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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
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UNCLAS STATE 122725 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL AORC KPAO PTER UNSC EUN RS CA UK FR NO
SUBJECT: PROMOTING SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1540 VOLUNTARY FUND 
 
REF: A. EXPERTS INPUT -- VOLUNTARY FUND 
     ¶B. USUN 769 
     ¶C. BERLIN 1412 
     ¶D. EMAIL 9/16 WUCHTE/GORDON -- REPLY LAVROV PROPOSAL 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request for Moscow, P3 Embassies 
(London and Paris), the European Union Council and 
Commission, which participate in the G8 Nonproliferation 
Directors Group (NPDG), as well as Norway -- see paras 7 and 
10 to be left as non-papers.  For USUN, see para 12, for 
Ottawa, see para 13, and Moscow see also para 14. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1540 was adopted in April 2004, and has served as an 
important new international standard for all States regarding 
the establishment of controls on chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons, related materials, and their means of 
delivery.  UNSCR 1540 has thus become a critical component of 
international efforts to prevent terrorists and other actors 
from obtaining WMD-related materials.  Much of the initial 
effort of the Security Council's 1540 Committee was 
organizational, e.g., agreeing on rules of procedure, 
selecting its eight independent experts, and agreeing on how 
it should carry out its mandate.  Since then, the Committee 
has spent much of its time encouraging States to submit 
country reports detailing the steps they have taken or intend 
to take to implement the myriad provisions of UNSCR 1540 and 
reviewing such reports. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) UNSCR 1810 extended the 1540 Committee's mandate to 
2011, requested the 1540 Committee consider options for 
developing and making more effective existing funding 
mechanisms, and directed the Committee report to the Council 
no later than December 31, 2008.  The report was delivered on 
March 31, 2009, to the UN Security Council.  But for a lack 
of funding, the Committee is now well positioned to fulfill 
its mandate. 
 
¶4. (SBU) To date, the United States, European Union, and 
Norway are the primary states that have offered to donate 
funds to resource 1540 Committee activities.  There have been 
5 other less significant donors (Denmark, Andorra, Spain, UK, 
and New Zealand) to the current UN Office of Disarmament 
Affairs Trust Fund, the identified source of funds to support 
1540 Committee activities, despite efforts to generate more 
robust resourcing as the scope of activities increased. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Many States have requested assistance to enable 
them to implement (and report on) Resolution 1540.  While 
many other States and international organizations have come 
forward to offer such assistance, the overall response has 
been slow in meeting the capacity building needs identified 
through contributions and outreach. Since this process began, 
the 1540 Committee has reported on the need to intensify 
assistance efforts and has participated in a series of 
workshops to understand emerging assistance needs.  Based on 
discussions with Committee member states during deliberations 
on the Committee's renewal in 2008, the United States 
proposed that the Committee have access to funds it could 
deploy to: 1) help states ascertain their own needs with 
regard to identifying proliferation risks; 2) help states 
create mechanisms to prevent and/or interdict the transfer of 
WMD in or through their territories; and 3) help states with 
bilateral or multilateral programs designed to stem attempted 
transfers and capture and punish violators. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) On September 30, the U.S. proposed at the UN 
establishing a 1540 Voluntary Fund to assist with the 
resolution's implementation.  Such a fund would complement 
existing U.S. efforts to combat proliferation by facilitating 
the provision of direct technical assistance by the Committee 
to states that have the will but not the capacity to 
implement 1540 and are not receiving assistance from the U.S. 
or other donors, thereby helping close loopholes that 
encourage attempts to move prohibited WMD and associated 
delivery system items through weak links in the global export 
control architecture. 
 
---------- 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Washington requests action Posts emphasize the 
following objectives and leave as a non-paper the following 
points.  Post is also requested to provide a copy of Ref A, 
which are possible projects the 1540 Committee Experts Panel 
has identified for a new 1540 voluntary fund: 
 
-- The United States believes a strengthened 1540 regime must 
include increased stakeholder participation in the 1540 
Committee by a broad community of assistance-providers. 
 
-- In furtherance of this goal, the United States has 
proposed a 1540 Voluntary Fund be established under UN 
auspices to 1) help states ascertain their own needs in 
regard to identifying proliferation risks; 2) help states 
create mechanisms to prevent and/or interdict the transfer of 
WMD in or through their territories; and 3) help states 
sustain mature bilateral or multilateral programs designed to 
stem attempted transfers and capture and punish violators. 
We are informally providing more detailed ideas on the 
proposed fund's modalities. 
 
-- We recognize from the Comprehensive Review that the 
existing 1540 assistance mechanism needs better alignment 
with both providers of assistance and those seeking to build 
capacity, but we must stress that only a new voluntary fund 
will permit the broad political buy-in to overcome the myth 
of &western8 or &northern8 imposition of terms regarding 
nonproliferation.  Moreover, only a new voluntary fund will 
permit the flexibility necessary to implement the 
nonproliferation goals specified in 1540 in a timely fashion. 
 By definition, the fund currently maintained by the Office 
of Disarmament Affairs is slotted, in part, for 
'disarmament8 issues.  This creates unnecessary confusion 
that detracts from the implementation of resolution 1540,s 
nonproliferation goals. 
 
-- The United States is prepared to make an initial 
contribution to a 1540 voluntary fund and to encourage other 
countries, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) to offer matching, 
robust contributions. 
 
-- We recognize that &robust8 contributions will vary 
case-by-case, but will encourage all member states to 
participate, particularly those located in Latin America, the 
Middle East, and Asia, along with the traditional Western 
European and Others Group (WEOG) donor countries. 
 
-- Establishing such a fund with global donor participation 
would empower the 1540 Committee with appropriate resources 
to assist requester states in implementing the resolution. 
As Pakistan noted at the recent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament, some countries 
prefer to work more directly through the multilateral 
framework of the UN rather than bilaterally.  The fund 
provides such a mechanism for developing and carrying out 
appropriate projects. 
-- The 1540 Voluntary Fund is not intended to duplicate 
ongoing capacity-building programs, whether bilateral or 
multilateral.  Instead, it would allow the UN to have a 
complementary ability to facilitate and organize assistance. 
The fund is not intended to develop more workshops and 
outreach, but to address individual country needs. 
Eventually, the fund could enable larger-scale projects 
through UN)led coordination, an extended G8 Global 
Partnership, or other means. 
-- Once we receive your input, we plan to introduce the 
attached draft letter and illustrative list of Committee 
Experts Panel inputs as a joint U.S.-Russian proposal for 
achieving a voluntary fund consistent with Russia's proposal 
for bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540.  Support for 
establishing this fund is consistent with our recommendation 
to Russia to promote multilateral cooperation through 
U.S.-Russia bilateral efforts. 
 
-- For Moscow only:  Underscore with Moscow that we would 
welcome joint U.S.-Russian cooperation in achieving a 
voluntary fund consistent with Russia's proposal for 
bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540 as suggested in the March 
2009 Lavrov-Clinton letter.  Support for establishing this 
fund is consistent with our recommendation to promote 
multilateral cooperation through our bilateral efforts. 
Ultimately, we wish to introduce the voluntary fund among the 
G-8 as a U.S.-Russia bilateral initiative. 
 
--For P3 and EU Council/Commission only:  We wish to hold 
consultations on long-term Committee outreach funding before 
the end of the year as discussed in Berlin regarding the next 
EU Joint Action to support UNSCR 1540 (see Ref A para 7).  We 
are introducing this proposal simultaneously with Russia as 
we seek inputs. 
 
-- For Paris only:  France's suggestion to hold a 1540 donor 
conference in proximity to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Review Conference has merit and would be helpful in focusing 
on more funding.  We will work with France to make this a 
success.  Also, we draw attention to the complementary 
relationship between G-8 Global Partnership commitments and 
the 1540 Voluntary Fund as explained in the attached 
nonpaper. 
 
-- For Oslo:  As proposed in March 2007, we are prepared to 
work further with Norway on its suggestion to establish a 
like-minded group of friends on UNSCR 1540.  Our emphasis 
would be to build on the Norwegian recommendation to 
encompass both assistance providers as well as those 
requesting assistance. 
 
------------------ 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (U) Posts are requested to deliver the above points NLT 
the week of December 4 and report results NLT December 11, 
¶2009. 
 
---------- 
NON-PAPERS 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Please provide the texts in para 10 below as a 
non-paper draft letter from U.S. and Russia for recipients, 
comments.  (Note to Posts -- please underscore.  Once we hear 
back from recipients, and receive agreement from Russia with 
whom we are consulting separately, we intend to share this 
non-paper as a U.S.-Russia initiative with all G8 countries, 
the European Union, and Norway. End note to Posts) This is 
not intended to be an exclusive group.  Rather, these are the 
major stakeholders who have contributed either directly or 
in-kind to the 1540 Committee infrastructure and/or outreach 
to date. 
 
 
¶10.  (U) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER: EXPLAINING THE VOLUNTARY 
FUND 
 
 
As you know, on 28 April 2004, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter, obliging States to refrain 
from supporting by any means non-State actors from 
developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, 
transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and their delivery systems.  To this end, 
Resolution 1540 imposes binding obligations on all States to 
establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of 
delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over 
related materials.  Recognizing the extent of the effort that 
implementing the resolution requires, the Security Council 
invited States &to offer assistance, as appropriate, in 
response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal 
and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience 
and/or resources8 in order to fulfill the provisions of the 
resolution. 
 
Many States have requested such assistance, and while many 
other States and international organizations have come 
forward to offer such assistance, the overall response needs 
better alignment among both providers of assistance and those 
seeking to build capacity.  Since this process has begun, the 
Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 has participated 
in a series of meetings to understand emerging assistance 
needs.  The United States is strongly committed to 
establishing a voluntary fund to help provide the technical 
support and expertise to support implementation of Resolution 
¶1540.  We will seek to make a meaningful contribution to such 
a trust fund once it is established, provided it contains 
effective transparency and accountability mechanisms.  We are 
prepared to work with the 1540 Committee and others to make 
that happen. 
 
The 1540 Committee agreed March 27, 2009 on a Chairman's 
paper (available on the UN 1540 Committee homepage) that 
outlines how to use the existing UN funding mechanisms and 
the current basis for coordinating donor fund activities. 
The United States believes the low number of contributors to 
the &UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament 
Activities8 stems from its broad focus and lack of direct 
ties to UNSCR 1540.  An entirely separate 1540 Voluntary Fund 
was proposed at the Comprehensive Review.  The United States 
sees this fund as the best complement to fully support the 
role of the 1540 Committee.  The 1540 Committee and all 
contributors to the Fund could provide input into the choice 
of projects supported by such a Voluntary Fund and their 
implementation.  While the 1540 Voluntary Fund would seek to 
work on the basis of consensus, no State or other contributor 
could veto the use of any funds other than its own.  The 
United States has determined that this would be a more 
effective mechanism than the UN Trust Fund for Global and 
Regional Disarmament Activities managed by UN Office of 
Disarmament Affairs.  That latter fund is suitable for 
coordinating outreach, but is not structured or staffed for 
the representative projects aimed at facilitating assistance 
outlined in inputs from the Committee Experts Panel ) this 
list is attached. 
Although the specific operation of any such 1540 Voluntary 
Fund would require careful discussion by the Committee, the 
principles to guide that discussion should include:  1) all 
contributions would be voluntary; 2) any State or other body 
may submit a proposal or contribute to the fund; 3) the Fund 
would consider the proposals on a case-by-case basis and use 
its existing tools, such as the matrix and assistance 
template, or other mechanisms it deems appropriate, in its 
deliberations on the proposed projects; 4) all contributors 
and representatives of the Fund with the 1540 Committee could 
provide input into the choice of projects supported by the 
Voluntary Fund and their implementation as appropriate; 5) 
while the Committee would seek consensus, no State or other 
contributor could veto the use of any funds other than its 
own; 6) projects identified through the Voluntary  Fund for 
further consideration could focus on increasing the capacity 
of States to build their infrastructure to implement the 
obligations of the resolution, particularly in areas not 
covered by existing assistance projects and that, where 
appropriate, also promote economic and social development of 
the project participants; 7) the Committee would encourage 
first projects that come from those offering and those 
requesting assistance as already identified to the 1540 
Committee; 8) the Committee would emphasize transparency, 
inclusion, and fairness in its deliberations and 
decision-making in supporting projects for the fund; and 9) 
the Committee would look to existing UN financial mechanisms 
and requirements, such as those used by other UN Trust Funds, 
to manage financial and other administrative aspects of the 
fund, permitting the Committee to focus on strategic and 
other policymaking matters for the fund. 
The United States and Russia believe that by working 
together, contributors and those seeking assistance can avoid 
duplication and other inefficiencies, while devoting more 
time and resources to their most critical concerns. 
 
Below are frequently asked questions about various aspects of 
the issue that perhaps are not fully understood. 
 
¶1.  Why are a more robust Committee role and resources needed 
as States more finely tune requests for assistance? 
 
A:  From existing 1540 work, Committee Experts estimated that 
there are about 15 non-Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD)/developing states with a biological 
infrastructure of interest, 50 with chemical infrastructure, 
about 50 with a nuclear infrastructure, and about 100 with 
some relevant trade infrastructure.  These states would be 
most in need of capacity-building through the Committee's 
assistance mechanisms.  The cost to move a typical lower 
middle income country with an extant export control 
infrastructure to a sustainable and enforceable system is 
several million dollars and frequently outstrips its 
dedicated national budget resources.   This estimate does not 
include associated requirements for border security programs 
and related equipment.  Given the disproportionate impact of 
the global economic crisis on lower middle income countries, 
additional resources are required to conduct the required 
activities in terms of customs, physical security, and 
legislation, as well as other critical areas. 
¶2. How will the Voluntary Fund be structured to complement 
the current UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA) fund? 
A:  We view the Piracy Fund, Counterterrorism Executive 
Directorate (CTED) Fund, and/or Democracy Fund as relevant 
models for aspects of the structure of the 1540 fund and will 
quickly verify the most appropriate vehicle, as proposed in 
the 1540 Comprehensive Review.  Building on our existing G8 
coordination, we will reach out to interested countries to 
create a like-minded group to focus on issues regarding 
establishment, management, and coordination as originally 
proposed by Norway in 2007.  We envision that the fund will 
be established and managed under UN auspices but with a board 
outside of the Committee itself.  The 1540 Voluntary Fund 
would be a &multi-donor trust fund.8 
¶3. How much money would the U.S. provide to the Voluntary 
Fund?  For how long? 
 
A:  We have stated that we will provide a &meaningful 
contribution8 for the Fund's start-up from the United States 
in the coming year.  We expect the fund would exist so long 
as the 1540 Committee continues to exist. 
 
¶4. What is the difference between the G-8 Global Partnership 
and the 1540 Voluntary Fund? 
 
A:  The G-8 Global Partnership (GP) is a ten-year, $20 
billion initiative in which 22 countries and the European 
Union seek to limit the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction.  In its initial years, the GP focused on 
chemical weapons destruction and nuclear submarine 
dismantlement in Russia and Ukraine.  In 2008, the GP agreed 
to expand its focus to WMD issues worldwide.  The United 
States believes that under an expanded G-8 Global 
Partnership, partners should count any funds spent on any 
activities supporting the principles established at the 2002 
G-8 Kananaskis Summit, including 1540 Voluntary Fund 
commitments, toward their GP pledges.  In 2010, the partners 
expect to discuss extending the GP beyond its current 2012 
mandate, and the United States believes 1540 Voluntary Fund 
commitments should be included as part of any pledges for GP 
extension as well. 
 
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER 
 
¶11.  (SBU) USUN only.  The Committee only reached consensus 
on a robust Program of Work and the commitment to conduct a 
Comprehensive Review by the end of 2009 because of USG 
intervention during our Presidential Inauguration Weekend to 
insist on working groups to get delegations more involved 
beyond the panel of experts.  Both agreements finally provide 
the basis to implement a funding plan for assistance.  The 
four Committee-led working groups on the monitoring of 
implementation, the provision of assistance, cooperation 
among regional and intergovernmental organizations, and the 
coordination of transparency and outreach have been very 
successful.  The 1540 Committee, however, is still not well 
positioned to obtain new funding streams quickly; there are 
staffing shortages in New York (both in national delegations 
and in the Secretariat) that have delayed full-time 
implementation solely through UN delegations. See Ref B. 
 
12 (U) Requested USUN action: 
 
-- Indicate that, as a next step, the Committee (along with 
the 8 experts) should review the current program of work to 
address integration of greater long-term funding.  (Note: 
Per Ref B we do not believe that a sufficiently detailed cost 
analysis has been provided by USUN on the staffing shortages 
addressed by UN ODA.  End note.) 
 
-- Please submit to Washington recommendations on integrating 
long-term funding. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) For Ottawa only:  (Per Ref C) We are committed to 
an effective G8 1540 process with a follow on expert-level 
meeting among G8 1540 referents before the Nuclear Security 
Summit in April 2010.  We plan to introduce to the G8 the 
fund proposal as a joint U.S.-Russian cooperation in 
achieving a voluntary fund consistent with Russia's desire 
for bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540.  Joint support for 
establishing this fund is consistent with our recommendation 
to Russia to promote multilateral cooperation through 
U.S.-Russia bilateral efforts.  The United States looks 
forward to cooperating with Canada. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) For Moscow only:  Per Ref D, we responded to FM 
Lavrov,s March 2009 letter proposing bilateral cooperation 
on UNSCR 1540 by indicating our desire to promote 
multilateral cooperation through our bilateral efforts.  Post 
should seek Russia's agreement on introducing the voluntary 
fund among the G-8 as a U.S.-Russia bilateral initiative, 
seek Russian inputs to our draft letter in para 10, and pulse 
the GOR,s willingness to make a contribution to the 
voluntary fund if and when it is established. 
 
¶15.  Further questions or information on UNSCR 1540 can be 
directed to Tom Wuchte, U.S. 1540 Coordinator, at 
(202-736-4275, WuchteTA@state.gov).  Department appreciates 
Post's assistance. 
CLINTON