VZCZCXRO3378
OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHTG #1231/01 3350002
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010002Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1215
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0050
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0529
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 1260
RHMFISS/CDR JTF-BRAVO  PRIORITY
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CINC/POLAD// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT PEPE LOBO 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001231  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  The Ambassador and President-elect Lobo met 
on November 30.  Both discussed the positive results of the 
elections.  The Ambassador briefed Lobo on the continued U.S. 
approach post-election that included implementation of the 
Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord.  They reviewed prospects for 
Congressional restitution of President Zelaya, the need for 
regime leader Micheletti to step aside, and the importance of 
creating a government of national unity.  Lobo said he was 
looking forward to addressing the major socio-economic issues 
facing the nation and discussed some of his plans to fight 
corruption and be responsive to the needs of the common 
people.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with President-elect Pepe Lobo on 
November 30.  Lobo agreed to meet at the Ambassador's office 
in the chancery.  The Ambassador opened the exchange by 
congratulating Lobo for his strong victory over his principal 
rival, the Liberal Party's Elvin Santos.  The Ambassador 
added that the elections had been well managed by the Supreme 
Elections Tribunal (TSE) and that the elections had been held 
in a climate of peace and harmony, which had been impressive. 
 The Honduran people deserved great credit for their 
commitment to democracy. Both agreed that Elvin Santos' 
concession speech had been appropriate and helped create calm 
following the TSE's announcement of the TREP results showing 
Lobo's landslide victory.  Lobo said that he believed voter 
turn out had been strong and predicted that the numbers would 
exceed the levels reached in the 2005 elections.  He also 
predicted that he would receive more than one million votes, 
which would exceed President Zelaya's vote tally in 2005, 
which had been 900,000. 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted that the elections results were a 
positive development and a necessary -- if insufficient -- 
condition to resolve the Honduran crisis.  The Ambassador 
discussed the U.S. commitment to the implementation of the 
Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord (TSJA).  He said that Honduras,s 
ability to normalize its ties with the international 
community would hinge on decisions and actions taken in the 
coming days.  The Ambassador cited the imminent vote on 
Zelaya's restitution scheduled for December 2.  The 
Ambassador said we hoped that the vote would be favorable to 
restoration, but at the very least we would insist that the 
Congress deal with this issue in a solemn, open and 
transparent manner, ensuring open media coverage, debate and 
a roll call vote.  The Ambassador suggested to Lobo that he 
needed to engage on this issue.  Lobo expressed concern that 
the National Congress had scheduled the vote too soon after 
the elections.  He added that if the vote were held on 
December 2, he feared that Congress would reject Zelaya's 
restitution.  He said that it would be far better if Congress 
deliberated more slowly and that the vote happen later in the 
week or early the following week. The Ambassador suggested 
that Lobo encourage congressional leaders and his own 
congressional delegation to support a serious consideration 
of the issue, and added that a public expression of support 
for restitution might be well received internationally. 
¶4. (C) Lobo discussed the possibility that Congress would 
vote to reject Zelaya's return.  He said if this had happened 
it was still in his best interest for Micheletti to not 
return from his temporary absence.  He said he had discussed 
this matter with Chief of Defense General Romeo Vasquez 
Velasquez.  He said he had made his views known but had found 
Vasquez somewhat unsure of what to do, and still somewhat 
loyal to Micheletti.  Both agreed that more lobbying was 
needed to bring key players in support of Micheletti's 
resignation.  The Ambassador agreed to Lobo's request that 
international officials reach out to Micheletti and also help 
convince him and his close advisors to step down.  Lobo 
suggested that we enlist Panamanian President Martinelli and 
said that Micheletti had great respect for Martinelli.  He 
noted that Martinelli was scheduled to visit Honduras on 
December 9.  Lobo and the Ambassador concurred that if 
Micheletti resigned and Zelaya failed to be restored, it was 
still critical to create a government of national unity 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001231  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
consistent with the TSJA to serve in a transition role until 
Lobo and his government assumed office on January 27, 2010. 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador briefed Lobo on Assistant Secretary 
Valenzuela's interest in speaking to him possibly today. 
Lobo welcomed the opportunity to speak with him.  The 
Ambassador also briefed him on his conversation with 
President Arias and Arias' attempts to be supportive of 
Honduras at the Ibero-American Summit in Portugal.  Lobo said 
he had been trying to call Arias and had considered the 
possibility of visiting him in San Jose. 
¶6. (C) Lobo spoke of his interest in dealing with some of the 
major issues confronting Honduras and outlined plans to deal 
with the economic crisis, his commitment to fight crime, and 
improve the educational and health systems.  Lobo said he 
wanted to send a message that he would not tolerate 
corruption and would not hesitate on cracking down on 
powerful individual business and political interests that 
were violating the law.  He also said that he greatly admired 
President Uribe and would hope to emulate his constant 
outreach to the common people, including by convening town 
hall meetings around the country. 
LLORENS