VZCZCXRO9253
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0706 3511549
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171549Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6540
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: RECALIBRATING MACEDONIA POLICY 
 
REF: SOFIA 000511 
 
Classified By: Classified by CDA Susan Sutton for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Bulgaria added a new wrinkle to its 
long-standing policy of support for Macedonia's EU/NATO 
accession when, in November, PM Borissov proposed to his 
Macedonian counterpart that the two countries sign an update 
to a 1999 joint agreement on bilateral relations.  Our 
contacts insist Bulgaria will not become an outright obstacle 
to Macedonia's integration even if it does not sign the 
agreement, but we detect a growing quid pro quo undercurrent 
in our discussions with members of the new government.   The 
document addresses a host of Bulgarian complaints about what 
Sofia sees as Skopje's reluctance to engage in "good 
neighborly relations."  Our contacts claim that signature 
would "guarantee" Bulgaria's "unconditional" support for 
Macedonia, but we are not so sure.  It is evident that the 
new government is recalibrating its Macedonia policy and it 
is not clear whether simple signature -- or actual 
implementation -- is what Sofia is after.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BORISSOV OUTLINES CLEAR PATH FOR UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C) PM Borissov met his Macedonian counterpart in Sofia 
November 16 at PM Gruevski's request.  Borissov's foreign 
policy adviser described the short meeting as a Macedonian 
attempt to ensure Bulgaria's support in the since-postponed 
December 2009 accession date talks.  In the course of the 
meeting, Borissov handed over a four-page "Agreement for 
Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations" which he proposed 
the two countries sign.  The text, an update to a 1999 
bilateral agreement, was first submitted to Macedonia in 
December 2008.  This updated agreement covers the same ground 
as its predecessor, but also addresses more recent Bulgarian 
concerns, including the use of anti-Bulgarian "hate speech" 
in state-controlled and -influenced media and neglected 
Bulgarian military monuments and graveyards in Macedonia. 
 
¶3.  (C) Our MFA and Council of Ministers contacts tell us 
Bulgaria will support Macedonia's accession to the EU and 
NATO, including the securing of a date for opening EU 
accession talks, even if Skopje does not sign the new 
agreement (and it was prepared to make good on this promise 
at the December Foreign Affairs Committee meeting.)   Still, 
our contacts say they see the signing as an indication of 
good faith that Macedonia is willing to work on issues of 
increasing concern to Bulgaria.  The Prime Minister's foreign 
policy adviser told us that the signing of the document would 
"guarantee unconditional Bulgarian support" for Macedonia's 
integration into the key euro-atlantic institutions.  Without 
signature, he said Bulgaria would not block Macedonia's EU 
bid, but many top government officials are clearly frustrated 
with what they see as the Macedonian government's lack of 
sensitivity to Bulgaria's concerns while seemingly taking 
Bulgarian support for granted. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Our contacts deny Bulgaria has changed its stance on 
Macedonia, saying what we are seeing is not a change in 
policy, but rather a "re-articulation" of old policy. 
Regional security is still Bulgaria's focus, and Sofia agrees 
that this can best be secured through Macedonia's EU and NATO 
accession.  But the new government is much less willing than 
the last to accept what it perceives as Macedonian slights. 
There are also internal political gains to be made by 
recalibrating Macedonia policy.  By demanding signature of 
the resurrected 2008 document, the PM appeases (and out 
flanks) nationalist party ATAKA, on which his minority 
government depends in Parliament.  We do not think Bulgaria 
will become a new obstacle to Macedonian integration on the 
order of Greece (at least not at this point), but Sofia's new 
demands and willingness to raise its concerns in EU forums 
could provide support and backing to other member states less 
supportive of Macedonian integration. 
 
 
SUTTON