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INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 001651 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM UZ
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN UZBEKISTAN: NOTHING WRONG BUT THE 
BIG PICTURE 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Elections for Uzbekistan's lower house of 
Parliament took place on Sunday, December 27.  Five election 
observation teams from the Embassy visited 33 polling stations in 
Tashkent and the neighboring regions, and concluded that although 
the elections were not free and fair (no opposition political 
candidates were on the ballots), on a technical level they ran 
smoothly.  The only significant abnormalities noted were proxy 
voting and the use of a "mobile ballot box."  The Embassy's views 
align closely with those relayed to us by the head of the 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TAKING "TRAINING WHEELS DEMOCRACY" OUT FOR A SPIN 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The GOU approach to elections is characterized by the 
paternalistic assumption that ordinary Uzbek citizens are not ready 
for real, "no holds barred" democracy.  Accordingly, the 
parliamentary elections are a type of semi-democratic exercise 
wherein the government strictly limits the "variables" and then 
allows the elections themselves to proceed with little apparent 
interference.  After first setting very narrow parameters for 
candidacy and virtually guaranteeing that eventual parliamentarians 
will fully support the executive branch (if not completely agree 
with each other), the GOU made the elections themselves as 
technically correct as possible.  For this reason, election 
observers were welcome to witness the main event, but discouraged 
from analyzing the political situation in the country in the months 
before election day.  (NOTE:  Technically the elections are not 
over as runoffs will take place in 41 constituencies where no 
candidate received 50 percent of the vote.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Embassy election observers noted that although the GOU 
seems to miss the point on the most essential aspects of a 
democratic society, particularly a free press and robust political 
dialogue with opposing viewpoints, it tries to make up for its 
democratic shortcomings by focusing on minute details during the 
elections themselves.  For example, our teams noted each polling 
station had a first aid room staffed by medical professionals, and 
a "mother and child" room, stocked with toys, so that parents can 
comfortably vote without worrying about childcare.  Election 
officials were also proud to show observers their complete array of 
books and pamphlets addressing the rights and privileges of Uzbek 
voters, and their collections of newspapers with election coverage 
and information about the candidates.  More importantly, polling 
station officials generally appeared to be conscientious and 
committed, if not downright enthusiastic.  (One poloff noticed an 
election chairman removing his own eyeglasses and lending them to 
an elderly gentleman who was unable to read the ballot.) 
 
THE FAMILY THAT VOTES TOGETHER . . . 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) The most obvious technical weakness on election day was 
the widespread practice of allowing a single family member to cast 
proxy ballots for all of the eligible voters in the family. 
Evidence of this practice was noted in every polling station that 
embassy observers visited.  In many polling stations, there was not 
even an attempt to conceal this "family voting."  In full view of 
embassy teams, a single voter would present multiple passports at 
the registration point and receive multiple ballots in return.  One 
team observed a single voter stuffing an estimated 30 ballots into 
the ballot box.  In other polling stations, particularly those 
where most people had already voted, observers looked over the 
registration lists and noted long series of identical signatures, 
indicating that a single person had "signed out" numerous ballots. 
Only in a few polling places did election officials attempt to 
conceal the evidence of proxy voting by refusing to issue multiple 
ballots while the embassy's observers were clearly watching. 
(COMMENT:  Emboffs thought that the voters presenting multiple 
passports appeared visibly upset not to receive all of "their" 
ballots, and believe that election officials probably told those 
voters to come back after the embassy team left.  End Comment.) 
Evidence of proxy voting was still apparent on the registration 
lists, though election officials at those locations tried to 
convince embassy observers that very similar handwriting "runs in 
the family." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Aside from the obvious problem that casting multiple votes 
is not consistent with international standards of democracy, as 
well as being illegal under Uzbek election law, ubiquitous proxy 
voting means that voter turnout statistics are grossly inflated. 
Based on our observation, we estimate that each person physically 
present at the polls was casting an average of two to four votes. 
Even some of the Embassy's local staff admitted that they had 
allowed (or asked) their family members to vote for them.  Thus, it 
is safe to estimate that the real voter turnout was below fifty 
 
TASHKENT 00001651  002 OF 003 
 
 
percent, certainly not the officially reported 88 percent. 
However, it is possible that more of those absent family members 
would show up at the polls if the convenient, family-style method 
of voting was not so widely accepted.  Officials clearly felt that 
achieving a high voter turnout was one of their electoral duties, 
motivating them to overlook or even endorse a practice that 
increases their success rate.  Each polling station also boasted a 
"mobile voting box," ostensibly only for the collection of ballots 
from voters confined to their homes due to illness or disability. 
However, our teams believe that "door to door" voting services 
might have been used as another means to boost turnout numbers. 
 
CITY VOTER, COUNTRY VOTER 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) During the run-up to election day, opposition websites 
conducted informal polls in Tashkent that demonstrated Uzbek 
citizens' utter apathy to the parliamentary elections.  And yet, 
our embassy observation teams viewed a considerable amount of 
unfeigned enthusiasm on the big day.  It is simply not possible to 
characterize definitively a single Uzbek attitude toward the 
election process.   Some of the discrepancies between those gloomy 
media reports and our personal impressions may be due to 
differences between the election situation in urban and rural 
areas.  In general, the urban population is more cynical about the 
political situation and more apathetic towards the election 
process.  The Embassy's own local staff mostly falls into the 
latter category; although they are among the most well-informed and 
politically savvy citizens of Uzbekistan, many of them told us they 
did not vote at all.  On the other hand, emboffs who observed the 
elections in rural areas noted that many rural citizens seem to be 
true believers in the Uzbek system. 
 
A CLIMATE OF FEAR, OR A PARTY ATMOSPHERE? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Most impartial international observers, including our 
teams, have concluded that the parliamentary elections were neither 
free nor fair.  However, press reports which alleged that the 
elections took place in a climate of fear are exaggerated.  In 
point of fact, there was no need for the government to discourage 
Uzbeks from voting for the opposition-after all, there were no real 
opposition candidates on the ballot.  (NOTE:  The instructions on 
the ballot clearly stated that if voters either marked multiple 
candidates or did not mark any of the candidates, the ballot would 
not be tallied-so no chance of casting a blank ballot in protest. 
End Note.)  According to our observations, neither was there any 
particular need for citizens to be coerced into voting.  There were 
many polling stations, so voting was not inconvenient, and for many 
(particularly in the rural areas), election day seemed to be a 
social occasion and a welcome break from their routine.  Several of 
the polling stations were playing loud, festive music; one of our 
teams saw a number of people dancing at the polls.  The close-knit 
neighborhood organizations (mahallahs) were actively involved in 
the elections, and prominent members of the community were seen to 
cast their ballots and then nip off for a cup of tea, a plate of 
plov, or a bowl of stew with members of the election commission. 
Members of the election commissions (particularly in rural areas) 
seemed excited to welcome international observers, show off their 
"mother and child" rooms, and then share their traditional Uzbek 
hospitality in the form of tea and food. 
 
¶8. (U) Welcoming eighteen-year-old voters also seemed to be a 
matter of considerable pride at each polling station.  The full 
birth dates of all local residents who were eligible to vote for 
the first time were posted on the registration lists, and several 
of the election commissions had planned a special acknowledgement 
for first-time voters upon registration.  One polling station even 
had small gifts for all young people casting their votes for the 
first time.  Many young voters seemed to be excited to participate 
in the political process. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Our observation teams did not witness any voter 
intimidation, and it seems highly unlikely that intimidation 
tactics are part of the central government's game plan.  (As 
previously noted, the GOU has no need to resort to thuggish 
behavior against voters, since every candidate on every ballot is a 
member of a political party that supports the president.)  However, 
it is possible that intimidation, pressure, and possibly other 
sorts of election fraud may happen within certain electoral 
districts under the direction of local leaders with a particular 
interest in the outcome.  For example, social pressure to 
participate in the polls might be applied to constituents in 
certain districts.  Teachers might feel compelled by their 
supervisors to "volunteer" to assist at the polls.  And of course, 
the previously mentioned technical weaknesses -- family voting and 
 
TASHKENT 00001651  003 OF 003 
 
 
the mobile ballot box -- could be exploited on a local level. 
Before the election, many eligible citizens received text messages 
on their cell phones reminding them that it is their civic duty to 
vote.  One of our local staff told us that someone called his home 
on Sunday afternoon to ask why he had not voted yet; he felt that 
the tone of the call was scolding, but not at all threatening. 
 
OSCE HAS SIMILAR EXPERIENCE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) In a post-election meeting with Ambassador Norland, the 
head of the OSCE Election Assessment Mission Ambassador Jolanda 
Brunetti described the experiences of the 8-person OSCE team. 
(NOTE:  The OSCE did not deploy a full election observation mission 
due to its finding that the current political spectrum does not 
offer a genuine choice between political alternatives.  End Note.) 
The OSCE observers saw family voting at each of the polling 
stations they visited, as well as occasional failures to check for 
valid registration cards.  Brunetti said she saw this not as bad 
faith but simply sloppy implementation of Uzbekistan's own laws and 
procedures.  Overall, she said she observed good organizational 
layout at the polling stations she visited.  Although the elections 
did not meet international standards, Brunetti said progress had 
been made, particularly in comparison with her experience in 
Uzbekistan in the 1990s. 
 
COMMENT:  HAS ANYTHING CHANGED?  WILL ANYTHING CHANGE? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) At his local polling station, President Karimov took the 
opportunity to reiterate to the media that his theory that 
incremental change is the ideal path to democracy, and he held 
Uzbekistan up as a model for the rest of the world even while 
admitting that Uzbek democracy was still a work in progress.  Like 
many regional leaders, Karimov was spooked by the "Color 
Revolutions" and seems determined to ensure that no revolutions 
will ever throw his country into chaos.  His policies suggest that 
he considers stability and security to be among the most desirable 
characteristics of a political system; his preference for strong, 
centralized government is a natural byproduct of his Soviet 
background.  While democracy may be a necessary evil, elections 
present the risk of revolution -- a risk that can be minimized by 
strictly controlling the variables. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Not surprisingly, given the "evolutionary" political 
philosophy of its president, Uzbekistan's progress on the road to 
democracy has been slow -- so slow that the GOU sometimes appears 
to be moving backwards.  However, the political system in 
Uzbekistan does appear to be evolving, albeit at a glacial pace. 
Despite the extremely deliberate process, the political parties 
themselves have shown some encouraging signs of differentiation, 
and debate over social and economic policy has begun to cautiously 
enter Uzbekistan's political sphere.  For the first time, political 
parties have begun to criticize each other, and they seem to be 
gaining confidence in their role as potential shapers of policy. 
This could be a small but important step.  In addition, our 
observers noted that many young people were present at the 
polls-not just as voters, but also as officials and political party 
representatives.  Several of them told us that they were proud to 
be part of the political process and hoped to be candidates 
themselves some day.  As Uzbekistan continues to distance itself 
from its Soviet past, democratization is possible, even if it will 
not come quickly. 
NORLAND