VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0768/01 3571625
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O 231625Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3622
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0179
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV 
BAGHDAD FOR REID AND HOLCOMBE 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
NSC FOR LUTES 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ
SUBJECT: CWC:  TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT PLANS FOR EXPERTS 
MEETING ON IRAQI BUNKERS, JANUARY 12-13, 2010 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 738 
 
Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
This is CWC-78-09 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) On December 22, Delreps met with senior 
Technical Secretariat (TS) officials to discuss 
plans for the trilateral meeting with Iraqi and 
U.S. experts January 12-13, 2010, on the status of 
the Iraqi chemical weapons bunkers (reftel). 
Senior TS staff had met with the Director-General 
(DG) and the Legal Advisor the day before, and 
emphasized the need for substantial justification, 
including photographs, of the Iraqi weapons bunkers 
before a legal determination can be made on 
possible encapsulation of the bunkers in lieu of 
destruction.  The Technical Secretariat wants to 
separate the cases of the two remaining bunkers 
and, at minimum, help Iraq amend its initial 
declaration by removing Bunker 41 which no longer 
contains chemical weapons. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
MORE ASSESSMENT/PROOF NEEDED OF BUNKERS' CONTENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) Delreps Beik and Smith met with Horst Reeps, 
TS Director of Verification, and Dominique Anelli, 
Head of Chemical Demilitarization, on December 22 
to get a read-out on the TS meeting the day before 
on whether encapsulating Iraq's remaining chemical 
bunker would meet the legal requirements of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.  The Director-General 
held the meeting with senior staff before leaving 
for the Christmas holidays.  Reeps stated that the 
DG's concern is that Iraq not be treated 
differently from any other State Party to the 
Convention, despite the differences in its history 
and the condition of its remaining chemical 
weapons.  The TS believes that Bunker 41 can be 
separated out and removed by amendment from Iraq's 
initial declaration as there appear to be no 
remaining weapons in that bunker.  Anelli noted 
that the DG and Legal Advisor needed "more 
assessment" of Bunker 13 and very clear 
justification before determining whether 
encapsulation of the bunker with cement would meet 
the legal requirements of the Convention. 
 
¶3. (C) Both Reeps and Anelli emphasized the need 
for photographs as the best evidence of what 
remains in the bunkers.  Reeps noted that U.S. 
troops took photos in 2003, and that the Iraq 
Survey Group also had photos that would be useful. 
He asked what exactly the U.S. experts were 
bringing in January; Delrep said she would forward 
the question to Washington, but noted that the 
experts coming had developed the DOD paper 
presented to the Iraqi delegation in Washington in 
October.  Anelli stated that if no new information 
and evidence of the contents is forthcoming, the 
January meeting is not worth the time and expense 
for the experts to come to The Hague. 
 
¶4. (C) Delrep asked whether the initial TS visit to 
Iraq would take place in the near future.  Reeps 
responded that he himself has now been tapped to 
lead the team, and more TS officials had recently 
undergone UN security training in Amman.  He said 
the UN would plan to accompany the team with armed 
guards, probably private contractors, and was 
concerned about the Baghdad itinerary as both the 
Qconcerned about the Baghdad itinerary as both the 
Ministry office and INMD are outside the Green 
Zone.  Reeps noted that the OPCW is waiting for an 
 
invitation from the Iraqi government, and that the 
"Kurdish Ambassador here" (a clear reference to 
Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa) had different views 
from his government on the best site for the 
meeting.  Reeps did not believe the visit would be 
possible before the March elections. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
PLANS FOR THE JANUARY 12-13 EXPERTS MEETING 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Delrep informed Reeps of the list of U.S. 
experts coming for the January trilateral meeting 
and the names of the Iraqi experts that she had 
received from their Embassy.  Reeps said he would 
chair the meeting, with TS participants including 
Anelli, Senior Demil Officers Yaugen Ryzhykau and 
Gabriela Coman-Enescu, and an observer from the 
Legal Advisor's office.  He proposed starting the 
meetings at 9:15 on January 12 "with very few 
breaks" and the agenda to go "bunker by bunker." 
The TS is under orders from the DG to report 
everything on Iraq on a daily basis and would 
propose a summary status at the end of each 
session, to be drafted by the TS and approved by 
the group.  The DG will include status information 
on Iraq in his report to the Executive Council (EC 
59) in February. 
 
------------------------------- 
ASSISTING IRAQ TO MAKE ITS CASE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Reeps expressed his intention to conclude 
the meeting with how to proceed and the next steps 
for all concerned, particularly Iraq, which will 
need to amend its initial declaration if this 
meeting agrees on the assessment basis and the 
separation of the status of the two bunkers. 
Although the time is relatively short, it would be 
ideal for Iraq to present amendments to its initial 
declaration at EC 59 in February -- ideally for 
both Bunkers 41 and 13, but at least for Bunker 41. 
This would be a year after Iraq's accession to the 
Convention and its initial declaration, and it 
would be preferable for Iraq to present its case 
first before Council members dissect the amendment 
documents.  Delrep noted that TS endorsement of any 
plans for entombment of Bunker 13 would be critical 
to convince the Council of its viability; if it 
appears to be a U.S. or Iraqi proposal, Council 
members will be suspicious that Iraq is shirking 
its responsibilities.  Reeps and Anelli 
emphatically agreed. 
 
¶7. (C) Reeps advised that the group of countries 
wanting to assist Iraq be activated, and included 
in the information exchange and political planning 
early, to help make Iraq's case to the Council.  He 
said Germany could be helpful in this regard. 
Delrep noted the meeting that took place during the 
CSP among countries interested in assisting Iraq as 
a good starting point. 
 
¶8. (U) BEIK SENDS. 
 
MANN