VZCZCXYZ0019
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0977/01 3491647
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151647Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0944
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0006
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0980

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000977 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA, IO/UNP, NEA/MAG, AND DRL/NESCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREF PREL UN MO WI
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: SAHRAWI ACTIVISTS CONCERNED ABOUT 
AMINATOU HAIDAR AND INCREASED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
REF: A. RABAT 0908 
     ¶B. RABAT 0915 
     ¶C. RABAT 0935 
     ¶D. RABAT 0941 
     ¶E. RABAT 0849 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In the wake of King Mohammed VI's stern 
November 6 speech, Sahrawi pro-independence and human rights 
activists report a tangible uptick in police harassment and 
decreased tolerance for freedom of expression in Western 
Sahara.  They have refrained from organizing demonstrations 
or rallies, in effect placing self-restrictions on their own 
freedom of assembly.  Pro-independence Sahrawi civil society 
had greeted the appointment of Christopher Ross as the UNSG's 
Personal Representative with optimism.  However, the mood has 
now changed to bitter disappointment, with the Aminatou 
Haidar case and the GOM's reaction to it appearing to have 
scuttled any chance for near- or medium-term resumption of 
the UN process.  Civil society activists also warn that if 
Haidar were to die or become otherwise incapacitated, massive 
Sahrawi demonstrations would spontaneously erupt -- and would 
likely prompt a violent GOM response.  Our contacts also 
provided an update on the seven Sahrawi activists whom the 
GOM arrested in October and who are now awaiting trial before 
a military tribunal.  While the specific details of the 
Haidar case remain murky, we find our Sahrawi contacts' human 
rights concerns -- and their fears of what might happen if 
Haidar dies -- to be credible and worrisome.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) PolCouns and PolOff traveled to Laayoune, Western 
Sahara, and met with pro-independence Sahrawi activists and 
human rights NGOs on December 8.  Vice Chairman Brahim 
Elansari represented the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights 
Defenders (CODESA), in the absence of CODESA Chairwoman 
Aminatou Haidar, who remains in the Canary Islands (reftels). 
 Djimi Elghalia, Vice-Chairwoman of the Sahrawi Association 
of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations (ASVDH), hosted 
the meeting at her home.  Also present were ASVDH Chairman 
Mustapha Dah, Mohamed Mayara, Dahha Rahmooni, Fadel Hairach, 
Bachir Lahkfanoui, and Saltana Khaya, most of whom are 
members of both ASVDH and CODESA. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
The Negative Impact of the King's Speech 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Our interlocutors were unanimous in emphasizing that 
King Mohammed VI's November 6 speech (on the anniversary of 
the Green March -- Ref A) had tangibly damaged both the human 
rights environment in Western Sahara and the prospects for 
resuming UN-led negotiations.  According to Elansari, 
Sahrawis greeted the naming of UN Personal Envoy for the 
Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, with optimism.  However, 
the king's speech -- in which he rejected a referendum to 
allow Sahrawis to decide their own future and divided them 
into "patriots" or "traitors" -- obstructed any positive 
momentum.  Elansari further interpreted the king's speech to 
be an acknowledgment that the GOM's much-touted autonomy plan 
was a failure, in that -- contrary to their repeated claims 
-- it did not correspond to their desires for and vision of 
self-determination.  Other interlocutors agreed, adding that 
the king's November speech gave further proof that the GOM 
was not really interested in resolving the Sahara question 
through the UN process.  In one way, said Mayara, the king's 
harsh rhetoric -- including his "racist" labeling of Sahrawis 
as either patriots or traitors -- was welcome, in that it 
demonstrated to the world the GOM's preference for the status 
quo -- and its willingness to resort to repression in Western 
Sahara to maintain it. 
 
------------------------- 
Human Rights Implications 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In addition to putting a chill on efforts to resolve 
the Western Sahara standoff on the international level, 
CODESA and ASVDH members stated that the king's speech had 
also prompted a measurable uptick in repressive police 
behavior towards independence activists.  In the eyes of 
Sahara-based security forces, the king's speech legitimized 
increased suppression of Sahrawi activities and emboldened 
local authorities to further repress freedom of speech and 
assembly, Dah and Elghalia said.  For example, they described 
a recent event in which plain-clothed and uniformed police 
came to Elghalia's home -- the very place we were sitting -- 
to break up a meeting between ASVDH members and Spanish 
 
journalists, who had also sought to meet with Haidar's 
children.  In an unrelated incident, other journalists had 
received approval for a meeting with CODESA from one 
government entity, but police prevented the meeting, saying 
that they now needed approval from additional local 
authorities.  Elansari conceded that, technically, foreign 
journalists are required to receive approval from three 
different Ministry of Interior (MOI) and/or local government 
offices before meeting with pro-independence NGOs -- a 
requirement he described as an abuse in and of itself. 
However, prior to the king's Green March speech, police often 
looked the other way if journalists had obtained at least one 
authorization.  Now, suddenly, the restrictions were being 
enforced to the letter, our contacts said.  They added that 
in at least one of these cases foreign journalists were 
ultimately expelled from Morocco, but they did not provide 
further details. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Our contacts also lamented an increased disregard 
for freedom of assembly.  Ever since a violent GOM crackdown 
on a demonstration to mark International Human Rights day in 
2006, Sahrawi activists had held no significant sit-ins or 
other such public gatherings, Elansari said.  Until recently, 
he continued, this unofficial "self-imposed limitation" was 
not based on a fear of GOM reprisal, but rather the result of 
Sahrawis' simply having resigned themselves to fact that 
local authorities never granted them the necessary legal 
permits to hold public events.  However, again in the wake of 
the king's speech, there had been a change.  For example, 
Elansari and Elghalia reported, when Haidar's family and 
various ASVDH and CODESA members gathered at the airport to 
welcome her home in November, police met them at the airport 
and demanded that they return home under threat of force or 
arrest.  Later, when the Spanish government attempted 
unsuccessfully to send Haidar back to Laayoune aboard a 
charter flight on December 4, at least one activist received 
a threatening phone call from police, again warning him not 
to organize any sort of gathering at the airport. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Aminatou Haidar: A Worse-Case Scenario 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Turning more specifically to the case of Aminatou 
Haidar, Elghalia and others expressed grave concerns about 
her health and disputed the official version of events we 
have repeatedly heard from GOM sources (Refs B-D).  CODESA 
members insisted that Haidar did not renounce her passport, 
and offered evidence to suggest that the authorities had 
decided to expel her even before her plane landed. 
 
¶7.  (C) Unlike our GOM contacts, however, the Sahrawi 
activists were less concerned about the technical and legal 
aspects of the case and far more worried about the 
"devastating" developments they believe would follow if 
Haidar's hunger strike actually resulted in her dying or 
becoming seriously incapacitated.  In such an event, they 
warned, thousands of Sahrawi activists would take to the 
streets in spontaneous demonstrations that could involve 
violence.  Dah and Mayara noted that there existed a great 
mass of Sahrawis who were not politically active and were 
generally apathetic regarding the question of whether the 
territory remained under Moroccan administration or became 
independent.  However, many of these same people view Haidar 
as a human rights defender and a leader among the Sahrawi 
tribes, they said, and their response to her passing would be 
significant.  They also predicted that the GOM's response to 
any spontaneous outbursts would be firm, rapid and even more 
violent. 
 
¶8.  (C) Outside of Moroccan-administered territory, Dah 
continued, the Sahrawi response would be equally dramatic, 
and her death would place significant pressure on the 
Polisario to respond.  In a best case scenario, he warned, 
this would involve the Polisario rejecting the UN process for 
an indeterminate period of time.  At the worst, it could lead 
to Polisario acts of war or other violence.  While they 
hesitated to otherwise predict events, all our interlocutors 
all agreed that Haidar's public comments -- in which she has 
stated that she planned on returning to Western Sahara "with 
or without passport, dead or alive" -- should not be taken 
lightly. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Update on the Seven Arrested Sahrawis 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) ASVDH and CODESA representatives also provided us 
 
an update on the seven pro-independence Sahrawi activists 
arrested in October and charged with "intelligence 
cooperation with a foreign entity" (Ref E).  While they did 
not accuse the GOM of committing gross human rights 
violations against the seven, ASVDH and CODESA members held 
that the case illustrated the GOM's newly restrictive and 
intolerant attitude toward pro-independence activities.  They 
also offered some disturbing evidence to suggest that while 
the GOM's treatment of the seven might be in keeping with the 
letter of international human rights laws and standards, it 
was not in keeping with the spirit.  For example, while the 
GOM has permitted all seven detainees family visits (as 
required by Moroccan law), our contacts said that authorities 
are permitting only one 15-minute visit per week -- something 
not easily achieved for families in Laayoune who live 1,200 
kilometers from the Sale prison, where the seven are 
currently being held.  Moreover, these visits are tightly 
controlled, Elghalia said, and the prisoners were never are 
allowed to talk privately to family members.  Worse, the 
seven have had access to a lawyer, but only once since their 
arrests.  In addition, Elghalia expressed particular concern 
for Idagja Lachgar, the only female amongst the seven 
arrested.  Her family had reported that she was being held in 
solitary confinement and was not reacting well to the 
isolation. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) CODESA and ASVDH have a stated pro-independence 
agenda and -- like our GOM contacts -- a clear political bias 
that colors their interpretations of the Aminatou Haidar 
case.  Nevertheless, we find their wider allegations 
regarding an uptick in repressive police response and the 
curtailment of freedom of assembly to be credible and 
sincere.  Likewise, if the worst were to happen and Haidar 
were to pass away, we do not doubt the likelihood of our 
contacts' dire predictions regarding potential outbursts of 
Sahrawi violence -- and an even more violent GOM response. 
We will continue to urge restraint on all sides, but if the 
GOM does not find a way to resolve the Haidar's case 
peacefully and soon, our urgings could be in vain.  End 
Comment. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
KAPLAN