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Viewing cable 09STATE130144, GICNT: RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN CONCERNS REGARDING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE130144 2009-12-22 18:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0144 3561808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221802Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 130144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KGIC US
SUBJECT: GICNT: RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN CONCERNS REGARDING 
REVISION TO TERMS OF REFERENCE DOCUMENT 
 
REF: ISLAMABAD 2417 
 
Classified By: ELIOT KANG, REASONS E.O. 13859, 1.4 b,d 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.(U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 3 and 
4. 
2.(C) Department requests Embassy to clarify and reassure 
appropriate senior officials within the Government of 
Pakistan that proposed revisions of the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) original Terms of Reference 
(TOR) document do not in any way attempt to control the 
implementation of military nuclear facilities or activities 
and thus the understanding that Pakistan referenced in its 
2007 letter of endorsement remains valid.  The GICNT is a 
non-binding partnership that does not/not address military 
nuclear programs.  For reference, background on the GICNT is 
found beginning at para 5 and Pakistan's letter of 
endorsement is reproduced at paragraph 9; it contains 
relevant understandings.  End Summary. 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
3.(C/REL GRP) Department requests Embassy to pursue the 
following objectives: 
--Reassure appropriate senior officials within the Government 
of Pakistan that Pakistan,s understanding as stated in its 
2007 letter of endorsement remains valid.  The GICNT is a 
non-binding partnership that does not address military 
nuclear facilities or activities, and the proposed revisions 
to the Terms of Reference will have no effect on this issue. 
--Inform Disarmament Director that the United States and 
Russian Co-Chairs' goal in proposing revisions to the Terms 
of Reference document is to clarify the roles of partners and 
observers, and thereby strengthen and enhance Global 
Initiative implementation.  The proposed revisions do not in 
any way change the original mission or scope of the GICNT, 
which is to enhance international capacities to deter, 
detect, prevent, and if necessary respond to an act of 
nuclear terrorism. 
--Encourage Pakistan to send policy and technical experts to 
the January 19 GICNT Exercise Planning Group in Budapest, 
Hungary, at which the co-chairs aim to discuss proposed 
revisions. 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
4.(U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to 
ISN/WMDT before January 5. 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
5.(U) Launched in July 2006, the mission of the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is to 
strengthen international cooperation and collaboration in 
building national and collective capacities to combat the 
growing threat of nuclear terrorism.  Consistent with its 
commitment to prevent proliferation and combat the threat of 
nuclear terrorism, Pakistan endorsed the GICNT in 2007. 
Partners of the GICNT are committed to a set of principles 
which encompass a broad range of deterrence, prevention, 
detection, and response objectives.  The GICNT is not 
involved in military nuclear programs, nor does it attempt to 
control the implementation of such programs.  Through 
multilateral activities and exercises, partners share best 
practices and lessons learned, particularly with regional 
neighbors, in order to strengthen both individual and 
collective capabilities to combat the threat of nuclear 
terrorism.  To date, over thirty multilateral activities and 
five senior-level GICNT meetings have been conducted, 
resulting in strengthened policies, enhanced information 
sharing techniques, and greater partner nation collaboration. 
 There are 76 partners in the GICNT, as well as four 
observers: the IAEA, EU, INTERPOL, and UNODC.  The USG wishes 
to continue to work with Pakistan as a partner nation within 
the GICNT to combat nuclear terrorism. 
6.  (U) President Obama called for the GICNT to become a 
"durable international institution" (Prague speech, April 
2009).  The U.S. and Russian Co-Chairs welcome strengthening 
the GICNT and are currently revising the Terms of Reference-a 
document which outlines the structure of the GICNT and 
describes the role of partners and observers-to enhance 
implementation of the Initiative.  We expect the revised 
Terms of Reference (TOR) to include activating the 
Implementation and Assessment Group, which would serve as an 
advisory body for strategic and policy-related GICNT issues. 
Once agreed between the Co-Chairs, the proposed revised Terms 
of Reference will be provided to the partnership for review 
(anticipated delivery in late 2009).  We expect the document 
to be discussed at the January 19, 2010 Exercise Planning 
Group Meeting in Budapest, Hungary.  That meeting will serve 
as an opportunity for partners to provide input to shape the 
GICNT into a durable international institution.  We strongly 
encourage Pakistan,s participation in this meeting. 
7.  (C) Per ISLAMABAD 2417, on October 6, Kamran Akhtar, 
Disarmament Director, was briefed on proposed enhanced 
implementation of the GICNT.  He welcomed the updated 
schedule for the Exercise Planning Group, but cautioned that 
Pakistan will want to look carefully at any changes to the 
GICNT TOR.  He asserted that Pakistan joined the Global 
Initiative only after receiving USG assurances that the GICNT 
exception for P-5 military nuclear facilities and activities 
would be extended to Pakistan. 
8.  (C) In the course of discussions between the United 
States and Pakistan in the run-up to Pakistan's endorsement 
of the GICNT in 2007, the United States reassured Pakistan 
that the GICNT did not cover any state,s military nuclear 
facilities or activities, and suggested language concerning 
this issue for Pakistan,s letter of endorsement. 
9.  (C) For reference, Pakistan,s letter of endorsement of 
the GICNT reads as follows: "7 June 2007.  The Embassy of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan presents its compliments to the 
U.S. Department of State and with reference to the telephone 
conversation between His Excellency Ambassador Mahmud Ali 
Durrani and Mr. John Rood, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Security on June 5, 2007 regarding 
Pakistan's endorsement of the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism has the honor to state the following: 
'Pakistan, while endorsing the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism, reaffirms the voluntary commitments of the 
Statement of Principles and declares its understanding that 
the Global Initiative does not cover Pakistan,s military 
nuclear facilities or activities.'  The Embassy of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan avails itself of this 
opportunity to the esteemed U.S. Department of State the 
assurances of its highest consideration."  The note verbale 
was addressed to Mr. Andrew Grant, Acting Director, Office of 
WMD Terrorism. 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
11.  Department greatly appreciates Posts, assistance. 
Cables should be slugged to the Department for ISN/WMDT and 
SCA.  E-mails regarding the GICNT may be sent to 
. 
CLINTON