VZCZCXRO9334
PP RUEHRN
DE RUEHC #2604/01 3652120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 312114Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 9000
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 1505
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0228
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0617
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0746
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME PRIORITY 0786
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9309

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 132604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019 
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL DJ ET EU KE SO YM
SUBJECT: PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL SOMALI REFUGEE FLOWS 
 
Classified By: PRM/AFR Director Margaret McKelvey 
 
¶1. (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  In view of likely significant 
refugee outflows from Somalia to neighboring countries in the 
Horn of Africa in early 2010, addressees are requested to 
urgently provide their best advice on how the USG can work 
with host governments, including in consultation with other 
relevant donors, to ensure that reluctant hosts will indeed 
receive fleeing Somalis.  U.S. Mission Geneva is requested to 
urgently engage UNHCR on prepositioning of supplies and 
drawing up funding appeals.  Please see paras. 10 - 13. 
 
¶2. (C)  SUMMARY:  Humanitarian conditions inside Somalia have 
recently taken a notable turn for the worse (even by the 
standards of a conflicted failed state), which is likely to 
generate additional refugees in a region that is already far 
less welcoming to those seeking safety and asylum than it has 
been in the past.  Security and access for humanitarians have 
deteriorated in the areas of south-central Somalia currently 
controlled by the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) al-Shabaab that encompass roughly half of 
the more than three million Somalis judged to be in need of 
food aid to survive.  Al-Shabaab elements have tightened 
control and decreed that the UN World Food Program (WFP) 
should cease distributing foreign food aid as of January 1; 
WFP has pulled back for an undetermined period in view of the 
threats.  Even without the latest al-Shabaab threat, WFP and 
other humanitarian agencies were lacking support from the 
U.S. and other donors owing to terrorism concerns.  Without 
access to humanitarian aid, tens of thousands of Somalis (if 
not more) are expected to move toward Somaliland and Puntland 
as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen.  All of 
these are preoccupied to a degree with their own internal 
struggles as well as drought and can be expected to resist 
new arrivals.  To try to forestall additional violence, loss 
of life, and destabilization, planning for emergency response 
is urgently needed.  End Summary. 
 
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BACKGROUND FACTORS 
------------------ 
¶3. (U)   Somali refugees total an estimated 550,000 persons 
throughout the continent of Africa and beyond, most of whom 
are in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti.  As a protracted 
refugee situation due to Somalia conflict and insecurity 
dating back to the early 1990s, Somalis are now the largest 
group of African refugees, and the outflow from Somalia is 
expected to swell starting early in 2010.  The people of 
south-central Somalia largely live without the protection of 
a working government, and in fear of conflict and food 
insecurity that has already induced increased displacement 
and refugee flows to neighboring countries in 2009.  Most of 
Somalia is rated by U.S. and UN famine early warning systems 
as either highly or extremely food insecure.  Fighting and 
civilian casualties continue in Mogadishu and in other areas 
of south-central Somalia, notably a November 2009 conflict in 
the Afmadow district of Somalia, bordering Kenya, that 
displaced an estimated 2,200 people.  During a September 2009 
monitoring trip to refugee camps in Kenya, refugee program 
officers from State,s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration heard from some Somali new arrivals that they left 
Somalia because of a fear of Al-Shabaab methods/punishments. 
The anti-government and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) Al-Shabaab continues to attempt to impose 
Islamic Sharia law in the parts of southern and central 
Somalia that it controls, including parts of Mogadishu and 
the port city of Kismayo.  Al-Shabaab represents an extreme 
fundamentalist form of Islam and in late 2009 has attempted 
to punish Somali people for listening to music, women for 
wearing bras, and, in recent weeks, has organized a public 
stoning of a teenage female victim accused of adultery 
because she was raped. 
 
¶4. (U)  In 2009, more than 53,000 new Somali refugees arrived 
at the Dadaab Camps in Kenya, with a high of more than 8,000 
new arrivals in January 2009 and a low of approximately 1,200 
during the rainy season month of November 2009.  In Ethiopia, 
Somali new arrivals have averaged about 1,500 refugees per 
month in 2007, 2008 and 2009.  There are an estimated 150,000 
Somali refugees in Yemen where Somalis receive prima facie 
refugee status by the Yemeni Government.  In addition, there 
are more than 11,000 Somali refugees registered with the UN 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Djibouti; however, 
 
STATE 00132604  002 OF 003 
 
 
there are an unknown number of Somalis fleeing violent 
conflict and insecurity to urban areas of Djibouti and who do 
not register with UNHCR as refugees. 
 
¶5. (C)   Expectations for a worsening humanitarian crisis 
strongly suggest that there will be another large outpouring 
of Somalis in early 2010.  Continuing conflict, drought and 
high food prices have resulted in a staggering 3.3 million 
people in Somalia in need of food aid.  Already there are an 
estimated 1.5 million Somali internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) inside of Somalia.  WFP has faced a lack of access to 
populations in need of food aid due to conflict and threats 
to its staff by al-Shabaab in many parts of southern and 
central Somalia throughout 2009.  Most recently, al-Shabaab 
issued a dictate that as of January 1, 2010, no foreign food 
is to be distributed in areas that it controls.  While the 
United States has consistently been the largest provider of 
humanitarian assistance in Somalia, renewal of some U.S. 
humanitarian programs, including provision of food aid 
through WFP, has been delayed while we review conditions on 
the ground to determine how to best deliver humanitarian 
assistance consistent with U.S. policy and law regarding 
possible benefit to an FTO.  The anticipated outflow of 
Somali refugees is considered particularly challenging in 
light of a less welcoming atmosphere for Somali refugees in 
some neighboring countries during 2009. 
 
¶6. (C)  Kenya, host to 300,000 or more Somali refugees, has 
kept its border with Somalia officially closed since January 
2007 -- in violation of its OAU Convention obligations to 
allow asylum seekers to enter -- citing terrorism/security 
concerns.  Somalis have nonetheless been able to continue to 
bribe their way into Kenya, and, incongruously, the 
Government of Kenya (GOK) fingerprints and registers them. 
There are 266,000 mostly Somali refugees in three severely 
overcrowded camps near the Somalia border called the Dadaab 
Camps, and more than 40,000 Somalis in the Kakuma Camp in a 
desert-like environment in northwestern Kenya.  Despite 
multiple diplomatic efforts by the USG, some other donors, 
and UNHCR, the GOK continues to resist establishing a fourth 
camp in Dadaab or to re-open other sites that once housed 
Somali refugees, and has thus far only provisionally agreed 
to an expansion of one of the existing camps.  Kenya had 
proposed creating a so-called safe haven inside Somalia 
itself (Comment:  A non-starter because historically safe 
havens have proven not to work to protect people and there is 
no military force that could be engaged to occupy and secure 
such an enclave.  End Comment.) and/or moving more Somali 
refugees from the Dadaab Camps to Kakuma Camp; however, UNHCR 
considers Kakuma Camp to be about 10,000 refugees away from 
reaching its maximum capacity, especially given the harsh 
arid conditions of the area.  Should Sudan revert to civil 
war as many fear, Kakuma Camp would be needed to help house 
an influx of Sudanese refugees.  Kenyan recruitment of 
refugees to fight inside Somalia has been another challenge 
to humanitarian principles.  Kenya is also experiencing a 
severe drought and its own sharp ethnic conflict with 
2007-2008 post election violence matters still unresolved and 
many observers convinced that another major outbreak of 
communal violence is imminent.  This means that the GOK may 
be both distracted from dealing with the Somalia/Somali 
refugee situation and fearful of more Somali refugees and its 
own Somali population. 
 
¶7. (C)  In Ethiopia, three out of four existing refugee camps 
hosting Somalis are considered by the Government of Ethiopia 
(GOE) to have reached maximum capacity.  The fourth, 
Bokolmayo Camp, is considered to be approximately 10,000 
refugees from capacity.  Ethiopia had been reluctant to 
acknowledge refugee flows into the area around Bokolmayo Camp 
and was not prepared to allow UNHCR to register them until 
2008 as the GOE prepared to withdraw from the war in Somalia. 
 Like Kenya and much of the rest of the Horn, Ethiopia is 
also experiencing a severe drought and food shortages.  This, 
at a time when the GOE has been restricting political space 
and is less receptive to USG criticisms. 
 
¶8. (C)  A modest but steady flow of refugees continue to make 
their way from Somalia to Djibouti.  The Government of 
Djibouti (GODJ) has been less welcoming of Somalis recently, 
with a GROD policy announcement in 2009 to deny young, single 
male Somalis entry to Djibouti even if they claim to be 
seeking asylum.  In November the GODJ forcibly repatriated to 
Mogadishu 43 Somali asylum seekers who were rescued at sea 
and disembarked in Djibouti. 
 
¶9. (C)  Somalis in Yemen are comparatively well received, and 
 
STATE 00132604  003 OF 003 
 
 
this may in fact encourage inflows.  Yemen is increasingly 
viewed as a troubled, fragile state with north-south 
divisions gaining new salience and a heightened rebellion by 
Houthi tribesmen.  Recently some Somalis seeking to cross 
into Saudi Arabia were reportedly impressed by the Houthis 
into fighting against the Government of Yemen (ROYG).  We are 
concerned that Yemen, preoccupied by its own conflicts and 
terrorism threats, may also be a less willing partner on 
refugee response. 
 
--------------- 
ACTION REQUESTS 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  During this time when neighboring countries may be 
less likely to welcome additional Somali refugees, the USG is 
committed to continuing to seek protection for Somali 
refugees.  The top protection concern will be for Somalis to 
be able to access first asylum, including in the Puntland and 
Somaliland regions of Somalia.  The challenge will be to work 
with refugee-hosting governments and localities ahead of time 
to try to prevent denied entry or pushing asylum seekers 
back.  Top assistance concerns for Somali refugees will be 
adequate water and sanitation, requiring agreement from host 
governments for potential sites with available water and 
sufficient space to allow for sanitary conditions.  Other 
assistance elements such as shelter material and non-food 
items, and even food, can and should be prepositioned.  Among 
the range of critical and difficult protection issues, we 
seek to prevent the recruitment and attacks by any of the 
various Somali factions, including in cooperation with host 
government authorities.  Finally, ensuring first asylum and 
funding what will likely be an expensive emergency refugee 
response are both well beyond the means of the USG alone and 
will demand greater multilateral cooperation. 
 
¶11. (C)  For Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and Sana'a: 
Please provide your best advice on how we can help secure 
cooperation from host authorities to plan for arrival of 
additional asylum seekers, and/or their agreement to receive 
asylum seekers humanely when they arrive.  How should the USG 
present the appeal?  Where are the pressure points? 
Recognizing that the Kenyans, for example, have not been 
moved so far by USG offers of help on the border security 
front, are there things that the USG could reasonably offer 
hosts to help secure their agreement?  (Note:  Given that the 
USG has not yet decided how to address humanitarian 
requirements in al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia, 
Emboffs should not/not discuss USG policy on that issue.  End 
Note.)  As we receieve posts' feedback, PRM will develop 
together with posts talking points for communication with 
host governments that will also include information about PRM 
refugee assistance in host countries. 
 
¶12. (C)  For Geneva:  Mission is requested to meet urgently 
with UNHCR staff at an appropriately senior level to discuss 
plans and budgets for increased refugee flows, including 
pressing for urgent prepositioning of non-food items and 
release -- confidentially if need be to avoid raising host 
concerns -- appeals for financial support so that donors can 
have adequate lead time to prepare a response.  The Mission 
is also requested to informally engage missions of the 
largest donors to UNHCR regarding expectations and increased 
funding needs associated with the anticipated refugee 
outflows.  As above, given that the USG has not yet decided 
how to address humanitarian requirements in al-Shabaab 
controlled parts of Somalia, Missionoffs should not/not 
discuss USG policy on that issue. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  For USUN/Rome:  Mission is requested to provide an 
update on WFP planning for refugee feeding efforts, including 
information on the pipeline for the PRROs in Kenya, Ethiopia, 
and Djibouti that cover refugees.  As above, given that the 
USG has not yet decided how to address humanitarian 
requirements in al-Shabaab controlled parts of Somalia, 
Missionoffs should not/not discuss USG policy on that issue. 
 
¶14. (U)  PRM thanks Embassies and Missions in advance for 
responses as soon as possible but no later than January 6. 
PRM Washington POC is Program Officer Janet Deutsch at 
deutschje@state.gov (or deutschje@state.sgov.gov) or 
202-663-1031.  Regional Refugee Coordinator at Embassy Addis 
Ababa is Inga Heemink at heeminki@state.gov or IVG 750-4330. 
CLINTON