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RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO RS
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA:  ALLIES UNITED IN OPPOSITION TO 
RUSSIAN TREATY PROPOSAL 
 
REF: A. USNATO 579 
     ¶B. STATE 127435 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 3003 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Allies agreed during a December 14 NAC that 
the Russian proposal for a new treaty with NATO was a 
non-starter and affirmed that the Russian initiative would 
not create divisions within the Alliance.  There were 
differences over tactics:  German, the SecGen and some other 
Allies warned against rejecting the Russian proposal outright 
and proposed discussing certain elements of the Russian draft 
in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), while Poland and others 
expressed concern about holding discussions with Russia on 
any part of the draft treaty.  Allies agreed the Russian 
proposal should not distract the NRC from focusing on 
substantive cooperation on mutual areas of concern, although 
some observed that the Russian draft treaty was the latest 
indication that Moscow was not committed to this course of 
action, preferring to use the NRC for discussion.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) NATO Secretary General Rasmussen set the tone for the 
first Allied discussion of the Russian proposal for a legally 
binding treaty with NATO during a November 14 informal North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting when he stated that the 
Russian proposal would give Moscow a veto on NATO enlargement 
and the deployment forces within the Alliance (ref A).  He 
stated that it was "pointless" to consider a legally binding 
agreement when existing international arrangements could 
address Russian concerns.  The SecGen stressed that it was 
crucial that NATO respond cautiously to the Russian proposal 
because, unlike the European Security Treaty (EST), this was 
aimed directly at the NRC.  He thought that to reject it 
outright would deprive NATO of an opportunity to take the 
offensive by pressing Russia to explain its current proposal 
and larger security goals.  The SecGen observed that the 
draft treaty drew selectively from previous NRC agreements, 
and proposed that NATO could offer to negotiate with Russia a 
new political document reaffirming a commitment to agreed 
principles lsited in the three key documents: the 1997 
Founding Act, the 1995 OSCE Charter and the 2002 Rome 
Declaration.  He intended to be largely in "listening mode" 
during his December 15-17 visit to Moscow. 
 
¶3. (C) Allies thought Russian interest in a political 
document would be limited.  Canada observed that the previous 
NRC agreements were made during the "high water mark" in 
NATO-Russia relations, and Moscow might not be interested in 
reaffirming its support for these same principles today.  The 
UK cautioned that an attempt to re-affirm key principles 
might lead to a Russian attempt to dilute what was already 
agreed.  If NATO negotiated anything with Russia, the 
Alliance must carefully determine what it really wanted in 
advance. 
 
NATO Should Take the Offensive 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Allies agreed with the SecGen's cautious approach in 
responding to the Russian initiative, observing that simply 
saying no to the Russian proposal would cede the momentum to 
Moscow.  Several Allies noted the similarity between the 
latest Russian proposal and the draft EST, indicating that 
Moscow was shopping for the best format to advance its goals. 
 Norway warned that NATO would lose the "moral high ground" 
by rejecting outright the Russian proposal and should at 
least give elements of it some consideration within the NRC. 
Estonia thought, however, that the only way for NATO to go on 
the offensive was to prepare an "equally outrageous treaty" 
and "throw" it at Russia, much the way Foreign Minister 
Lavrov did by delivering this document without comment on the 
margins of the December 4 NRC Ministerial. 
 
¶5. (C) Germany advised that NATO should not be in a hurry to 
respond to the Russian proposal, which was an expression of 
Moscow's desire for its security concerns to be addressed. 
The German PermRep advised NATO to take the CFE "more 
seriously" and use it to address Russian concerns expressed 
in the draft treaty.  Slovenia agreed it was necessary to 
 
USNATO 00000585  002 OF 002 
 
 
show "sensitivity" to Russian concerns, which could be done 
through the existing international security architecture 
rather than by negotiating a new treaty. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Daalder explained that Washington had 
carefully studied the Russian proposal and determined clear 
redlines, including the basic Russian notion of the need for 
a new treaty (ref B).  He delivered U.S. objections to 
specific aspects of the Russian proposal, while pointing out 
that certain issues raised were appropriate for discussion in 
the NRC.  Doing so could help NATO out of the current, 
difficult position in which it could "not just say no to the 
Russian proposal, but could not just say yes either."  Turkey 
supported the U.S. approach, which could help Allies better 
understand Russian intentions behind this proposal.  Belgium 
thought the treaty demonstrated the concerns of a country 
that was worried about its position in Europe and was trying 
to "manage its decline." 
 
How to "Kill" the Treaty 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Poland offered the strongest reaction to the Russian 
proposal, stating that Russia was attempting to "outsmart 
NATO and destabilize the organization from within."  To 
characterize the Russian proposal as highly problematic (as 
the Danish PermRep had done) was too mild, as this should be 
seen as a "hostile" attempt to divide the Alliance.  NATO had 
to "kill" the Russian proposal, either now or after allowing 
discussion with Russia in the NRC.  The Polish PermRep was 
concerned that if there was an open discussion in the NRC, 
where certain Allies would present a very "tough" position, 
there was a real chance that Russian Ambassador to NATO 
Dmitri Rogozin would tell the press about the proceedings, as 
he had done several times previously. 
 
¶8. (C) Estonia feared that NATO would go "wobbly" if it left 
open the option to discuss certain parts of the treaty. 
Lithuania warned that we should not let Russia succeed in 
undermining the Alliance by discussing the proposal. 
Portugal stressed that "nothing" could create division 
between the newer and older Allies. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The latest Russian proposal, coming on the heels of 
the EST, demonstrates the need for an in-depth, interagency 
discussion to devise a comprehensive U.S. response to these 
Russian initiatives.  We need to assure Allies that may be 
concerned the U.S. and NATO will go "wobbly" of our ability 
to lift some aspects of the Russian draft treaty from this 
document and discuss them within the NRC without compromising 
our principles.  We also need to determine an appropriate 
mechanism by which to coordinate consideration of the EST in 
the OSCE while holding complimentary discussions in the NRC. 
DAALDER