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Viewing cable 09SOFIA703, DAS QUANRUD'S DECEMBER 11 VISIT TO SOFIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SOFIA703 2009-12-15 09:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Sofia
VZCZCXRO6209
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0703/01 3490937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150937Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6536
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/3/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG ECON BU
SUBJECT: DAS QUANRUD'S DECEMBER 11 VISIT TO SOFIA 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Susan Sutton for reasons 1.4 (b) and(d 
) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  In December 11 meetings with DAS Quanrud, 
Bulgarian Defense Minister Mladenov described his plans for 
new deployments to Afghanistan and asked for U.S. support to 
establish a NATO training hub, possibly for OMLTs, at our 
joint military facilities in Bulgaria.  Noting Bulgaria's 
tight budgets, he urged the U.S. and NATO to find ways to 
partner wealthy countries that were unwilling to fight with 
poorer allies that had political will but fewer resources. 
Both Mladenov and Deputy Foreign Minister Lyutskanov 
emphasized the importance of close coordination on 
Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and the Western Balkans and offered 
Bulgarian assistance wherever it is needed.  DPM and MoI 
Tsvetanov noted the progress his government has made in 
fighting corruption, including dozens of indictments against 
current and former public officials and reform of the 
Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Agency. 
He emphasized the importance he places on U.S. political 
support and close law enforcement cooperation, including 
exchange programs and technical assistance.  Lyutskanov and 
the Deputy Minister of Economy and Energy stressed the 
pressure Bulgaria was under to continue participation in 
Russian-dominated energy projects.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Afghanistan 
------------- 
 
2.  (C)  DEFMIN Mladenov said Bulgaria welcomed President 
Obama's Afghanistan speech and said three areas were 
particularly important going forward: protecting the Afghan 
civilian population, greater engagement at the regional 
level, and a strengthened civilian development and 
reconstruction effort.  Like others in the alliance, Bulgaria 
worries that Karzai will not act responsibly, particularly in 
his handling of the regional governments.  Mladenov also 
suggested that NATO discuss which scenarios for Taliban 
reconciliation would be acceptable.  Both Mladenov and DFM 
Lyutskanov agreed on the importance of steady public outreach 
and said NATO should step up its public diplomacy efforts, 
including programs to send journalists to Afghanistan and 
Brussels. 
 
3.  (C)  Noting that Bulgarian forces do not operate under 
any national caveats, Mladenov said Bulgaria would increase 
its 470-person contingent in Afghanistan and eventually 
consolidate it in the Kandahar area.  Details will hopefully 
be complete by January, but he'd like to send an additional 
20 soldiers in January and another 70 to 80 later in 2010. 
He noted that Bulgaria is also prepared to send a second 
Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) whenever an 
appropriate Afghan National Army partner unit is identified. 
In addition, Bulgaria has the personnel and equipment 
necessary to deploy a Role Two Military Medical facility, but 
it does not have sufficient funds for transport and 
sustainment in the field.  Mladenov said he wrote to the U.S. 
Defense Department to see if it is possible to embed this 
medical facility into a U.S. contingent. 
 
4.  (C)  Mladenov said Bulgaria wants to play a positive role 
in Afghanistan beyond military assistance.  On December 10, 
Bulgaria announced it would contribute five police trainers 
to the EU police mission in Afghanistan.  Once the NATO 
Training Mission -- Afghanistan (NTM-A) is fully operational, 
he said Bulgaria would participate in this as well.  Bulgaria 
also plans to invite Afghan military personnel to participate 
in Bulgarian military education and training programs. 
 
5.  (C)  Addressing the broader picture of NATO force 
generation for Afghanistan, Mladenov suggested that the 
Alliance find better ways to match up wealthy countries that 
are unwilling to fight with poorer countries with greater 
political will but fewer resources.  He said a UK/French 
initiative to refurbish helicopters provided some precedent 
for this and urged the allies to find other creative 
approaches.  He said Bulgaria has spoken with other allies 
and some, like the UK, were very supportive. 
 
Using U.S.-Bulgaria Bases to Support Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6.  (C)  The Defense Minister acknowledged the bruising 
budget battles currently waging inside the Bulgarian 
government and said that money would continue to be the 
biggest obstacle to additional deployments. Nevertheless, he 
said he would work to find other, creative ways to contribute 
to the fight.  He said the joint military facilities in 
Bulgaria were a underutilized resource, and he hopes they 
 
SOFIA 00000703  002 OF 003 
 
 
could become a hub for NATO training, perhaps for OMLTs.  He 
has discussed this idea with U/SD Flournoy and with SACEUR 
and said both responded positively.  He hoped that DAS 
Quanrud would also raise this issue in Washington to help 
gain traction. 
 
Establishing a Regular Security Dialogue 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (C)  Mladenov said the U.S.-Bulgaria security 
relationship could be made stronger through more regular 
consultations at a more senior level.  Complex issues such as 
expanding the use of our joint facilities, joint deployments 
in Afghanistan, acquisition of U.S. aircraft, and missile 
defense cooperation could be analyzed and decided more 
efficiently with an annual meeting.  He requested DAS Quanrud 
explore with OSD such consultations. 
 
Iran 
------- 
 
8.  (C)  Deputy Foreign Minister Lyutskanov noted Bulgaria 
supported the last round of sanctions against Iran, and would 
continue to continue to support a hard line.  He wondered 
whether the U.S. and Europe should more openly and vigorously 
support the opposition in Iran, though he acknowledged that 
the appearance of outside support could hurt the opposition 
and leave us open to accusations of meddling. 
 
Russia 
-------- 
 
9.  (C)  Lyutskanov described the Bulgarian attitude to 
Russia as a "love-hate" relationship.  In his view, Russia is 
operating under a great deal of fear, as its internal 
situation is highly unstable.  Russian leaders, he commented, 
still feel they must posture as if they were "Peter the Great 
or Stalin," and have made mistakes in Eastern Europe by being 
too forceful in dealing with their former satellites.  He 
agreed that more confidence building measures are needed and 
argued that despite "irresponsible policies" by Moscow, a 
soft, measured approach will accomplish more than a hard 
line.  He said it is important to get the NATO-Russia 
dialogue back on track and added that a new NATO-China 
dialogue would be valuable as well. 
 
10.  (C)  Mladenov emphasized that Europe should reject any 
Russian security proposal that would lessen the role of NATO, 
EU, OSCE or CFE structures.  He noted, however, that from a 
Russian perspective, the allies' annual expenditure of money, 
time and resources on NATO Reaction Force rotations must seem 
provocative when the alliance claims that Afghanistan is 
NATO's main threat and not Russia. 
 
The Balkans 
---------- 
 
11.  (C)  Lyutskanov said it was important for Europe and 
America to continue to engage the Western Balkan countries. 
He shared our disappointment over Bosnia's inability to make 
the political progress necessary to qualify for MAP, but 
noted that Bulgaria still supports eventual EU and NATO 
membership for all of the Western Balkans.  On a positive 
note, he emphasized that the decision to allow visa-free 
travel to the EU for the countries of former Yugoslavia was a 
positive development as it gave these countries a window into 
Europe and offered them an attractive alternative to 
isolation and "refighting old wars".  If the U.S. has 
specific ideas for how Bulgaria could further assist the 
integration of the Western Balkans, he said his Ministry 
would be happy to help. 
 
Visa Waiver Program 
--------------------- 
 
12.  (C)  Lyutskanov stressed the importance of the visa 
waiver program to Bulgaria.  As a strategic partner who 
cooperates with the United States in all areas of foreign 
policy and defense, it is painful for Bulgarians to remain 
outside the VWP. 
 
Rule of law 
-------------- 
 
13.  (C)  DPM and MoI Tsvetanov stressed the progress his 
ministry has made in the fight against organized crime (OC) 
and corruption and the importance of close cooperation with 
the United States.  He noted that GERB's goal was the 
establishment of an interagency approach to fighting 
 
SOFIA 00000703  003 OF 003 
 
 
organized crime and corruption and was working closely with 
the State Security Agency, the Minister of Justice and the 
Prosecutor General to accomplish this.  Since taking power in 
July, the new government has achieved success in pursuing 
high-level corruption cases and passing needed reforms.  When 
asked about "next steps," he said that reform of the criminal 
code and criminal procedure code was a top priority as well 
as formation of specialized court panels to hear 
OC/corruption cases.  He acknowledged that broader judicial 
reform was also necessary, but said his preference was to 
allow the judiciary to work this problem internally in order 
to avoid the appearance of interfering with the independence 
of the judicial branch.  He noted the high impact of U.S. law 
enforcement assistance and said that nearly all of his 
regional police chiefs had received U.S. training.  U.S. 
equipment and resources are also of great assistance in 
Bulgaria's efforts to fight highly sophisticated organized 
crime groups.  He suggested that U.S.-based training for a 
top cadre of Bulgaria's best judges could be highly 
beneficial. 
 
14.  (C)  In a meeting with representatives of leading 
Bulgarian NGOs, rule of law experts agreed that the new GERB 
government has the political will to fight corruption, though 
some worry that incompetence, apathy and corruption 
throughout the staffs of the ministries would make reform 
difficult despite the best intentions of a few at the top. 
But all agreed that the government was off to a good start 
and deserved support.  Representatives of UNODC and the EC 
emphasized that the international community would like to see 
more successful prosecutions in organized crime and 
corruption cases. 
 
15.  (C)  All agreed that reform of the criminal code and the 
criminal procedure code is sorely needed, and that corruption 
among prosecutors and judges remains one of the most serious 
challenges facing Bulgaria.  There was no consensus, however, 
on the best way forward.  Some felt that constitutional 
amedments were necessary to fundamentally reshape the 
judiciary system (such as reform of the Supreme udicial 
Council or moving the Prosecutorial servce into the 
government), while others focused on ways to hold the 
judiciary accountable for its acions. 
 
Energy 
--------- 
16.  (C)  Lyutskanovnoted the intense Russian pressure 
Bulgaria is uder to conclude energy deals.  He agreed that 
Bugarian bargaining power will increase over time, bu given 
Russia's pressure, he said "it is hard fo us to wait."  He 
agreed that transparency shoul be Bulgaria's guiding 
principle in all its negoiations and over time, he believes 
Russia will acept that it is dependent on Bulgaria as a 
marketand will alter its approach. Deputy Minister of 
conomy, Energy and Tourism Ivo Marinov, who had just 
returned from talks with the Russians, said there would be no 
great breakthroughs or surprises emerging from 
Bulgarian-Russian economic talks held in Sofia December 
10-11.  Negotiations on South Stream, the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the Belene nuclear 
power plant would all continue.  At the same time, Bulgaria 
would continue to support Nabucco and seek additional 
diversification through interconnector projects, LNG and CNG, 
and nuclear fuel alternatives. 
 
GUANTANAMO 
---------- 
 
17.  (C) In a dinner with DAS Quanrud, Parliamentarians 
focused on whether Bulgaria should accept a Guantanamo 
detainee.  They noted that an internal memo from the Prime 
Minister and a letter from SPE Fried had been leaked and 
circulated within Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Defense 
Committee earlier in the day.  Those present supported taking 
a detainee, and agreed that humanitarian and EU-solidarity 
arguments would best pursuade the Bulgarian public o support 
such a decision.  They noted that the Foreign Affairs 
Committee would discuss the issue with DPM Tsvetanov December 
15. 
DAS Quanrud has reviewed this message. 
SUTTON