VZCZCXRO5057
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0601/01 3480911
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140911Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8750
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0579
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000601 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019 
TAGS: PGOV XG ZL MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: GOVERNMENT USES STATE ORGANS TO ENFORCE 
LOYALTY AND SILENCE DISSENT 
 
REF: SKOPJE 522 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Over the past month, it appears that Prime 
Minister Gruevski and his VMRO inner circle have used the 
judicial and policing arms of the state to enforce party 
discipline and quell dissent, which has contributed to an 
increasing climate of fear. The government has been using a 
catch-all corruption charge of "abuse of office" or "misuse 
of official position" against members of the political elite 
in Macedonia. Highly publicized arrests, detentions or 
investigations of current and former ministers, party 
members, and the opposition have put pressure on the 
political elite in Macedonia to refrain from challenging or 
criticizing the Gruevski government. We have also heard 
complaints from non-governmental organizations whose members 
have been called in by the police for "informative talks" on 
their actions. Moreover, these tactics can be sold to the 
Macedonian public as the government's valiant efforts against 
corruption, which helps maintain public support for these 
abusive actions. 
 
Friends Become Enemies of the State: Trenkoski and Besimi 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) One recent high profile arrest was of Georgi 
Trenkoski, former manager of the Macedonian Health Fund and 
ruling VMRO-DPMNE party member. Trenkoski had the reputation 
for being one of the cleanest bureaucrats in the Macedonian 
Government and was given a "gold star" award for excellent 
management in 2007. In July, he resigned from his position on 
principle, disagreeing with Gruevski,s current policies. He 
is also an alumnus of the U.S. State Department's Ron Brown 
Fellowship Program and has close ties to the international 
community. On 3 November, he was publicly arrested on charges 
of "misuse of official position" and accused of authorizing 
the payment of a pharmaceutical company twice for the same 
shipment. Trenkoski told the Ambassador before his arrest 
that he had been threatened with legal action by the PM,s 
Chief of Staff Martin Protoger. Protoger hotly denied this to 
us. The arrest occurred on the street with press 
"conveniently" nearby--it was evident that select "government 
friendly" media were tipped off ahead of the arrest. The 
papers condemned Trenkoski as corrupt and ran with the story 
immediately after he was picked up by police. 
 
¶3. (C) In a 10 November meeting with the Ambassador, fellow 
Ron Brown alumni and close associates of Trenkoski informed 
the Ambassador that the entire event was politically 
motivated and engineered by the Prime Minister for the sake 
of punishing Trenkoski for speaking out of turn even though 
he did so privately. They firmly believed that Trenkoski was 
innocent and that the charges were meant as a message, not 
only to him, but to others who might consider crossing the 
party. They claimed Gruevski was making an example out of 
Trenkoski and that he was using his political power over the 
judiciary to bring &trumped up8 charges against political 
enemies. 
 
¶4. (C) Another notable case is the recent allegation against 
Minister of Economy Fatmir Besimi for the previous 
government's decision to sell shares of Skopje,s 
publicly-owned transport company. (Besimi held the same 
position in the 2002-2006 SDSM-DUI government.) A preliminary 
investigation into the legality of the sale was opened in 
2007, but did not lead to any arrests or charges. Allegations 
in the case resurfaced 7-8 November against Besimi (and 
former SDSM Finance Minister Popovski), almost four years 
after the event in question. Both Besimi and especially 
Popovski enjoy reputations as clean politicians, a relative 
rarity here. In a 12 November meeting, Besimi told us that he 
sees clear political motives for this case, mainly to ruin 
his reputation, to reduce his effectiveness in seeking reform 
in the energy sector, and perhaps to pressure DUI leader Ali 
Ahmeti to fire him or force his resignation. He is determined 
not to resign, but if indeed criminal charges are brought 
against him, he feels he would have to do so as he could not 
carry out his duties effectively. Besimi told the Ambassador 
on 23 November that he thought the current threat had passed, 
but he noted that government investigators are always 
snooping around his ministry and collecting data that VMRO 
can use against him. Popovski was questioned for hours by a 
plain clothes police officers, but no charges have been 
levied as of 25 November. 
 
Pre Trial Detention: A Method to Create Fear and Ruin  
 
Reputations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Macedonian law allows for people accused of a crime to 
spend time in pre-trial detention (or jail) for a minimum of 
30 days, with a possible extension to 180 days if a council 
of three judges orders a 60-day extension for further 
investigation and a superior court offers an additional 
90-day extension, allowed only in cases for which the crime 
under investigation is subject to a sentencing guideline of 
at least 5 years. The detention period gives the 
investigative judge time to interview witnesses without 
interference by the defendant, but it also can be ordered if 
the judge feels the defendant might flee or might commit the 
same or another crime. In some cases, the judge will "amend" 
the charges to allow for more time behind bars. Pre-trial 
detention is an effective tool for a government that wants to 
create a climate of fear because not only does it lock 
someone in jail for at least 30 days, it also does 
irreparable damage to their public and professional 
reputation. The accused's reputation often does not recover, 
even if they are eventually acquitted of the charges. 
 
¶6. (C) When on November 10 Trenkoski appeared to face a more 
serious charge and the likelihood of additional weeks of jail 
time, his lawyers applied for bail to release him. (Court 
sources and other contacts informed us that, although all the 
witnesses had been interviewed, the judge was considering 
additional, more serious charges and ordering expert 
testimony that would have kept Trenkoski in jail for an 
additional undefined amount of time.) After a text message 
from the U.S. Embassy to the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff 
Protoger, and a follow-up phone conversation, Trenkoski was 
released on 11 November. Most likely he will eventually have 
to stand trial for the charges. Even if he is acquitted of 
all charges, the damage to his reputation has already been 
done. 
 
Let's Not Forget the Opposition 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In addition to enforcing discipline in the party and 
governing coalition, Gruevski also uses his control over the 
judicial and policing functions of the state to attempt to 
silence the opposition. The arrest and detention in August 
2008 of SDSM Vice-President and Strumica mayor Zoran Zaev, 
was an early indicator of the government's tactics. Although 
Zaev won reelection in March 2009, in the last two weeks, he 
is one of five members of the opposition SDSM party that have 
been charged with this same &abuse of office/misuse of 
official position charges8 for corruption. On 4 November, 
the government floated allegations in the press that former 
President and current SDSM leader Branko Crvenkovski and his 
cabinet used thousands of denar of state money for personal 
use during his time as president. The SDSM spokesperson 
publicly accused the government of using the judiciary to 
attack its political opposition and create a psychological 
climate of fear among the public against questioning or 
criticizing the government. 
 
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
 
¶9. (SBU) Two SDSM youth members were questioned for several 
hours by police on 21 November for distributing leaflets 
about a local the poor government practices of a local mayor. 
The party members told the press that the incident was 
intimidation and an attempt by the government to silence the 
opposition. The police claim that the mayor filed a complaint 
against the two youth, and they were obliged to investigate 
the complaint, but admitted to the press that the youth did 
nothing illegal. 
 
¶9. (C) Slajana Taseva, head of the Macedonian NGO  
Transparency Zero Corruption, has complained to European 
diplomats and in the media that recently she has been 
harassed by police, being called into their headquarters at 
night for lengthy "informative talks" on her behavior and 
criticism of the government. Although she has not been 
formally charged or under arrest, she received an official 
summons from the police. When she arrived at the police 
station with her attorney, she was given "friendly advice" 
about her work on anticorruption. Other NGOs have made 
similar claims. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The political influence of Gruevski on the judicial 
and policing arms of the government is no secret. This latest 
spate of public arrests, accusations, and indictments shows a 
definite spike in such interference and manipulation. We have 
received an increasing number of complaints about late night 
"informative talks" with the police and threats from the 
government about possible "corruption charges" that may be 
investigated should people chose to defy the government or 
speak out. Meanwhile, there is no action against Gruevski's 
insiders widely reputed to be corrupt, such as intelligence 
director Sasho Majalkov (also Gruevski's cousin) and Minister 
or Transport and Communications Mile Janakieski. It is 
possible that Gruevski is lashing out as he feels especially 
vulnerable now. International and domestic pressures are 
building to solve the "name issue" with Greece or face the 
prospect of not being able to commence EU membership 
negotiations, despite receiving a favorable report from the 
EU commission (see REFTEL). These cases distract public 
attention away from the name issue and give Gruevski an 
enhanced sense of control. We will continue to use our 
influence judiciously to counteract this tendency, in 
specific cases when warranted. More broadly, we and the other 
international actors here keep pressing for practical 
measures to increase judicial independence, police and 
prosecutorial professionalism, and promote rule of law. 
REEKER