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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 STATE 126209 
 
SENSITIVE SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM ENRG PREL IAEA NPT MNUC KTBT
SUBJECT: US APPROACH TO 2010 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE 
 
STATE 00126209  001.2 OF 009 
 
 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:   This is an action request 
(see para 11 below).  As we reach the six- 
month mark before the start of the May 2010 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference (NPT RevCon), posts are requested 
to use all appropriate opportunities with host 
government officials and in public diplomacy 
fora to highlight the U.S. commitment to 
strengthening the NPT and overall 
nonproliferation regime.  The year 2009 saw a 
dramatic shift in U.S. nonproliferation and 
arms control policy that reinforces our 
efforts to encourage a constructive, balanced 
review of the NPT next May.  We hope that the 
NPT RevCon will, in turn, give impetus to new 
initiatives and on-going efforts that can 
accelerate and broaden international 
nonproliferation efforts in the ensuing years. 
 
¶2. (U) Outreach to non-nuclear-weapon states 
in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G- 
77, which make up the largest segment of the 
NPT membership, is particularly important.  We 
seek to underline to them and others that the 
United States is fully committed to an 
ambitious arms control and disarmament agenda 
to achieve the peace and security of a world 
without nuclear weapons, to the expansion of 
cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
(consistent with the NPT's nonproliferation 
obligations), to effective verification by the 
IAEA, to full compliance by all states with 
the NPT's nonproliferation obligations, and to 
the universalization of the NPT.  We will work 
to achieve a balanced review of the NPT at the 
2010 RevCon, and urge others to join us in 
this endeavor.  END SUMMARY 
 
CONTEXT 
------- 
 
¶3. (U) The year 2009 marked a dramatic shift 
in U.S. nonproliferation policy.  This shift 
began with President Obama's April 5 speech in 
Prague, in which he stated that the United 
States seeks the peace and security of a world 
without nuclear weapons and, toward this end, 
is working to strengthen the NPT as the basis 
for international cooperation on nuclear 
nonproliferation.  Among other major impacts 
on the global nonproliferation and disarmament 
discussion, the speech helped spur the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to 
adopt a program of work for the first time in 
12 years.  That program of work included 
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty (FMCT), an important element in the 
President's nonproliferation agenda.  The July 
6 U.S.-Russia Summit in Moscow reaffirmed the 
commitment of the United States and Russia to 
seek to finish a START follow-on agreement. 
 
¶4. (U) Alongside the UN General Assembly this 
fall, President Obama chaired an historic UN 
Security Council Summit on Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament; the Council 
Summit unanimously adopted UN Security Council 
Resolution 1887, which endorsed a broad 
framework of actions to reduce global nuclear 
dangers including specific steps to strengthen 
the NPT and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).  Secretary Clinton led U.S. 
participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Article XIV Conference 
on facilitating entry into force of the 
treaty, the first time that the United States 
had attended in ten years.  The UNGA First 
(Disarmament) Committee in October 2009 
provided a forum in which the U.S. again 
demonstrated its commitment to increased 
multilateral engagement on nonproliferation 
and disarmament issues, reducing the number of 
its negative votes from 23 to 10, and in no 
case voting "no" in isolation. 
 
¶5. (U) Looking forward, the United States will 
continue to work with other CD members to try 
 
STATE 00126209  002.2 OF 009 
 
 
to implement the 2009 program of work and 
begin FMCT negotiations promptly when the CD 
convenes on January 18.  Washington expects to 
complete its Nuclear Posture Review early in 
¶2010.  The Nuclear Security Summit in 
Washington on April 12-13, 2010 will provide a 
forum for countries to come to a common 
understanding of the threat posed by nuclear 
terrorism and to recognize that nuclear 
material, whether in civilian or military use, 
should not be vulnerable to that threat. 
 
¶6.  (U) The United States also is engaged in 
an ongoing process of intensive work with the 
defense, intelligence, and scientific 
communities to prepare the ground to seek the 
advice and consent of the Senate to the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); 
we also are working with friends and allies to 
encourage other countries to ratify the CTBT 
and allow it to enter into force.  Finally, 
the NPT RevCon itself will be an opportunity 
for the United States and the other NPT 
parties to reaffirm their commitment to the 
Treaty and its principles, and to agree on 
measures that can be taken to improve 
implementation of the Treaty and strengthen 
the global nonproliferation regime. 
 
NPT BACKGROUND 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The NPT, with nearly 190 States Party, 
is a key element in the global 
nonproliferation regime.  From May 3-28, 2010, 
NPT Parties will meet at the United Nations in 
New York for the 2010 NPT Review Conference 
(RevCon).  The Treaty provides for a 
conference of the Parties every five years "to 
review the operation of this Treaty with a 
view to assuring that the purposes of the 
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are 
being realized."  The Treaty text (which is 
less than 2300 words) can be found at 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm. 
 
¶8. (U) The 2010 RevCon convenes at a time of 
great challenge to the NPT and the broader 
nonproliferation regime.  Although the basic 
bargain of the Treaty remains sound and 
relevant, the regime is challenged, among 
other things, by the failure of a handful of 
NPT Parties - most notably, Iran and the DPRK 
prior to its announcement of its intention to 
withdraw from the NPT - to comply with their 
NPT nonproliferation and IAEA safeguards 
obligations; the growing commercial 
availability of sensitive nuclear technology; 
and weaknesses in the IAEA verification 
system. 
 
¶9. (U) The RevCon is a key opportunity to 
address these challenges, and we would like it 
to reaffirm the Parties' commitment to the 
Treaty and to agree on actions to strengthen 
its implementation.  We seek a balanced RevCon 
that strengthens all three NPT pillars - 
nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful 
uses.  A successful RevCon will not only 
revitalize the Treaty, but also contribute 
valuable momentum to our collective efforts in 
Vienna at the IAEA, in New York at the UN, in 
Geneva at the CD, in capitals, and elsewhere 
to deal with challenges to the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.  Specific U.S. 
objectives are detailed in the talking points 
in para 12 below. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Through the use of these points, we 
seek to: 
 
-- Reach out to NAM and G-77 states that are 
NPT parties, emphasizing our common interests 
in an effective nuclear nonproliferation 
regime and seeking their constructive 
participation and full engagement in order to 
achieve RevCon decisions and outcomes to 
strengthen that regime; 
 
-- Demonstrate the U.S. commitment to its 
disarmament obligations under Article VI of 
the Treaty by highlighting our actions in 
undertaking START follow-on negotiations, 
 
STATE 00126209  003.2 OF 009 
 
 
pursuing a verifiable FMCT in the Conference 
on Disarmament, and working toward U.S. 
ratification of the CTBT; 
 
-- Describe active U.S. efforts to support a 
strengthened NPT in other ways, including by 
providing greater resources for the IAEA and 
strengthening its safeguards system; working 
with others to promote cooperation on peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, consistent with the 
NPT's nonproliferation obligations; and 
working with others to deter abuse of the 
Treaty's withdrawal provision, such as by 
Parties that violate the NPT prior to 
withdrawal. 
 
-- Highlight U.S. leadership in funding and 
promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the 
pillar of most interest to many NPT member 
states in the NAM and G/77; and 
 
-- Avoid allowing the NPT to be overshadowed 
by Middle East nuclear issues.  The 
determination of Egypt and other Arab Parties 
to single out Israel for criticism of its 
nuclear program, while largely ignoring the 
Iran threat, is so strong that it could divert 
attention from our core NPT objectives, which 
include increasing NPT compliance, 
strengthening the IAEA, and preventing abuse 
of the Treaty's withdrawal provisions. 
 
ACTION REQUEST 
 
¶11. (U) Posts are requested to seek 
appropriate opportunities to draw on the 
points in para 12 below for use with host 
governments and in public diplomacy fora. 
Another cable containing more detailed points 
on U.S. activities in support of IAEA 
technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy is forthcoming.  In the coming 
weeks, the Department will make the talking 
points below available in the other official 
UN languages (Arabic, Chinese Mandarin, 
French, Russian, and Spanish). 
 
The point of contact for questions and 
reporting of host country reactions to these 
points is: 
 
William Menold 
ISN/MNSA (202)647-7662 
menoldwi@state.gov 
 
¶12. (U) Begin Text of Talking Points: 
 
-------- 
General: 
-------- 
 
-- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of 
the international nonproliferation regime, and 
the essential foundation for progress towards 
nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
 
-- The NPT entered into force in 1970 for a 
duration of 25 years, with provisions for a 
review conference (RevCon) every five years. 
At the 1995 RevCon, the Parties decided to 
extend the Treaty indefinitely. 
 
-- The basic bargain of the NPT is sound: 
Countries with nuclear weapons will move 
towards disarmament, countries without nuclear 
weapons will not acquire them, and all 
countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. 
 
-- Although this bargain remains sound and 
relevant, the global nonproliferation regime 
is under great stress, challenged by the 
growing commercial availability of sensitive 
nuclear technology, gaps in the IAEA 
verification system and detection, and the 
failure of a handful of states to comply fully 
with their NPT and IAEA safeguards 
obligations. 
 
-- The challenges to the regime never have 
been greater, but neither have been the 
opportunities to address them.  The May 2010 
 
STATE 00126209  004.2 OF 009 
 
 
NPT RevCon is a significant opportunity to do 
so. 
 
-- The United States would like the 2010 
RevCon to reaffirm the Parties' commitment to 
the Treaty and its core principles, and to 
agree on actions that they can take to 
strengthen its implementation. 
 
-- It is especially important that Parties 
avoid allowing their differences to overshadow 
their vital common interest in a strong Treaty 
and regime. 
 
-- As President Obama said in his statement to 
the third NPT PrepCom in May, "we must define 
ourselves not by our differences, but by our 
readiness to pursue dialogue and hard work to 
ensure the NPT continues to make an enduring 
contribution to international peace and 
security." 
 
-- The United States believes that it is very 
important that NPT Parties work together to 
prevent proliferation, including by ensuring 
that there are consequences for violating the 
Treaty. 
 
-- All Parties, including non-nuclear-weapon 
states, have a responsibility to strengthen 
the Treaty system, including by preventing 
further proliferation, helping to foster 
regional security in order to reduce 
proliferation pressures, securing nuclear 
materials against theft or other illicit use, 
contributing constructively to multilateral 
disarmament negotiations, e.g., FMCT, and 
working collectively to enforce compliance 
with the Treaty. 
 
-- The President's ambitious disarmament 
agenda - including negotiating a follow-on 
agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty, negotiating a verifiable Fissile 
Material Cut-Off Treaty, and ratifying the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty - 
demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the 
Treaty's Article VI (on disarmament) and to 
the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. 
 
-- We fully support the right, reflected in 
the NPT, of all Parties to develop the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, consistent 
with the Treaty's nonproliferation 
obligations.  We believe that Parties should 
agree to support measures to facilitate access 
to nuclear energy without increasing the risks 
of proliferation. 
 
----------------- 
Nonproliferation: 
----------------- 
 
Strengthening NPT Compliance 
---------------------------- 
 
-- It is essential that all Parties fully 
comply with the Treaty's provisions. 
Otherwise, the confidence necessary for 
Parties to take measures to strengthen the NPT 
further will be eroded, with dire consequences 
for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
 
-- President Obama stated in his April 2009 
Prague speech that there must be "real and 
immediate consequences for countries caught 
breaking the rules." 
 
-- Unfortunately, we know that some Parties - 
including Iran and North Korea - have broken 
the Treaty's rules.  NPT Parties that violate 
their Treaty obligations must come back into 
compliance. 
 
-- The United States believes that NPT Parties 
should agree on the importance of enforcing 
compliance with the NPT's nonproliferation 
obligations, and of taking actions to ensure 
that Treaty violators face consequences for 
their violations. 
 
Abuse of NPT Withdrawal Provision (Art. X) 
 
STATE 00126209  005.2 OF 009 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
-- The United States and other NPT Parties 
have raised concerns about abuse of the 
Treaty's withdrawal provision to pursue 
nuclear weapons programs prohibited by the 
Treaty. 
 
-- The importance of this issue was reflected 
in its inclusion in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1887, which was adopted unanimously 
by the UN Security Council Summit on Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament chaired by 
President Obama on September 24, 2009 on the 
margins of this year's UN General Assembly. 
 
-- In UNSCR 1887, the Council undertakes to 
address any State's notice of withdrawal from 
the NPT, and affirms that a State remains 
responsible under international law for 
violations of the NPT committed prior to its 
withdrawal. 
 
-- We fully recognize that the Treaty 
enshrines in Article X the sovereign right to 
withdraw from the Treaty if a State Party 
decides that extraordinary events related to 
the subject matter of the Treaty have 
jeopardized its supreme national interests. 
 
-- The United States fully supports that 
provision. 
 
-- We want to be clear that we have no 
intention to seek to amend the Treaty. 
 
-- However, Parties to the NPT have every 
right to consider the ramifications for their 
individual and collective security of such a 
withdrawal, including cases in which a state 
has breached its Treaty obligations prior to 
withdrawal and continues to benefit from 
technology acquired while it was a party. 
 
-- We strongly believe that NPT Parties should 
come together to develop effective mechanisms 
to dissuade both the violations and any 
subsequent withdrawal, and to ensure that 
materials and equipment previously provided in 
accordance with peaceful use obligations are 
not used to develop nuclear weapons. 
 
Supporting the IAEA 
------------------- 
 
-- We are committed to ensuring that the IAEA 
has the resources that it needs to accomplish 
its mission.  Parties must work together to 
strengthen the Agency's safeguards system, 
which is the Treaty's major tool for verifying 
compliance with the NPT's peaceful use 
undertakings and that peaceful nuclear energy 
programs are not diverted to nuclear weapons. 
 
-- The IAEA's vital mission is expanding 
faster than its resources, and its safeguards 
responsibilities now require it to gather and 
assess a wide range of information to detect 
not only diversion of declared nuclear 
material, but also the presence of any 
undeclared nuclear material and activities. 
 
Safeguards Agreements and the Additional 
Protocol 
---------------------------------------- 
 
-- In addition, the IAEA cannot do its job 
without the necessary legal authorities.  We 
urge all NPT Parties that have not yet brought 
into force the "comprehensive" safeguards 
agreement required by Article III of the NPT 
to do so as soon as possible. 
 
-- As the IAEA's experiences in Iraq 
demonstrated, and as we see in other cases 
today, comprehensive safeguards agreements 
alone are not sufficient to detect undeclared 
nuclear material and activities. 
 
-- With that in mind, the IAEA and its Member 
States have adopted the Additional Safeguards 
Protocol.  The Protocol is an essential 
element of the nonproliferation regime. 
 
STATE 00126209  006.2 OF 009 
 
 
-- It is critical that all Parties work 
together to make the Protocol universal.  We 
urge all states that have not yet done so to 
negotiate and bring into force an Additional 
Protocol as soon as possible. 
 
-- The U.S. Protocol entered into force on 
January 6, 2009, and we are in the process of 
implementing its provisions. 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
-- The United States continues to fully 
support a Middle East free of all weapons of 
mass destruction and the means of their 
delivery. 
 
-- Indeed, we fully support all of the 
objectives of the Resolution on the Middle 
East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference 
(which includes a call for a Middle East WMD 
free zone), and will continue to work with all 
states, within and outside the region, towards 
implementing the Resolution's objectives at 
the earliest possible date. 
 
-- We believe that a Middle East free of all 
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
systems is an achievable goal, but it will not 
happen overnight, or without a concerted 
effort by the international community to make 
it a reality. 
 
-- However, we recognize that such goals can 
be achieved only in the context of progress 
towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East, and evidence that Iran and Syria are 
fully implementing and upholding the existing 
international agreements to which they are 
parties. 
 
-- The United States urges all states to take 
practical and concrete steps, in a 
constructive and collaborative manner, to 
remove the obstacles to achieving this goal. 
 
-- The United States long has supported 
universal adherence to the Treaty.  We 
continue to urge all non-parties to join the 
Treaty and to accept full-scope safeguards by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, as 
required by the Treaty. 
 
Nuclear Security 
---------------- 
 
-- The possibility that terrorists might 
acquire a nuclear weapon is the most immediate 
and extreme threat to global security. 
Consequently, the challenge of accounting for 
and physically securing nuclear materials and 
facilities has become an even higher priority 
for the international community. 
 
-- The United States will seek support from 
others to implement President Obama's proposal 
for a new international effort to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear material around the world. 
As part of this effort, we will host a Global 
Summit on Nuclear Security next April. 
 
-- We seek to elevate this issue on the 
international agenda and set new standards, 
expand our cooperation with Russia, and pursue 
new partnerships to lock down these sensitive 
materials. 
 
------------ 
Disarmament: 
------------ 
 
-- President Obama has committed the United 
States to take concrete steps towards a world 
without nuclear weapons, the goal envisioned 
under the NPT's Article VI provision, which 
states:  "Each of the parties to the Treaty 
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament 
 
STATE 00126209  007.2 OF 009 
 
 
under strict and effective international 
control." 
 
-- To this end, the United States is 
negotiating a START follow-on agreement with 
the Russian Federation; is pursuing 
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty; and has pledged its support for 
negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament 
end to verifiably end the production of 
fissile materials for nuclear weapons. 
 
-- We urge other states to identify and 
implement practical steps that they might take 
to support their Article VI obligations. 
 
START 
----- 
 
-- The President said in Prague that:  "We 
will seek a new agreement [to replace the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] by the end of 
the year that is legally binding and 
sufficiently bold~  This will set the stage 
for further cuts, and we will seek to include 
all nuclear weapon states in this endeavor." 
 
-- In Moscow on July 6, 2009, President Obama 
and Russian President Medvedev signed a Joint 
Understanding setting forth key elements of a 
follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START). 
 
-- The United States and Russia have been 
intensively negotiating the new treaty as 
Presidents Obama and Medvedev stated when they 
met in Singapore in early November. 
 
-- This agreement will lay a foundation and 
set the stage for deeper nuclear reductions in 
the future. 
 
CTBT 
---- 
 
-- The permanent and legally binding cessation 
of all nuclear weapon test explosions 
constitutes another meaningful step towards 
nuclear disarmament, and long has been a goal 
of NPT Parties. 
 
-- President Obama confirmed in Prague that 
the United States will pursue U.S. 
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test- 
Ban Treaty (CTBT).  We have commissioned a 
study by the National Academy of Sciences that 
addresses the technical advances that have 
occurred during the ten years since the United 
States Senate declined to give its advice and 
consent to the CTBT in 1999.  We continue to 
consult with the scientific, defense, and 
intelligence communities to address relevant 
issues related to reconsideration of the CTBT 
by our Senate.  We also will launch - and 
encourage your support for - a diplomatic 
effort to bring on board the other states 
whose ratifications are required for the 
treaty to enter into force. 
 
-- Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, 
the United States reaffirms its moratorium on 
nuclear testing, and calls on other states to 
do likewise. 
 
FMCT 
---- 
 
-- The United States is seeking a new treaty 
that verifiably ends the production of fissile 
materials intended for use in nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices - a Fissile 
Material Cut-Off Treaty - which is another 
long-standing international objective. 
 
-- Following the President's Prague speech, 
for the first time since 1998, the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva reached 
consensus in May 2009 on a program of work 
that included negotiations on an FMCT. 
Although procedural objections by one CD 
member state precluded the start of such 
negotiations in 2009, the United States is 
 
STATE 00126209  008.2 OF 009 
 
 
working with members of the CD to try to 
ensure that negotiations can begin when the CD 
convenes for its 2010 session on January 18. 
 
-- Pending the successful negotiation and 
entry into force of an FMCT, the United States 
reaffirms its decades-long unilateral 
moratorium on the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons, and calls on 
others that have yet to do so to join us. 
 
U.S. Nuclear Reductions 
----------------------- 
 
-- The United States continues to make 
extraordinary progress in reducing its 
stockpile of nuclear weapons, strategic 
delivery systems, fissile materials for 
weapons, and the associated nuclear weapons 
infrastructure. 
 
-- We have dismantled more than 13,000 
warheads since 1988.  Under current plans, the 
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile by 2012 will be 
less than 25 per cent of its 1991 total, and 
at its lowest level since the 1950s. 
 
-- The United States has reduced the number of 
operationally-deployed nuclear weapons from 
approximately 10,000 in 1991 to approximately 
2,250 as of December 31, 2008. 
 
-- The United Stated has dismantled more than 
3,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, removed 
all such weapons from surface ships and 
aircraft, and reduced their deployment in 
support of NATO in Europe by 90 percent from 
the peak of the Cold War. 
 
-- To date, the United States has declared 374 
tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 61.5 
tons of plutonium (Pu) excess to nuclear 
weapons needs and removed that material from 
the weapons inventory - enough material, based 
on the IAEA definition of significant 
quantities of nuclear materials, to produce 
more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. 
 
ONLY If asked about the Nuclear Posture Review 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
-- The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is 
authorized by the U.S. Congress periodically. 
It will analyze the role of nuclear weapons in 
our national security strategy, the size and 
composition of nuclear forces necessary to 
support that strategy, and the steps necessary 
to maintain a safe, secure, and effective 
nuclear deterrence posture for the next 5-10 
years. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: 
-------------------------------- 
 
-- The U.S. strongly supports the NPT's 
Article IV provisions affirming "the 
inalienable right of all the parties to the 
Treaty to develop research, production and use 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with 
Articles I and II~" and that "All the parties 
to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and 
have the right to participate in, the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy...." 
 
-- Peaceful uses of nuclear energy include 
programs that apply nuclear science and 
technology to advance human and economic 
development needs, including:  food safety, 
nutrition, disease prevention, medical 
diagnostic and therapeutic capacities, and 
water resource management. 
 
-- The United States is the largest 
contributor to the IAEA's peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy and technical cooperation 
programs.  We continue to explore possible 
areas in which we can expand and deepen our 
support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in 
ways that can benefit the most vulnerable, 
 
STATE 00126209  009.2 OF 009 
 
 
particularly in the areas of cancer diagnosis 
and treatment, disease prevention, and potable 
water and food security. 
 
-- The President's commitment to ongoing 
support of peaceful uses is reflected in the 
continuation of our long-held status as the 
leading funder of peaceful uses programs in 
the IAEA. 
 
-- Peaceful uses also include efforts to 
promote nuclear power and enhance the safe use 
and handling of nuclear material. 
 
-- If deployed with the highest possible 
standards of safety, security, and 
nonproliferation, nuclear energy will play an 
essential role in combating climate change, 
while advancing peace and promoting 
sustainable development worldwide. 
 
-- The need for a new framework is ever 
growing, as more and more countries express 
interest in new civil nuclear power programs. 
At last count, more than 60 states had 
expressed some level of interest in 
introducing civil nuclear power into their 
energy mix. 
 
-- These "nuclear newcomers" will be faced 
with many challenges in establishing the 
robust infrastructures necessary for the safe, 
secure, and safeguarded deployment of nuclear 
energy and its applications. 
 
-- In response to the growing interest in 
civil nuclear power, advanced nuclear states 
rapidly are expanding infrastructure 
development programs with newcomer states. 
 
-- For example, the United States and others 
are providing assistance with the development 
of necessary legal infrastructure to ensure 
that civilian uses of nuclear technology will 
be properly regulated, and will incorporate 
the highest international safety and security 
standards. 
 
-- Worldwide expansion of nuclear power must 
not be accompanied by a dramatically increased 
threat of nuclear proliferation. 
 
-- Any successful, broadly supported approach 
must assure countries expanding or embarking 
on nuclear power programs that they will have 
reliable access to peaceful nuclear 
technologies and fuel services and - at the 
same time - must serve the international 
community's collective security interest in 
avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons 
production capabilities. 
 
-- In his Prague speech, President Obama 
declared:  "We should build a new framework 
for civil nuclear cooperation, including an 
international fuel bank, so that countries can 
access peaceful power without increasing the 
risks of proliferation.  That must be the 
right of every nation that renounces nuclear 
weapons, especially developing countries 
embarking on peaceful programs." 
 
-- We are working with the IAEA and others to 
pursue these goals and concepts, such as 
international fuel cycle centers (as proposed 
by Russia), and reliable fuel supply 
assurances. 
 
-- Over time, these arrangements can be 
broadened to include not only fuel banks, but 
international enrichment centers, fuel 
fabrication cooperation, fuel-leasing 
approaches, and spent fuel take-back and 
management schemes. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS. 
CLINTON