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C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019 
TAGS: PREL XH ZL NATO TU BK YI HR MW AM AJ IR
OSCE 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S DECEMBER 1, 2009 
CONVERSATION WITH TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER DAVUTOGLU 
 
Classified By: Carol Fuller, Charge d,Affaires. Reason 1.4.(d) 
 
¶1.  (U)  Cleared by Deputy Secretary Steinberg 
 
¶2.  (U)  December 1, 2009; 5:30 pm; Athens, Greece. 
 
¶3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Deputy Secretary 
EUR Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon 
Jeff Hovenier, NSC 
Jim Kuykendall (Notetaker) 
 
OTHER COUNTRY 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu 
 
 
¶4.  (C) SUMMARY.  In a meeting that lasted over one hour, FM 
Davutoglu was almost exclusively interested in discussing the 
MAP accession prospects for Bosnia.  Deputy Secretary 
Steinberg made it clear that the United States would need to 
see more progress from all parties before we would support 
extending MAP.  Davutoglu was insistent that Turkey could 
bring the Bosniak parties together and the Deputy Secretary 
proposed that we work on a common approach, with the EU and 
Spain, to try and push for real progress on measures to 
improve the functioning of the Bosnian government in the next 
2-3 months.  The Deputy raised the topic of Iran and said he 
hoped Turkey would be a supportive actor in what were sure to 
be a critical next few months.  The principals also briefly 
discussed the Minsk Group meeting and the Ministerial 
Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh, noting their agreement on the 
positive direction the negotiations seem to be heading.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------- 
BOSNIA 
------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In a frank but cordial exchange which took up the 
vast majority of the meeting, FM Davutoglu was insistent that 
Bosnia be extended MAP at the December NATO Ministerial.  He 
argued that: 
- All the major parties involved (Bosnia, Croatia, and even 
Serbia) have no objection to extending MAP to Bosnia. 
- While constitutional reform is a &must8, extending MAP to 
Bosnia is the best way to incentivize the needed reforms. 
- The U.S. and Europe brought Bosnia into the UNSC and that 
after 15 years and the horrible suffering the Bosnians have 
endured, we are punishing them by not extending MAP. 
- Turkey could bring the Bosniak parties together if MAP was 
to be extended at the December NATO Ministerial. 
¶6.  (C) Deputy Secretary Steinberg, however, asserted that 
the administration sees the situation in Bosnia differently 
from Turkey. He noted: 
- If NATO offers MAP to Bosnia now, there will be no 
incentive left with which to push for further reforms. 
- Reform in Bosnia will be a step-by-step process, and so far 
the parties have not even taken the first step of coming to 
the table. 
- The Bosniaks are not even talking among themselves, but 
that if they could reach a common position, there would be 
some pressure that could be applied to Dodik. 
- The bottom line is that the Bosnian leaders want others to 
solve their problems so they don,t have to do the hard work 
or take any political risk to solve their own problems 
themselves, and the U.S. won,t support that mentality. 
- The President has been clear on our position, which is that 
the reform and MAP process is not compensation for their past 
suffering, and that all the parties must show signs of 
progress before the U.S. will support MAP for Bosnia. 
- The best chance for MAP for Bosnia was this spring, and 
that it was not realistic to expect such an important 
decision, which would need to be made by the President, to 
come together in the next 48 hours. 
¶7.  (C) A/S Gordon added that extending MAP to Bosnia would 
be asking MAP to take on more than it could bear 
(compensating Bosniaks for their losses in the war).  If 
Bosnia were to get MAP now, everyone would be happy for a 
very short time, but ultimately none of the problems would be 
solved and the biggest incentive we have would be gone. 
 
¶8.  (C) Looking forward, the Deputy Secretary proposed that 
E 
 
at the NATO Ministerial, allies welcome Bosnia,s interest in 
MAP and state that they hope to see serious attempts by all 
parties to agree on steps to improve the functioning of the 
government before an invitation to MAP be extended to Bosnia. 
 He suggested that after the Ministerial, we identify a 
common approach to dealing with all the parties in Bosnia, 
get the EU and Spain on board, and try to work on real 
progress in the next 2-3 months. 
 
¶9.  (C) In response to Davutoglu,s question about the 
specific conditions were under which the U.S. would support 
MAP for Bosnia, D(S) made clear that the U.S. wanted to avoid 
setting specific benchmarks, but that the parties all needed 
to come to the table and begin discussing the proposed 
reforms in order for us to support MAP.  Ultimately, all of 
the reforms proposed so far are in the best interests of all 
the parties involved. 
 
¶10.  (U) Both Davutoglu and the Deputy Secretary agreed that 
working closely together on Bosnia is essential. 
 
----------------------- 
IRAN 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The Deputy Secretary raised the issue of Iran and 
noted that we are moving into a very important period of time 
in dealing with their nuclear program. He said the President 
remains hopeful that his overtures will produce results, but 
at the same time, this waiting game cannot go on forever. By 
the end of the year, if there is still no progress, he said 
the U.S. would have to go in another direction and he hoped 
Turkey would be a supportive actor. 
 
¶12. (C) Davutoglu said that President Ahmadinejad told the 
Turkish Government that he had sent three offers to the White 
House through &secret channels.8  He also relayed his 
impression that Ahmadinejad believes in the sincerity of 
President Obama, but that he is very unhappy that the U.S. 
sends sanctions proposals to Russia, France, and others. The 
Deputy underscored that to his knowledge, no such channels 
had been established. 
 
¶13. (C) Davutoglu emphasized that we need to deal with Iran 
discreetly, and that the &carrot and stick8 method would 
only work behind the scenes.  He warned that if we threaten 
publically, Iran would follow suit.  The Deputy Secretary 
countered that the U.S. had been negotiating for 11 months, 
and tried for nine months to negotiate discreetly.  He noted 
that the President showed agreement in principle to an 
approach that was extremely generous to Iran. 
 
¶14. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that the IAEA Board of 
Governors resolution in Vienna was a &shot across the bow8 
and in explaining the Turkish abstention on that resolution 
vote, Davutoglu said he agreed in substance with the 
resolution, but not on its timing.  Davutoglu also said that 
Turkey is supposed to meet with Iran again in January to 
discuss new ideas, and he hoped we would wait to see the 
outcome of those meetings. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
OSCE Minsk Group Decision- Nagorno-Karabakh Process 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶15.  (C) Both principals agreed that the OSCE Ministerial 
Statement, which stated that the Nagorno-Karabakh process be 
governed by the Helsinki Principles, was a positive step. 
Davutoglu said that while publically the message has been 
that there is no linkage between Nagorno-Karabakh resolution 
and Turkey-Armenia normalization, there is a linkage in 
reality, specifically where Turkey,s Parliament is 
concerned.  He said that it would be important for the U.S. 
to push all sides but that &now is the time8 for progress. 
The Deputy Secretary reiterated that the U.S. does perceive a 
large stake in all of these negotiations, and believes there 
are lots of positive opportunities for Turkey, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan in these discussions. 
FULLER