic impact of peacekeeping; the command and 
control arrangements of peacekeeping operations; and 
cooperation with and capacity-building of regional 
organizations. Of note, the EU indicated that the DFS 
mid-point non-paper on the field support strategy provided a 
"promising basis for discussion," while concurrently making 
clear that "further discussions with Member States are needed 
to work out details of the proposed strategy." 
 
¶6. Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the 
Moroccan representative, while reaffirming long-standing NAM 
positions (e.g. insistence on adherence to principles of 
consent of the parties, non-use of force in self-defense, 
impartiality, respect for sovereignty, political 
independence), made several noteworthy general policy points. 
 First, the NAM expressed appreciation for the UNSC's efforts 
to deepen consultation with TCCs, as evidenced by the work of 
the UNSC working group on peacekeeping and the PRST of August 
5, 2009.  Additionally, it called for "streamlining the 
various Member State initiatives" on peacekeeping and 
"expressed its readiness" as a major partner to engage in the 
debate over the "New Horizon" non-paper, calling for 
increased focus on the operational aspects, especially in the 
military real. NAM expected the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations to "lay down action orientated 
recommendations" related thereto, as well as to engage in 
discussions on the DFS Support Strategy.  It reaffirmed the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation's position on 
protection of civilians in peacekeeping, notably that it is a 
primary responsibility of the Host Country, and requires an 
integrated and comprehensive approach, timely provision of 
adequate resources, logistical support and training, as well 
as clearly defined and achievable mandates.  NAM urged 
caution in invoking Chapter VII in peacekeeping contexts and 
called for future debate on "robust peacekeeping" to be 
"restricted to the operational and tactical level." 
 
¶7. The NAM continued it's policy points calling for greater 
engagement from the Secretariat, to support the capacity 
building activities of the regional and national training 
centers of TCC.  It called for continuing efforts to 
strengthen African Peacekeeping capabilities, including 
implementation of the Joint Action Plan for UN support to 
African peacekeeping, and enhanced partnership between the UN 
and AU.  It reiterated the enhancement of the safety and 
security of peacekeepers as a top priority. Lastly, turning 
to financial matters, the "NAM commend(ed) the steps taken by 
the Government of the United States in payment of their 
arrears", while concurrently proposing that the C-34 hold 
informal consultations on measures to ensure rapid processing 
and payment of reimbursements to TCCs. 
 
¶8.  Mexico on behalf of the Rio group, echoed NAM calls for 
strengthened partnership among all major stakeholders, 
greater consultation with and timely reimbursement of TCCs, 
continued focus on training (including translation of all 
training materials in Spanish and Portuguese) and readiness 
 
to discuss the New Horizon non-paper in the C-34. Unlike the 
NAM, however, the Rio Group expressly mentioned the 
importance of adhering to the Zero Tolerance policy on sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. It welcomed new 
provisions on SEA in the model Memorandum of Understanding as 
a substantial improvement. It looked forward to considering 
relevant aspects of the SYG's report on assistance to victims 
of SEA (A/64/176) and took note of the issuance in 2009 of a 
victim's assistance guide. The Rio group also expressly 
supported the efforts of MINUSTAH and called for attention to 
the socio-economic and development-related aspects of its 
mandate, in addition those pertaining to security. 
 
¶9. Thailand, speaking on behalf of countries from ASEAN, was 
more forward leaning on evolutions in modern-day 
peacekeeping.  It stressed that "complex and integrated 
mandates, such as the protection of civilians and human 
rights protection, will certainly need clear guidelines from 
the Secretariat while mandates related to security sector 
reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and 
rule of law will need both operational guidelines and 
strategic guidance."  Thailand mentioned that ASEAN countries 
now had close to 3,500 troops and police serving in UN 
peacekeeping. The ASEAN member states, as they "move towards 
becoming one community by 2015," were "looking at the 
possibility of establishing a network among the existing 
peacekeeping centers of ASEAN Member States to conduct joint 
planning, training and sharing of experiences, as envisaged 
in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint." 
 
¶10. Canada, speaking on behalf of Australia and New Zealand 
(CANZ), made one of the longest statements, laying down 
several markers for the forthcoming session of the C-34.  It 
was "encouraged by the release" of New Horizon, "whose 
underlying principles and recommendations merit broad 
substantive discussion amongst the Member States" CANZ 
welcomed the call for strengthened partnership among all key 
stakeholders and outreach to TCCs.  CANZ echoed calls for 
clear and achievable peacekeeping mandates, adding that 
"ensuring missions are adequately resourced for success" 
should be "an essential precursor for any deployment," while 
"not allowing potential limitations in available forces to 
prejudge the feasibility of missions for which there is a 
clearly identified need."  It stressed that mandates should 
include benchmarks for evaluating progress that can assist, 
along with Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs), decisions 
about re-shaping or ending deployments. CANZ supported U/SYG 
LeRoy's view that all concerned needed urgently to come to a 
shared understanding of the key tasks, definitions and 
operational requirements of modern peacekeeping, especially 
for robust peacekeeping, protection of civilians and 
peacebuilding.  In this regard, CANZ remained interested in 
the Secretariat's analysis and recommendations on the 
management and use of military utility helicopters in 
peacekeeping missions. It stressed the importance of 
developing operational guidelines and training standards for 
civilian protection mandates, and looked forward to the 
independently commissioned DPKO-OCHA study on protection of 
civilians. CANZ believed it essential to dedicate equal 
attention to the political, economic and peace-building 
requirements in peacekeeping contexts. 
 
¶11. CANZ welcomed the efforts of the Peace-building 
Commission and encouraged the Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO) to "be engaged at an early stage in the development 
strategies for sequencing, resourcing and implementing 
mandated early safety and security stability tasks, as 
requested by the Special Committee in March 2009."  CANZ 
commended AU efforts in Somalia and pledged its commitment to 
supporting the development of the peacekeeping capacities of 
regional organizations.  It called on the UN to support 
regional efforts and demonstrate "leadership in developing 
the guidance necessary to ensure commonality of standards and 
procedures."  CANZ spoke at length about the importance of 
greater attention to policing issues and coordination with 
Police-Contributing Countries. It stressed the need for 
 
further development of policies, doctrine, operating 
guidelines, recruiting and evaluation criteria, as well as 
common pre-deployment training. It "welcomed the direction 
proposed by the DFS mid-point paper on a new field support 
strategy" and was eager for detailed discussion of the 
proposals and "the development of an implementation plan that 
sees a phased approach of agreed initiatives by priority." 
Finally, CANZ looked forward to continued discussions on the 
implementation of strengthening the Office of Military 
Affairs/DPKO, Secretariat plans for managing surge and 
stand-up capacity requirements, further development of the 
Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and improvements 
to the Human Resources and recruitment systems. 
 
P-5 and large donor statements about core issues 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶12. The U.S. took the occasion to mention President Obama's 
September 23 meeting with the leaders of top TCCs as 
indication of our commitment to strengthening partnerships 
among all key peacekeeping stakeholders. The U.S. had 
listened intently to the TCCs' concerns and shared many of 
them.  The U.S. believed that there are several major 
challenges facing UN peacekeeping.  First, a number of 
peacekeeping missions are operating in the midst of faltering 
peace processes, requiring political support.  Peacekeeping 
operations must be accompanied by-and not be a substitute-for 
critical peace-making efforts.  Second, peacekeeping mandates 
and means must be better aligned.  Missions face critical 
shortfalls, including well-trained and well-equipped troops, 
police and hospitals, engineers, transport and aviation 
units. Third, missions must be adequately staffed and 
resourced to effectively carry out mandates to protect 
civilians from physical violence, including sexual and 
gender-based violence.  Fourth, UN mission planning and 
support arrangements must be improved to reduce deployment 
delays, better respond to peacekeepers' needs on the ground, 
and ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiencies.  Fifth, more 
attention must be given to the peace-building and development 
priorities, which should accompany the peacekeeping work, 
particularly in reform of the criminal justice and security 
sectors.  Finally, mission strategies must have the 
flexibility to adapt to realities on the ground, and should 
be geared towards retaining the support of the host 
population in carrying out its mandate. 
 
¶13. The U.S. supported the call of LeRoy and Malcorra, on 
follow-up to New Horizon, for priority attention to the 
specialized military and police capabilities, operational 
standards, practical guidance and training, field support 
arrangements and oversight mechanisms needed to successfully 
carry out the essential tasks demanded of modern UN 
peacekeeping. These tasks currently often include protection 
of civilians, robust peacekeeping and peace-building.  It was 
important to build a shared understanding among Member States 
and the Secretariat of what is meant by these terms and what 
is required to 'operationalize' them in peacekeeping 
contexts. 
 
¶14. China stated that there had been numerous attempts at 
institutional reform of peacekeeping operations.  It hoped 
that the current reforms would include clear priorities for 
the secretariat especially in the areas of exit strategies. 
It also called on peacekeeping missions to emphasize 
capacity-building to ensure that missions did not need to 
return to a country.  China also noted that discussions 
should be premised on primary responsibility of countries 
concerned and the respect for their sovereignty.  It called 
on more efficient use of resources during the economic crisis. 
 
¶15. Russia stated that peacekeepers were tasked with 
increasingly complex tasks including security sector reform, 
disarmament, reintegration and soci-economic transformation. 
It noted that peacekeeping operations need to be enhanced to 
deal with these mandates.  Russia believes that the concept 
of "robust peacekeeping" must be studied and that protection 
 
of civilians is the responsibility of the governments 
involved in the conflict.  It stated that representatives of 
TCCs should play a more active role in decisions and that the 
number of troop contributing countries should be expanded. 
 
¶16. Japan welcomed the emphasis in "New Horizon" on making 
sure peacekeeping operations are established "in the context 
of the broader political process and should have mandates 
consistent with the objectives of the missions and the 
available resources."  It was important to make a clear 
distinction between what can be achieved by deploying a UN 
PKO and what could not.  Japan thought it "indispensable for 
peacekeeping missions to set benchmarks and have adequate 
planning toward mission objectives."   It appreciated that 
New Horizon called for more quality-over-quantity and sought 
to achieve more effective and efficient operations within 
limited resources. "In that context, (Japan) support(ed) the 
Secretariat's approach to engage Member States to review the 
Support Strategy." 
 
¶17. Japan observed that many of the issues TCCs and Council 
members has raised in the UNSC Working Group on Peacekeeping, 
which it has chaired since January 2009, coincided with those 
in New Horizon:  protection of civilians; capacity-building 
of troops; linkages with peace-building; and establishing 
partnerships for mandate implementation.  It sought 
continuing discussions on these issues in the C-34, as well 
as the UNSC Working Group.  It signaled out protection of 
civilians as one of the most important but difficult mandates 
assigned to missions.  As had been observed in Sudan and DRC, 
"it is nearly impossible to cover completely such vast areas 
with limited personnel."  Accordingly, it was important to 
look at the mobility of units, strengthened communications 
with host populations, creative measures such as instituted 
in MONUC (e.g. Joint Protection Teams) and greater attention 
to security sector reform and building rule of law capacities 
in the host government. Particularly close coordination was 
needed between the UNSC, TCCs and the Secretariat in this 
area.  Japan envisaged that the WG would begin discussing 
strengthening cooperation with TCCs in November. There were 
numerous ideas out there already, including detailed measures 
agreed in UNSCR 1353(2001).  The challenge was now to 
implement them. 
 
 
TCC statements about core issues 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶18. Pakistan aligned itself with the NAM statement and 
pointed out that it is now the number one contributor, with 
nearly 11,000 personnel accounting for 10 percent of all blue 
helmets in the world. It offered four general policy points. 
First, it welcomed President Obama's initiative to convene a 
"TCC Summit" in September. Second, it stressed the unique 
nature of UN peacekeeping, based on the guiding principles of 
the UN charter.  It was essential not to confuse it with 
other kinds of peace operations led by non-UN entities. 
Third, the missions needed to be provided with clear, 
realistic and achievable mandates. This required "a high 
degree of coherence" between the decision-makers in the UNSC 
who write the mandates, and the TCCs who are implementers on 
the ground.  Fourth, UN peacekeeping missions must be 
provided with adequate resources. In that connection, 
Pakistan valued the comment of Malcorra and DFS to get the 
right staff on board, secure sufficient funding and provide 
necessary equipment and logistical services in the field. 
Finally, the increased focus on peacekeeping needed to be 
accompanied by equal efforts at conflict prevention, 
resolution, and post-conflict peace-building.  In that 
context, Pakistan believed the Secretary-General's report of 
June 2009 on Peace-building provided "a solid foundation to 
move forward." 
 
¶19. Bangladesh associated itself with the NAM statement and 
pointed out that it now had 10,000 peacekeeping deployed in 
14 missions (making it the number 2 contributor) Since 1988, 
 
Bangladesh had lost 100 peacekeepers while serving in 32 
missions.   Bangladesh echoed the sentiment of others about 
the need for missions to be provided with the necessary 
political support and resources. It also strongly echoed the 
importance of strengthened partnership among the UNSC, TCCs 
and the Secretariat. Bangladesh added that "we must 
appreciate the recent initiative made by President Barak 
Obama convening a high level meeting with TCCs."  One of the 
key concerns TCCs faced was with respect to delays in 
reimbursements.  As of September 2009, Bangladesh was still 
owed $166 million for reimbursement of troops and 
contingent-owned equipment. 
 
¶20. India, now the third largest contributor to UN 
peacekeeping, aligned itself with the NAM.  It pointed out 
that Indian had contributed more than 100,000 peacekeepers to 
40 UN operations since 1956.  India took note, "with 
appreciation," of the efforts of the UK and France to examine 
the current state of peacekeeping. It also "took note" of the 
efforts of the UNSC WG and the Secretariat's New Horizon 
project.  For India, the primary challenge facing 
peacekeeping and its major concern pertained to peacekeeping 
mandates.  They were too broad and too ambitious. There was 
"very little correlation with the ability of the organization 
to deliver."  Unrealistic mandates had led to situations 
where mission personnel were forced to ask national 
contingents to undertake tasks and utilized CCOE in a manner 
that was inconsistent with the legal framework under which 
they were deployed.  This gap would only be narrowed with 
greater involvement in the mandate formulation process of 
those contributing manpower and resources to the PKOs. 
The most recently UNSC PRST on Peacekeeping, committing as it 
did to enhanced consultation with TCCs and the Secretariat, 
was therefore a welcome step in the right direction. 
 
¶21. India hoped DPKO would similarly involve developing 
countries more in the generation of doctrine, benchmarks and 
standards for the implementation of police and rule of law 
mandates.  There was also a need to engage countries that had 
undergone "successful post-colonial nation-building 
exercises" in the development of governance capacities in 
countries now hosting PKOs.  Finally, India was concerned 
that DFS needed  "far greater internal coordination and 
client-orientation." It needed to function more as a military 
support operation with a lean command structure. 
RICE